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“NaƟ onal and InternaƟ onal Security in Contemporary Changing Reality” is a com-
pelling, must-read work for those who study and try to gain a beƩ er understand-
ing of today’s naƟ onal and internaƟ onal security environment. 
A collecƟ on of diverse views of Polish and internaƟ onal authors on military, se-
curity, internaƟ onal relaƟ ons, new forms of warfare such as cyber-terrorism and 
challenges they bring about allows the reader not only to see the whole complex-
ity and interdependencies of the current security network, but creates a solid 
foundaƟ on for any further studies, especially for those readers who wish to ob-
tain a beƩ er understanding of the Polish and other former Warsaw Pact coun-
tries’ perspecƟ ve on the current and future role of internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons 
such as NATO and the EU. 
While discussing security and defense from many diﬀ erent angles, authors – 
whose backgrounds are diverse and who jointly represent a vast and profound 
experience in defense-related maƩ ers – invite the reader to embark on a fasci-
naƟ ng journey through the modern world of mulƟ faceted security relaƟ ons, links 
among someƟ me remote areas of defence-related studies, and challenges that 
not only NATO and its members but all the naƟ ons of the modern world must 
face and live up to.
I found it very rewarding and at the same Ɵ me refreshing to read arƟ cles by so 
many respected luminaries of internaƟ onal security science.
To have the views of them in one volume is simply a treat for any and every-
one who – like myself – endeavours to see and understand the global picture to 
a maximum possible extent.
The opportunity to learn the views and observaƟ ons of people of such diﬀ erent 
background and experience, represenƟ ng both military and civilian academia, 
administraƟ on and chain of command is indeed rare and worth careful study.
It greatly broadened my horizons, corrected or improved my understanding and 
I can with all honesty recommend it to all scholars and general readers who are 
interested in understanding the security environment of today.

Foreword
NaƟ onal and internaƟ onal security consƟ tutes one of the principal domains 
of the undertakings involved as part of the research on educaƟ onal condiƟ ons 
and specialƟ es available in the Department of Security Studies at Andrzej Frycz 
Modrzewski Krakow University. This issue is also extremely important in the fi eld 
of internaƟ onal relaƟ ons exisƟ ng in the contemporary world. The essence and 
character of security, both in the naƟ onal and internaƟ onal dimension are being 
refl ected in all funcƟ onal aspects of contemporary society. It not only refers to 
military security, but also to security in various spheres of economic, social, cul-
tural, poliƟ cal and ecological life. As regards the current globalizaƟ on processes, 
security applies to any area of the globe, equally to each and every human being 
and to enƟ re naƟ ons. The issue of safety is inseparably connected with threats 
and related challenges conƟ nually emerging in the reality around us. Such threats 
arise in specifi c geographical locaƟ ons and can exhibit diversifi ed dimensions. 
They can exert considerable impact on the sustainable development of countries, 
regions and areas. Ensuring a set of forward-thinking measures, which would 
lead to increasing security in all senses, will signifi cantly contribute to the proper 
economic development of our country, making the Polish economy more innova-
Ɵ ve and compeƟ Ɵ ve.
This study seeks to familiarize the reader with selected problems of conduct-
ing security-related research. Expanding this domain of knowledge is now of the 
utmost importance. Although security has consƟ tuted the subject maƩ er of sev-
eral publicaƟ ons, there are sƟ ll no concise and well-structured studies concern-
ing this area of human endeavor and acƟ vity, so important to our country.
Security is generally interpreted as the state of non-threat, peace and confi -
dence. As was stated by Józef Kukuła, it is a state of confi dence of the country and 
people’s existence in the subjecƟ ve, objecƟ ve and processual dimension.1 The 
NaƟ onal Security DicƟ onary defi nes it as “the state which gives a sense of confi -
dence, a guarantee of maintaining this state and the opportunity for its enhance-
ment. The situaƟ on in which there is no risk of losing what we cherish most, 
such as health, work, dignity, feelings and property, is one of the principal needs 
of every human being. Among diﬀ erent types of security, the following can be 
disƟ nguished: global, regional and naƟ onal security; military, poliƟ cal and public 
1 J. Kukułka, Narodziny koncepcji bezpieczeństwa (The origins of the security concept) 
[in:] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, teoria i praktyka (InternaƟ onal security – the-
ory and pracƟ ce), ed. K. Żukrowska, M. Grącik, Warsaw 2006, p. 40
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security; physical, psychological and social security; and also structural and per-
sonal security”.2 The diversity of defi niƟ ons causes various enƟ Ɵ es to approach 
the issue of security selecƟ vely. One and the same dicƟ onary proposes a number 
of diﬀ erent defi niƟ ons related to security and defense. Referring to the dicƟ onary 
cited above, the naƟ onal security is “a state ensured through properly-organized 
defense and protecƟ on against external and internal threats, determined as the 
relaƟ onship of the defense potenƟ al to the threats scale”.3 The essence of naƟ on-
al security in the narrow sense concerns the internal state and the internaƟ onal 
situaƟ on of a country, which eﬀ ecƟ vely secure its independence, consistency and 
interests, at the same Ɵ me excluding the real risk of internal destabilizaƟ on and 
external threats. NaƟ onal security in a broader sense is understood as the whole 
set of internal and external condiƟ ons that guarantee the sustainable develop-
ment of society and the protecƟ on of the naƟ onal territory against internal and 
external threats, and that ensure the capability of a country to implement au-
tonomous internal and external policies.
Although the defi niƟ ons of security are varied, it should be noted that the 
safe funcƟ oning of a country, and the safe living condiƟ ons of every family and of 
each human being consƟ tute the supreme value. The security-related need was 
already referred to in the 1930s by Abraham Maslow, the author of the classical 
theory of human needs. Maslow disƟ nguished fi ve levels of needs where fi rst-
level needs must be saƟ sfi ed before the next level could become dominant. Safe-
ty was assigned to the second level, immediately following physiological needs. It 
manifests itself as the need for security, stability, order and care, combined with 
the lack of fear, chaos and threat.
It should be stressed that neither security nor favorable condiƟ ons for the 
development of civilizaƟ on are given once and for all. They require an ongoing 
eﬀ ort to project the emerging challenges and to promptly react to them. The 
21st Century world has turned out more complicated and unforeseeable than it 
seemed at the end of the previous century. Therefore, we have to set new objec-
Ɵ ves on a daily basis, bearing in mind our strategic goals.
This publicaƟ on is devoted to the new trends in research, especially in the 
fi eld of security studies, including naƟ onal and internaƟ onal security, in the 
evolving areas of contemporary reality.
This publicaƟ on is addressed especially to naƟ onal and internal security stu-
dents, to all students undertaking research work in the widely-understood area 
of security, and also to the managerial staﬀ  of various units and insƟ tuƟ ons oper-
aƟ ng within the naƟ onal security and defense system.
The publicaƟ on contains a wide range of topics that are relevant to security, 
and includes the following arƟ cles: Mieczysław Bieniek – Global Common–Execu-
Ɵ ve Summary, Bryk Andrzej – American Military Strategy and the Economic Crisis, 
2 Słownik Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego (NaƟ onal Security DicƟ onary), Warsaw 2002, 
p. 13
3 Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego (DicƟ onary of naƟ onal secu-
rity terms), Warsaw 2002, p. 15
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Piotr Patalong – FighƟ ng the illicit trade and traﬃ  cking of small arms and light 
weapons – a world priority for the 21st century, Janusz Kręcikij – Polish NaƟ onal 
Security And The New NATO Strategic Concept – Progress or StagnaƟ on?, Erhard 
Cziomer – InternaƟ onal Security Challenges and Diﬃ  culƟ es at the Threshold of 
the Second Decade of the 21st Century from the PerspecƟ ve of Germany, Piotr 
Patalong, Mariusz Skulimowski – Experience and conclusions regarding the func-
Ɵ oning of the Special Forces within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, 
Sławomir Mazur – InternaƟ onal Aspects of CounteracƟ ng Terrorism, Monika Os-
trowska – Cyber-terrorism as the new form of threat in the twenty-fi rst century.
Mieczysław Bieniek
Sławomir M. Mazur

Mieczysław Bieniek
Global Commons 
– Executive Summary
The new Strategic Concept, which Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
presented at the Lisbon Summit on 19 November 2010, shaped the central fea-
tures of the security environment for a decade to come. Part of the concept em-
phasized the importance of assured access to the Global Commons, not only for 
NATO, but for the security and prosperity of partners, allies, and the world.
In October 2010, ACT directed a study of the Global Commons that would 
idenƟ fy the challenges and vulnerabiliƟ es that aﬀ ect assured access to and tran-
sit through the Commons for NATO. The goal of the study is to provide guidance 
and recommendaƟ ons for appropriate policy and planning in the immediate and 
near terms. This interim report serves as an outline for the more detailed fi nal 
report, which will be presented by SACT to the North AtlanƟ c Council and Military 
CommiƩ ee in early 2011.
To meet this mandate, a series of six workshops were held, both internally 
and externally to the Alliance. Building on the successful example of the MulƟ ple 
Futures Project, the conduct of and output from these workshops was based on 
open dialogue, and facilitated discussion among Alliance members, partners, and 
interested naƟ ons on what they deemed the most important issues regarding the 
Global Commons. 
Each workshop was organized around a theme, e.g., trans-AtlanƟ c relaƟ ons 
and views and perspecƟ ves from outside the Alliance, and each of the four do-
mains: air, space, cyber and mariƟ me. Analysts from ACT’s Think Tank group 
(TTG) presented each assembly with a tailored read-ahead outlining the aim of 
the workshop, along with quesƟ ons of interest that were designed to enhance 
understanding and elicit individual percepƟ ons regarding the importance of the 
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Commons in a globalized world. Lastly, the workshops asked parƟ cipants wheth-
er they saw a role for of NATO, and if so, what that role might be.
In addiƟ on to the free-fl owing discussions that took place, the TTG designed 
a survey for parƟ cipants and subject maƩ er experts, which asked them to rank 
their concerns regarding many aspects of the Commons. These ranged from 
where further study might best focus, to the appropriate role for NATO in specifi c 
acƟ viƟ es such as counter-piracy and non-proliferaƟ on. Over Ɵ me, several com-
mon threads emerged which form part of the early analysis and draŌ  conclusions 
of this report.
To be sure, the ideas presented here are clearly understood, and can become 
the basis of a common dialogue within the Alliance, this report begins by defi ning 
the four domains that make up the Global Commons, itself a maƩ er of conƟ nuing 
debate among naƟ ons. It goes on to describe NATO’s interests in the Commons, 
and outlines some of the known and evolving threats to those interests in each 
domain. The report then presents a case for why this is an appropriate and criƟ -
cal area of concern for NATO, and makes several draŌ  recommendaƟ ons for both 
immediate and more long-term acƟ ons the Alliance might undertake to secure 
the interests of its members and partners in assuring access to the Global Com-
mons. These recommendaƟ ons, based on the feedback received from naƟ ons 
and research conducted in the course of the past six months, are grounded in 
the hard contemporary reality of uncertainty, rapid change, and budget constric-
Ɵ ons. Equally important, however, is the message that the member naƟ ons of 
the Alliance can and must take posiƟ ve steps now, if we are to assure access to 
and security in the Global Commons.
I. The Global Commons in an uncertain world
Discussions of the Commons, what they encompass, and who controls them are 
not new. In the past, scholars defi ned the Commons as AntarcƟ ca, the high seas, 
the atmosphere, and space.1 In this report, the concept is modifi ed to encompass 
the four domains of air, space, mariƟ me, and cyberspace.2 InternaƟ onal prosper-
ity, peace, and security rely upon the fl ow of goods, services, and informaƟ on 
through these four domains, collecƟ vely known as the Global Commons.3 As-
sured access to the Commons therefore is essenƟ al to the modern globalized 
system. Access, as conceived here, however, is not only, or even primarily, about 
1 Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An IntroducƟ on (Island Press, Washington DC, 
1998).
2 Ungoverned, or minimally governed, terrestrial spaces, such as many border regions 
of South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, are not Global Commons because they 
are sovereign territory under the jurisdicƟ on and subject to the restricƟ ons of naƟ onal 
governments. AntarcƟ ca is technically a common territory governed by internaƟ onal 
treaty, but is not within the scope of NATO’s interests.
3 Dick Bedford and Paul Giarra, RUSI Journal, Vol. 155 no. 5 (October/November 2010): 
18–23.
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the movement of military forces or control of the four domains in what some 
strategists call the baƩ le space. Described by some as the connecƟ ve Ɵ ssue of 
internaƟ onal security, these domains together consƟ tute a global public good 
that serves as a crucial enabler of internaƟ onal security and trade. The Commons 
thus may best be understood as a system of systems: none of the funcƟ ons of 
globalizaƟ on as we know it, with its highly eﬃ  cient system of just-in-Ɵ me deliver-
ies of resources, materials, and manufactured goods to and from every country in 
the world, can work without assured access to all four domains.
A large part of NATO’s strength and success as a poliƟ cal-military alliance 
comes from its ability to transit and use the Global Commons in accordance with 
internaƟ onal law, whether to ship troops overseas into theatres of operaƟ on, 
maintain C4ISR4 through the use of advanced informaƟ on technologies in space 
and cyberspace, or control airspace in support of combat and rescue operaƟ ons, 
and, increasingly, disaster relief.
The fundamental and enduring purpose of NATO is to safeguard the freedom 
and security of its members by poliƟ cal and military means. The threats of today 
and tomorrow, clearly described in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, have become 
more diﬀ use, irregular, and unpredictable. As naƟ ons of the Alliance increasingly 
depend on access to the Commons, we also increase our vulnerability to adver-
saries that are always looking to exploit this global asset to their own benefi t, 
deny access, and disrupt the free fl ow of informaƟ on, goods, people, and capi-
tal.
II. The four domains
The domains of air, mariƟ me, space, and cyberspace have many similariƟ es and 
are closely interwoven, yet each has its own disƟ nct properƟ es, and thus should 
be addressed both individually and holisƟ cally. A criƟ cal weakness of the global 
system is that space and cyberspace, the two newest and most ubiquitous do-
mains to be exploited by humans, sƟ ll have few regulaƟ ons. As use has increased 
geometrically, the cost of potenƟ ally disrupƟ ve technology, and barriers to its 
acquisiƟ on, have declined rapidly. This inverse correlaƟ on allows potenƟ al adver-
saries to exploit new vulnerabiliƟ es and deny access to others at ever decreas-
ing cost. The challenge for NATO will be to idenƟ fy its interests in each domain, 
understand the implicaƟ ons and complexity of an increasingly inter-connected 
Commons, grasp the nature of the threats to those interests, and fi nally, in this 
age of austerity, apporƟ on scarce resources as eﬀ ecƟ vely as possible to best pre-
vent adversaries from imposing their will on the Alliance. If there is a “key to 
the Commons,” it lies in applying a comprehensive approach that draws on the 
knowledge and abiliƟ es of all stakeholders to help solve the problems of access, 
use, and security across the four domains.
4 C4ISR: Command, control, communicaƟ ons, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance.
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Mari? me
“The ocean is a mighty harmonist.” 
William Wordsworth
The mariƟ me domain, the oldest and best understood of the Global Commons, 
is considered by many to be the circulatory system of the global supply chain. 
Ninety per cent of all raw commodiƟ es and merchandise travel by sea, with 75% 
transiƟ ng through internaƟ onal chokepoints such as canals or straits. From 1970 
to 2006, the quanƟ ty of goods transported via the oceans of the world increased 
by over 284%. More than 50% of the world’s oil is transported across the mari-
Ɵ me commons; both China and Japan receive 80% of their oil by sea.5
The mariƟ me domain, a major source of food and other important resources, 
as well as the primary enabler of global trade, threatens to become a fl ashpoint 
for future confl ict as increasing demand minimizes the incenƟ ve to cooperate, 
and intensifi es both compeƟ Ɵ on and the impulse to deny access to compeƟ tors. 
MariƟ me animal and plant life are a criƟ cal source of protein, medicines, and 
other common products. New technology allows deep-water drilling for oil, gas, 
and minerals in once remote sea beds. The accelerated melƟ ng of the ArcƟ c ice 
pack is opening large stretches of formerly inaccessible sealanes and ocean fl oor 
to transit and exploitaƟ on, and the ArcƟ c border naƟ ons are already staking com-
peƟ ng claims under the 1982 United NaƟ ons ConvenƟ on on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) to these valuable regions.6
Modern use of the mariƟ me domain depends on secure and unencumbered 
access to space and cyberspace. The transmission of informaƟ on such as orders, 
inventories, and the tracking of assets uƟ lizes a vast network of both interconƟ -
nental undersea cables and space-based satellite links, and is a criƟ cal enabler 
to today’s “just in Ɵ me” business models. Redundancy is unaﬀ ordable, which 
means a disrupƟ on at a criƟ cal node such as a port or GPS constellaƟ on of satel-
lites, whether intenƟ onal or unintenƟ onal, can send damaging ripples through 
the system.
The destrucƟ on of, or denial of access to, any porƟ on of this dense web of 
trade and informaƟ on could be catastrophic. The supply chain that is the heart-
beat of deployed operaƟ ons all over the world is equally globalized, and thus 
equally vulnerable to disrupƟ ons, as China’s recent embargo of essenƟ al min-
eral supplies to Japan over a territorial dispute has illustrated.7 The combinaƟ on 
of convenƟ onal weapons systems and irregular tacƟ cs by state or non-state ac-
tors has given opponents the ability to disrupt the global system of commerce 
5 Frank Hoﬀ man, “The MariƟ me Commons in the Neo-Mahanian Era” in Contested 
Commons: The Future of American Power in a MulƟ polar World, Center for a New 
American Security, January 2010: hƩ p://www.cnas.org/fi les/documents/publica-
Ɵ ons/CNAS%20Contested%20Commons_1.pdf.
6 These naƟ ons, so far, include Russia, the United States, Canada, Norway, and Den-
mark.
7 Keith Bradsher, “AŌ er China’s Rare Earth Embargo, a New Calculus,” New York Times, 
30 October 2010: B1.
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through ever cheaper anƟ -access capabiliƟ es. Russia and Iran, for instance, have 
become global suppliers of anƟ -ship missiles. One enterprising arms manufac-
turer recently commenced markeƟ ng “missiles-in-a-box” – four cruise missiles 
packaged in a normal CONEX shipping container, ready to launch by remote com-
mand. Such a system, according to one report, “gives any merchant vessel the 
capacity to sink an aircraŌ  carrier or like vessel.”8
Denial and disrupƟ on are also occurring at the state level. China, for instance, 
has recently contended that, contrary to the provisions of UNCLOS III, foreign 
warships must now obtain permission prior to transiƟ ng its EEZ (exclusive eco-
nomic zone).9 Several states are expanding their territorial claims to waters in 
the South China Sea, which potenƟ ally will interfere with strategic sea lanes used 
by all sea-faring naƟ ons to transport goods and informaƟ on to and from the Pa-
cifi c and Indian Oceans. As trade between the East and West expands, the Indian 
Ocean will play an ever-increasing role in global mariƟ me operaƟ ons. India, how-
ever, has increased its procurement and development of naval weapon systems 
that can be used to support an anƟ -access strategy.10 In the highly sensiƟ ve Gulf 
region, Iran has repeatedly experimented with smallboat swarming as a tacƟ c 
to interfere with the movement of naval and commercial vessels in the Strait of 
Hormuz.11
Piracy, parƟ cularly in the Straits of Malacca and oﬀ  Africa’s eastern coast, 
has burgeoned in a very short Ɵ me from a nuisance for commercial shippers 
to a growing threat to free use of the mariƟ me Commons. GlobalizaƟ on, inad-
equate governance, and limited security regimes have allowed modern pirates 
to exploit the mariƟ me, space, and cyberspace domains by using a hybrid of high 
technologies, such as satellite phones and GPS-enabled navigaƟ on, coupled with 
low-tech, smallboat swarming tacƟ cs, to plan and execute aƩ acks while avoiding 
interdicƟ on.
The smuggling of humans and contraband is also changing, as criminals and 
adversaries adapt their techniques to both exploit and inhibit access to the Com-
mons through the use of sophisƟ cated technology. Not only are people increas-
ingly being traﬃ  cked, willingly and unwillingly, across oceans in shipping contain-
ers, there are reports of terrorist groups using trans-ocean commercial shipping 
to move explosive weaponry into Europe and the Americas.12 TacƟ cal nuclear and 
radiological devices, along with dual-use materials, could be moved this same 
way.
8 “New Russian weapons system hides missiles in shipping container,” Homeland Secu-
rity Newswire, 28 April 2010.
9 The EEZ was introduced in UNCLOS III, 1982, with a 200-nauƟ cal mile limit to protect 
the fi shing rights of coastal states.
10 Hoﬀ man, “The MariƟ me Commons,” 55.
11 See “Strait of Hormuz,” Robert S. Strauss Center, University of Texas, AusƟ n, 2007; 
hƩ p://hormuz.robertstrausscenter.org.
12 Jack Izzard, “Italian police fi nd smuggled explosives,” BBC News Online, 22 September 
2010.
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Space
“The massive bulk of the earth does indeed shrink to insignifi cance 
in comparison with the size of the heavens.” 
Nicolaus Copernicus
Several parƟ cipants in the space workshop characterized space as a “center of 
gravity” for the Alliance as a whole, and certainly for its individual members who 
have invested heavily in space. Precise air power (manned and unmanned), mis-
sile guidance, troop movements, environmental reconnaissance, and communi-
caƟ ons all depend on informaƟ on relayed by space assets. If NATO were to lose 
access to space, it would sƟ ll be able to defend itself, but the ability to project 
power beyond the geographical limits of the Alliance would be curbed sharply, 
and the human and economic costs of fi ghƟ ng such a war would be staggering.13 
The just-in-Ɵ me supply chain described above also depends on communicaƟ ons 
and data from satellite systems to manage its complex operaƟ ons. Space, like the 
mariƟ me domain, is a criƟ cal enabler of the globalized economy.
The present architecture of space assets is an amalgam of private and state-
owned and – operated systems. In recent years NATO, along with most naƟ ons, 
has come to rely increasingly on commercially owned and operated space-based 
assets, while commercial operators depend on NATO and naƟ onal militaries to 
protect their systems. In the past, space was a remote domain accessed, used, 
and threatened by only a few states. The past quarter century, however, has wit-
nessed the rapid commercializaƟ on of space – a pell-mell race with liƩ le concern 
for rules or procedures. As the use of space to support and enable private, com-
mercial, and military enterprises has increased, so have the vulnerabiliƟ es. One 
way to address stability and free access in the increasingly complex domain of 
space is through a comprehensive approach that brings together stakeholders 
from across the military, civil, and commercial sectors.
Civil and private enterprise are the largest users of the space commons. De-
spite the recent growth in commercial launch and operaƟ on centers, they sƟ ll 
depend largely on the military for access and space situaƟ onal awareness to 
launch and maneuver satellites, ships, and aircraŌ . Most satellites are in space 
to transmit and transfer informaƟ on, e.g., television, meteorological imagery, 
surveillance, posiƟ oning, and Ɵ ming, all of which have both commercial and se-
curity implicaƟ ons. While ground-based internet nodes using fi ber opƟ c cable 
and wireless transmission technologies can replace satellite communicaƟ ons, 
they are not ubiquitous, and the cost of access can be prohibiƟ ve for those in 
remote areas. Weather forecasƟ ng, global posiƟ oning, and the exact Ɵ ming cru-
cial for asynchronous systems in space are indispensable, and will remain so for 
decades to come. Given our collecƟ ve reliance on such systems, both militarily 
13 Militaries have conducted “A Day Without Space” exercises that indicated these out-
comes. The commercial sector, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has recently 
begun to study this scenario as well. Remarks at the Air and Space workshop, Kalkar, 
Germany, 15 October 2010.
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and economically, we have to understand what damage, deliberate or not, to 
a commercial and/or military satellite will mean for the security of the Alliance.
The space domain is not solely limited to orbiƟ ng satellites. Access to space 
includes the security of ground faciliƟ es that receive and disseminate signals 
from space. These staƟ ons tend to be well-protected, but most communicaƟ ons 
staƟ ons are commercial enterprises that calculate risk to operaƟ ons in criminal 
versus adversarial terms. NATO must have a clear understanding of its interests 
in helping naƟ ons secure these faciliƟ es, while naƟ ons must conƟ nue to devel-
op public-private partnerships that share informaƟ on and access to combined 
military and law enforcement capabiliƟ es, in order to prevent any aƩ ack on such 
criƟ cal infrastructure.
Though NATO depends on space to perform its tasks and missions, the Al-
liance itself has no space policy or force structure to sustain its space-based 
support. Hitherto, NATO has relied on space-faring naƟ ons to oﬀ er services on 
an as-required basis. The NATO mission in Afghanistan (ISAF) has experienced 
repeated diﬃ  culƟ es coordinaƟ ng “just-in-Ɵ me” space-based systems to deliver 
criƟ cal communicaƟ ons, surveillance, and targeƟ ng informaƟ on in Afghanistan. 
ISAF commanders rouƟ nely have urged NATO to draŌ  and promulgate a space 
policy to address these needs and empower future planners and pracƟ Ɵ oners. 
When polled, experts from across the Alliance cited the need for a clear, coherent 
policy as their most pressing concern with regard to NATO’s future in the domain 
of space.
An eﬀ ecƟ ve policy will bring the space capabiliƟ es of member naƟ ons into 
an organized whole, so that the problems of coordinaƟ ng diﬀ erent systems do 
not constrain NATO’s ability to execute in-area and out-of-area operaƟ ons in sup-
port of the strategic interests of the Alliance. The space treaƟ es of the 1960s and 
1970s, which outline basic principles of freedom of use, non-appropriaƟ on, and 
state liability/responsibility, have served this domain well to date, but they are no 
longer suﬃ  cient by themselves.14
Increased acƟ vity in space by an ever-growing number of players has pro-
duced relaƟ ve congesƟ on and compeƟ Ɵ on for frequencies and orbits, as well 
as dangerous levels of space debris that endanger satellite systems. Private and 
commercial actors are some of the newest to join the space arena, and are not 
subject to most treaƟ es agreed among states. It is important to note, however, 
that although these new players make space more congested, it is the states them-
selves that have been the most egregious violators of accepted space conduct, 
especially when it comes to the deliberate and unintended generaƟ on of space 
debris. The Chinese anƟ -satellite test in January 2007 was in the upper alƟ tude of 
LEO (low earth orbit, up to 2,000km), and the resulƟ ng debris will threaten assets 
in space for more than 20 years. According to the Air Force Space Command, the 
14 The fi rst is the Treaty on Principles Governing the AcƟ viƟ es of States in the Explora-
Ɵ on and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other CelesƟ al Bodies, known 
commonly as the Outer Space Treaty, which entered into force in 1967. Several others 
followed that focused on specifi c issues, such as registraƟ on of satellites (1975).
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wreckage from that one event increased the collision risk for about 700 military 
and commercial spacecraŌ  by 30 per cent.15
It does not require a specially designed weapon to destroy a satellite in space; 
any object with a guidance system can become a missile, and whether that col-
lision is intenƟ onal or not, it is nearly impossible to prove intent. Jamming and 
spoofi ng methods, now within the reach of many non-state actors, make dis-
cerning intent and aƩ ribuƟ ng destrucƟ ve behavior even more diﬃ  cult. Even the 
United States, with a formidable space situaƟ onal awareness, and working in 
concert with the European Space Agency (ESA), lacks the ability to disƟ nguish an 
aƩ ack from an accident. Not knowing the source of an aƩ ack produces instability 
in the system – instability creates uncertainty, and uncertainty in the interna-
Ɵ onal system triggers escalaƟ on. One of the key fi ndings of the Schriever 2010 
War game underscored that observaƟ on: the interweaving of civil, commercial, 
and naƟ onal space capabiliƟ es had become so complex that it was diﬃ  cult, if not 
impossible, to aƩ ribute an aƩ ack, or in some cases understand when, or even if, 
an aƩ ack had started, or whether it had ended.
Clearly, a retaliatory kineƟ c aƩ ack in space would be dangerously counter-
producƟ ve. What is the appropriate response if the target is a commercial sat-
ellite? Can NATO’s poliƟ cal and military power even play a useful role in such 
a situaƟ on? Since capability and intent in space are nearly impossible to assign, 
should we ignore capabiliƟ es and instead defi ne a set of behaviors that are more 
important than others? If so, once they are idenƟ fi ed, how do we incenƟ vize 
good behavior and punish destrucƟ ve behavior? Clearly, these are important 
quesƟ ons that the Alliance must address.
Air
“There is the sky, which is all men’s together.” 
Euripides
Although human access to the air domain is scarcely one hundred years old, air-
space is second only to mariƟ me in its levels of use; it is, however, more highly 
regulated and controlled than the oceans. Adding to the complexity of the air 
domain has been the rapid development of space and cyberspace capabiliƟ es, 
which have changed profoundly the way we use airspace and operate aircraŌ , 
both manned and unmanned. OperaƟ ons in the air domain depend on access to 
space-based, cyber-enabled communicaƟ ons and informaƟ on transfer for global 
posiƟ oning, Ɵ ming, precision, environmental monitoring of real-Ɵ me condiƟ ons, 
collision and missile warning capabiliƟ es, weapons guidance, coordinaƟ on, and 
constant surveillance and reconnaissance.
Like the mariƟ me domain, naƟ ons have sovereignty over their naƟ onal air-
space, while internaƟ onal airspace, as defi ned by treaty, is open to use by all.16 
15 Leonard David, “China’s AnƟ -Satellite Test,” Space.com, 2 February 2007.
16 Rules for civil aircraŌ  in internaƟ onal airspace are codifi ed in the 1944 InternaƟ onal 
ConvenƟ on on Civil AviaƟ on.
Global Commons – Executive Summary 21
Also like the oceans, airspace that is not designated as internaƟ onal is divided 
into zones with varying levels of access, depending on proximity to land, alƟ -
tudes, and aircraŌ  capability and capacity. By far the heaviest users of this domain 
are commercial air carriers, which transported more than three billion people in 
2009. Adding to these congested skies is a burgeoning air cargo industry that now 
transports over eight per cent of the world’s high-value cargo. Add to this mix un-
manned aerial systems (UAS), both micro and macro, whose use and destrucƟ ve 
capacity have increased a thousand-fold in the past fi Ō een years, and an already 
complex system becomes even more so.17
Since the Cold War era, NATO has fi lled the crucial role of air policing, to en-
sure the sovereignty of European airspace against any unwanted incursion. Air 
policing, however, with its component C2 systems, tracking and idenƟ fi caƟ on ca-
pabiliƟ es, and interceptors, comes at a high cost to the Alliance because, on the 
one hand, some member states insist on keeping complete control of their own 
airspace and assets.18 On the other hand, some new members have lacked criƟ cal 
capabiliƟ es required to meet Alliance standards, which has resulted in the cre-
aƟ on of regional systems such as the BalƟ c Joint Airspace Surveillance Network 
(BALTNET, 1998). In other cases, individual states within these regional groups 
take on specifi c responsibiliƟ es, as Finland has for patrolling the airspace of its 
region rather than only Finnish territory.19 The drawback to these arrangements 
for a mutual-security alliance like NATO is the devoluƟ on of purpose, or as one 
Ambassador lamented, the fracturing of the Alliance as regions adopt individual 
approaches to defenseand security. History has proven that when grand alliances 
fracture along regional and economic lines, solidarity suﬀ ers, interoperability de-
clines, and intra-regional command and control becomes increasingly diﬃ  cult.
As both naƟ onal and internaƟ onal airspace becomes more crowded, a criƟ cal 
quesƟ on for NATO is how naƟ ons coordinate internaƟ onal air traﬃ  c. When Ice-
land’s Eyjał allajokul volcano erupted in 2010, an event that was both predictable 
and unstoppable, its ash clouds disrupted traﬃ  c across the vital trans-AtlanƟ c 
corridor for two months. It took North American and European authoriƟ es a full 
four weeks to fi gure out how to achieve “almost real-Ɵ me” procedures and del-
egate authority to route trans-AtlanƟ c traﬃ  c in an eﬃ  cient and eﬀ ecƟ ve man-
ner.20 This problem is solvable, and the creaƟ on of a coordinated system should 
not have to wait for another crisis to spur acƟ on.
17 From April to July 1995, allied forces managed to fi eld three successful drones in Bos-
nia. In the present war in Afghanistan, drones are being deployed eﬀ ecƟ vely at the 
rate of 100 a day.
18 From “NATO’s Air Policing Mission Challenges”, read-ahead material for the JAPPC con-
ference, Kalkar, Germany, 13–15 October 2010.
19 Ibid.
20 Maj. Gen. Mark BarreƩ , USAF, “Managing Global Commons in the 21st Century: 
A Challenge for NATO,” forthcoming from ACUS, 2010.
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Cyberspace
“It is not drawn on any map; true places never are.” 
Herman Melville
Cyberspace is a unique domain in that it does not itself occupies physical space. It 
does, however, depend on physical nodes, servers, and terminals that are locat-
ed in naƟ ons that exert control and someƟ mes ownership. The public good that 
travels the informaƟ on highway is man-made and hard to categorize or locate. 
For example, a discrete transmission may start via cell tower (USA terrestrial), be 
converted to trans-AtlanƟ c fi ber opƟ c signal (mariƟ me), then be relayed via mi-
crowave tower (EU terrestrial) to a French satellite in space, ending as a SATCOM 
signal to a commercial Korean ship at sea. Transmissions like this occur millions 
of Ɵ mes each day, illustraƟ ng not only the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace, but 
also the complexity of these elaborate systems.
UnƟ l recently, most hackers were aŌ er the informaƟ on that consƟ tutes the 
payload of cyberspace, rather than its infrastructure; this however is changing. 
The infrastructure and informaƟ on base of cyberspace is almost enƟ rely in the 
hands of private and commercial enterprises, rather than governments or the 
military. To complicate things further, unlike the other domains, cyberspace 
does not depend primarily on state power for security; over 90% of networks 
are private and compeƟ Ɵ ve in nature. In this environment, providers have been 
extremely resistant to regulaƟ on and security, preferring self-regulaƟ on and less 
assurance rather than accept limitaƟ ons (and higher costs) that increase safety 
and reliability. One need look no further than the Russia–Georgia confl ict in 2008. 
Georgia’s reliance on its version of classifi ed and unclassifi ed networks was eas-
ily denied, and the system shutdown that occurred was predictable. In the 21st 
century, mission and the network have become intrinsically linked; without the 
network the mission will fail.
We know two things very clearly about cyberspace: the global economy and 
modern militaries are deeply dependent on assured access, and this access is in-
creasingly threatened by hackers, malicious soŌ ware (“malware”), and recently, 
by highly sophisƟ cated, coordinated aƩ acks on states and state-owned targets 
that some experts believe are state-sponsored. NATO for its part is constantly 
fending oﬀ  aƩ acks against its systems at all levels, ranging from the amateur to 
the extremely sophisƟ cated. The denial-of-service aƩ ack on Estonia in 2007 is 
generally regarded as the fi rst full-scale cyber-aƩ ack against a state, although it 
did no long-term damage and was arguably not state-sponsored. “Ghostnet”, an 
espionage botnet21 that forensics determined had originated from Asia, infected 
computers in the governments oﬃ  ces of 103 countries around the globe during 
21 The term botnet, short for robot network, refers to any network of computers that 
runs autonomously. More commonly, however, it refers to a clandesƟ ne network of 
machines that have, unknown to their users, been infected with a virus that turns 
background control of the computers over to the hackers.
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2008. Despite very strong circumstanƟ al evidence, however, that aƩ ack cannot 
be oﬃ  cially aƩ ributed.22
On a very diﬀ erent level, the 2010 worm called W32.Stuxnet, which invaded 
the control systems for Iran’s nearly completed Bushehr nuclear complex, did ac-
tual physical damage to the facility by turning the systems that control the enrich-
ment process over to hackers. Unlike previous aƩ acks, Stuxnet did not go aŌ er 
informaƟ on, it went aŌ er infrastructure.23
Experts from around the world believe that such a sophisƟ cated program 
took many months to develop, and many surmise that it could not have been cre-
ated without state sponsorship. Nevertheless, it is impossible to aƩ ribute with-
out doubt, and chances are no one will ever be held accountable for the Stuxnet 
worm.24 Like space, aƩ ribuƟ on of aƩ ack is one of the most important, and most 
elusive, aspects of operaƟ ng in the cyber domain. Lack of proof about who is re-
sponsible for an aƩ ack obviates the possibility of recriminaƟ on or retaliaƟ on. The 
quesƟ on is, should the Alliance concentrate on behavior rather than capability? 
If so, how can NATO help the internaƟ onal community to establish training and 
educaƟ on that sets codes for conduct and standards for interoperability?
NATO currently experiences dozens of cyber-aƩ acks every day, primarily of 
the standard lone-hacker type. Given the trends of the last decade and the explo-
sion of cyber-enabled funcƟ ons, both commercial and military, we can assume 
that the occurrence of these and ever more sophisƟ cated kinds of aƩ acks will 
conƟ nue to grow not just steadily, but geometrically. Cyber defi ance is a top-
down process when seƫ  ng policy and standards, but boƩ om-up in pracƟ ce and 
governance, centering on resiliency and conƟ nuity more than physical protecƟ on 
and military strength. NATO has insƟ tuted a defensemethodology called Detect, 
Respond, Recover, and Feedback, a constantly evolving process which, when fol-
lowed properly, improves informaƟ on assurance as each level incorporates data, 
checks for validity, generates conƟ nuous feedback, and promotes near instan-
taneous learning. In the coming decades, smart machines will do this without 
human intervenƟ on. UnƟ l that Ɵ me, the most criƟ cal vulnerability to any cyber 
system is human acƟ vity, which means that constant training, modifi caƟ on of 
protocols and procedures, troubleshooƟ ng systems, and human learning will 
conƟ nue to be a criƟ cal part of any cyber defense.
22 John Markoﬀ , “Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries”, New York Times, 
28 March 2009.
23 “W32.Stuxnet: A Tipping Point in Cyber Confl ict?” published in October 2010 by NATO 
HQ SituaƟ on Centre, is a compilaƟ on of news releases and reports regarding the Stux-
net worm.
24 “It is like nothing we have seen before – both in what it does and how it came to ex-
ist. ...Symantec experts esƟ mate it took fi ve to ten people to work on this project for 
six months ...along with access to [industrial control systems] to do quality assurance 
tesƟ ng....” Symantec, 28 September 2010, quoted in NATO HQ, “W32.Stuxnet”, p. 2.
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III. Potential roles for NATO in the Commons
Assured access to the Global Commons should be the goal of the Alliance in 
both the immediate and longer terms. This will be achieved through collecƟ ve 
acƟ on – a comprehensive approach that promotes best pracƟ ces, sets standards 
for behavior, and establishes layers of governance that broaden acceptance of 
the importance of rules and standards. NATO, along with its allies and partners, 
can prevent state and non-state actors and adversaries from exploiƟ ng the Com-
mons through acƟ ons that deny access or otherwise disrupt access to and transit 
through them.
One of NATO’s most important roles is as an advocate for policies and proce-
dures that will further this goal. The Alliance should:
– Encourage naƟ ons to honor the right to explore and use the domains of the 
Commons without interference, while fully respecƟ ng the Commons’ secu-
rity, safety, and integrity. 
– Advocate a state’s inherent right of individual or collecƟ ve self-defense in all 
domains of the Commons. 
– Emphasize the responsibility of all naƟ ons to take all appropriate measures 
and cooperate in good faith to prevent disrupƟ ve interference in the Com-
mons. NATO should become a leading advocate of the need for internaƟ onal 
codes of conduct and standards of behavior governing assured access to the 
Global Commons. Without rules there are no rule breakers, a truth that is par-
Ɵ cularly obvious in the domains of space and cyberspace. NATO should take 
the lead in defi ning appropriate behavior in the Commons where it is in its 
best interest, but norms are strengthened when naƟ ons agree to a compre-
hensive approach that by defi niƟ on is greater than the Alliance. NATO should 
support the eﬀ orts of the private and public sectors to establish rules and 
standards that promote good and penalize ill behavior. One way the Alliance 
can do this is to invite naƟ ons external to the Alliance to parƟ cipate in exer-
cises and decision-making simulaƟ ons. These can help promote collecƟ ve be-
havior that protects the health of the system, while segregaƟ ng the behavior 
of those that fall short. The best way to promote the stability of the Commons 
is by creaƟ ng the condiƟ ons that make the system successful. There are sev-
eral steps NATO can take to accomplish this goal: 
– Work with partners to increase situaƟ onal awareness. 
– Enhance transparency through informaƟ on sharing. 
– Understand and codify best pracƟ ces in cooperaƟ on with partners and stake-
holders. 
– Improve the aƩ ribuƟ on of disrupƟ ve acƟ viƟ es, parƟ cularly in space and cy-
berspace. To do this, a comprehensive approach with industry, the private 
sector, and internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons that set technical standards for gover-
nance is criƟ cal. 
– Deter misbehavior by codifying legal regimes, and supporƟ ng credible mili-
tary and economic capabiliƟ es in cooperaƟ on with all stakeholders. 
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– ConƟ nue to develop and build partnerships of common interest. 
– Create a framework and strategy to address specifi c issues and concerns in 
each.
– Commons domain. 
Mari? me
Much that can be done to assure access to the mariƟ me domain is already being 
done, but as actors and threats evolve, NATO will need to re-examine its roles and 
missions to support assured access. As in the other domains of the Commons, 
one of NATO’s most important roles will be to advocate responsible behavior in 
the mariƟ me domain. Another is to build consensus on shared interests, such as 
making the EEZ well understood and beƩ er managed; protecƟ ng deep seabed 
mapping and mining that limits environmental degradaƟ on; and preparing for 
the opening of the ArcƟ c Circle to navigaƟ on and exploraƟ on. NATO can take ad-
diƟ onal important measures to enhance the integrity of the mariƟ me domain: 
– ConƟ nue to evolve the Alliance MariƟ me Strategy, the MariƟ me Security Op-
eraƟ ons Concepts, and the MariƟ me SituaƟ onal Awareness Concept through 
the implementaƟ on of a comprehensive approach that takes into account the 
concerns of our partners and allies. 
– Engage allies and partners to understand how their interests, vulnerabiliƟ es, 
and capabiliƟ es coincide with and/or complement NATO’s in the mariƟ me 
domain. 
– Bring together experts and stakeholders to think about and help the Alli-
ance prepare for non-tradiƟ onal and asymmetric threats to the global supply 
chain. 
– Embrace a global perspecƟ ve with regard to the Commons. NATO has region-
al capabiliƟ es but global interests, which dictate a need for cooperaƟ on with 
non-NATO states and non-state actors. 
– Enhance the exisƟ ng NATO framework and strategy for the mariƟ me domain, 
in part by infl uencing policy development among members, allies, and part-
ners. Important aspects of this include procurement and the development of 
interoperable capabiliƟ es. 
– Bring together best pracƟ ces to enable individual states to beƩ er focus their 
mariƟ me capabiliƟ es. 
Space
It is imperaƟ ve that NATO develops a space policy for the Alliance that refl ects 
the range of interests of all members. In 2009, a total of 78 orbital launches took 
place from over 17 spaceports around the world, carrying 111 payloads for mili-
taries, civil governments, commercial enƟ Ɵ es, and universiƟ es. This brought the 
total number of satellites circling the earth in various types of orbits to 918.25 
Clearly the use of space has become an internaƟ onal acƟ vity. To conƟ nue a high 
25 Space FoundaƟ on, “The Space Report 2010”, pp. 62, 77.
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level of space awareness will require close cooperaƟ on with the European Union 
and the United States, as the two chief space-faring enƟ Ɵ es. 
One of the fi rst steps NATO needs to take is to determine its own require-
ments in space over the medium-to-long term. Once a clear picture is in place, 
the Alliance can begin to match capabiliƟ es to needs, and answer some basic 
quesƟ ons. For instance, does the Alliance need to fund and create its own space-
based system, or can its needs be met through conƟ nued cooperaƟ on with and 
reliance on space-faring members and partners in industry? Does NATO need to 
develop a cadre of space experts and if so, how should they be deployed?
There are several other steps NATO can begin to take now, to enhance secu-
rity and freedom of access in the space domain:
– Recruit and maintain space subject-maƩ er experts. This is fundamental to all 
other eﬀ orts. 
– Support the formaƟ on of expert groups to consider criƟ cal issues, including 
space debris, collision risks, interference, and counter-space acƟ viƟ es. 
– Work with appropriate partners, including in the commercial sector, to de-
velop a standardized system architecture. 
– Seek soluƟ ons to the problems of interoperability in space – make it a truly 
wide – based partnership with naƟ ons external to the Alliance. 
– Improve shared space situaƟ onal awareness, through data exchanges and the 
use of SSA systems.
Air 
NATO needs to support Alliance resiliency against disrupƟ ons in the free use of 
internaƟ onal airspace. Several possible measures support that goal: 
– Engage partners and promote measures and best pracƟ ces that will enhance 
resiliency. The EU’s “single sky” iniƟ aƟ ve is an example of such an approach. 
– Share informaƟ on to increase situaƟ onal awareness of the global air picture. 
– Understand and prepare for non-tradiƟ onal threats such as the disrupƟ ve use 
of unmanned air systems. 
– Address the issue of missile proliferaƟ on, and encourage members, partners, 
and allies to develop and support strong non-proliferaƟ on policies. 
– Prepare for the evoluƟ on of anƟ -access systems that put NATO air dominance 
at risk. Micro UCAVs and viruses that aƩ ack our air plaƞ orms across the sup-
ply chain are technically possible, and pose an asymmetric response to aerial 
dominance. 
Perhaps more than any other domain of the Commons, keeping cyberspace 
secure from aƩ ack and disrupƟ on, with open access to all parƟ cipants, will re-
quire a comprehensive approach that draws in stakeholders from every level of 
society, including private industry, academia, government, and non-governmen-
tal organizaƟ ons.
A credible strategy of deterrence must incorporate all aspects of cyber secu-
rity, from enhanced training and educaƟ on, to passive resiliency and redundancy, 
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to oﬀ ensive counter-measures in the event of an aƩ ributed aƩ ack. NATO can 
leverage its posiƟ on of leadership to:
– Work with naƟ ons to agree on a set of policies (in the form of a code of con-
duct or behavior) for the Alliance that, over Ɵ me could be adopted by allies, 
partners, and others. This will require NATO to work with members on the 
need to delineate naƟ onal responsibiliƟ es and burden sharing among them. 
– Recruit and maintain cyberspace subject maƩ er experts. Again, this is a fi rst 
step in support of all others. 
– Bring together best pracƟ ces for cyber security, and rigorously train and edu-
cate all personnel in them. 
– Establish a smart cyber policy, which should consider guidelines to acƟ vely 
respond to cyber oﬀ ensives. Along with a comprehensive approach, such 
a policy should address the necessity of using oﬀ ensive cyber capabiliƟ es, 
and the development of dedicated specialists in military units (similar to elec-
tronic warfare units of yesterday and today). 
– Develop, or sponsor the development of, new research and development, 
ideas, and hardware/soŌ ware that are encrypted or impregnable to cyber-at-
tack. NATO must commit to the innovaƟ ve use of technology and stay ahead 
of our adversaries. 
– Work with partners from all sectors to improve the ability to aƩ ribute aƩ acks, 
and punish and/or counter known bad actors. 
IV. Final thoughts 
The evolving globalized economic and security systems of the modern world de-
pend on unrestricted, safe access to all four domains of the Commons. Disrup-
Ɵ ons to the supply chain of goods, energy resources, and informaƟ on will have 
serious, even catastrophic eﬀ ects on naƟ ons’ economies and the security of their 
ciƟ zens. 
With innovaƟ on and new technologies come new vulnerabiliƟ es. Even as we 
become increasingly dependent on space and cyberspace for communicaƟ ons, 
commerce, and security, adversaries are looking for ways to use these same tech-
nologies to restrict our freedom to act, and do us harm. The proliferaƟ on of in-
expensive missile technologies threatens use of the air and mariƟ me Commons 
not only for commerce, but also for defense operaƟ ons when and as they are 
needed. Climate change and the melƟ ng of the ArcƟ c seaice pose further ques-
Ɵ ons of access to and sovereignty over newly available trade routes and valuable 
resources, among both Alliance members and other northern naƟ ons.
Given the importance of the Commons, and the seriousness of emerging 
threats to them, NATO should devote special aƩ enƟ on in the coming years to as-
suring access to all four domains, and thus to protecƟ ng the global supply chain. 
The Alliance, working in partnership with the United NaƟ ons and the Europe-
an Union, has an important role to play in this regard. It can help provide the 
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leadership needed to promote strong policies for space and cyberspace, two ar-
eas where policies that enhance partnership, interoperability, and a ruled-based 
system are lacking. Through a comprehensive approach, NATO is in a unique po-
siƟ on to build partnerships of experts and innovators from both the public and 
private sectors, to meet the central challenge of the coming decades: assuring 
access to the Global Commons.
Andrzej Bryk
American Military Strategy 
and the Economic Crisis 
Whatever derision was heaped on the so-called “end of history” thesis immedi-
ately aŌ er the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989, internaƟ onal geopoliƟ cs ini-
Ɵ ally refl ected that convicƟ on. Both the United States and the European Union, 
the name taken in 1992, assumed that the West was the most acƟ ve and cul-
ture-seƫ  ng part of the globalized world. They took it for granted that the West 
and liberal democracy had won. The diﬀ erences revolved around the extent of 
this victory, the methods of forming the globalized world, and a defi niƟ on of 
enemies. PoliƟ cal science, sociology, and economics studies focused on ques-
Ɵ ons of transformaƟ on, democraƟ zaƟ on and the means of modernizaƟ on along 
the lines of the liberal-democraƟ c model, mulƟ cultural studies notwithstanding. 
Both the United States and the European Union assumed that they possessed 
cultural dynamism, economic superiority and the military means to provide 
a safety net for experiments with modernizaƟ on outside of its own sphere. Al-
though the diﬀ erences between America and the European Union were real, 
they seemed superfi cial, with a clear understanding that the United States’ he-
gemonic status was not quesƟ oned.1 
At the beginning of the 21th century such an opƟ mism dissipated. The United 
States has not become the second Rome, which was to draw constantly into its 
orbit new provinces, thinking that its supremacy would be unchallenged. America 
has found itself in a psychological situaƟ on comparable to the one which Rome 
experienced aŌ er the baƩ le in the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD – a defeat which 
Augustus translated into a doctrine of the defi nite Roman limes beyond which 
1 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire, Harvard University Press 2002.
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it could not march any more, since it was not longer capable of it. Here and no 
further. The European Union realized in turn that it had no economic and military 
power or cultural stamina to sustain its external projects, masking its weakness 
with dreams of the KanƟ an peace, bureaucraƟ c regulaƟ ons and the euro poliƟ -
cal project, irrespecƟ ve of economic raƟ onality, while preaching magnanimity 
towards others. Europe has defi nitely lost its self-confi dence and civilizaƟ onal 
potenƟ al. But the United States has entered its own economic and idenƟ ty crisis 
as well, including a weakening of the rock-solid tradiƟ onal convicƟ on that the 
military is sƟ ll a sine qua non condiƟ on of its security in the global context of the 
new challengers, especially China. 
This new geopoliƟ cal situaƟ on is menacing. Since the Second World War 
American power, and a corresponding dependence on it of the non-communist 
world, had no compeƟ tor unƟ l the end of the 20th century. Over large areas, 
American infl uence worked in many respects to the clear advantage of those 
who landed in its gravitaƟ onal fi eld aŌ er the Second World War. AŌ er the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union the American world hegemony was for a decade or so 
unchallenged. This made internaƟ onal relaƟ ons predictable, with a recogniƟ on 
of the basic fact that the United States whether it wants to or not is responsible 
for the global order. But the poliƟ cal, military, economic and cultural–ideological 
supremacy of the United States is no longer taken for granted. 
An indispensable part of the American idenƟ ty since the DeclaraƟ on of Inde-
pendence of 1776 has been its universal messianic project, and Americans have 
had a tendency to shape others in their own image, seeking their admiring and 
grateful recogniƟ on.2 Since the Wilsonian project of making the world “safe for 
democracy” coming out of the First World War, this self-defi niƟ on was translated 
into foreign policy strategy.3 For this purpose Americans acted to uphold and gain 
recogniƟ on for ‘freedom and democracy’, someƟ mes making the world a bet-
ter place manu militari. But behind this mission we can also see someƟ mes an 
idenƟ ty-building obsession, with a fi rm convicƟ on that the United States is in 
fact the only country which can, in case of claimed necessity, treat external rules, 
principles and agreements as non-binding.4 As President George W. Bush put it, 
America need not “seek a permission slip from anyone”, simply because no one 
could eﬀ ecƟ vely forbid it to do anything it wanted.5 This is the ulƟ mate meaning 
of the American, benevolent and reluctant, but nevertheless real hegemony. 
By the end of the fi rst decade of the 21th century this strategy was applied 
in the wake of the 9/11 aƩ ack by the incredibly imprecise non-poliƟ cal term 
the “War on Terror”. With this the American security concerns began changing 
2 See Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it 
Changed the World, Routlegde, London 2002, esp. pp. 3–29, 310–334.
3 See Richard Gamble, “The War for Righteousness: Progressive ChrisƟ anity, the Great 
War, and the Rise of the Messianic NaƟ on”, ISI, Wilmindton, Del. 2003, pp. 209–232.
4 Clauss Oﬀ e, Refl ecƟ ons on America: Tocqueville, Weber and Adorno in the United 
States, Polity Press, Malden, MA 2005, pp. 99–100.
5 The State of the Union Address, 20 January 2004.
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dramaƟ cally. This new situaƟ on was caused by several interrelated factors. The 
American economic crisis of 2008 together with its European Union counterpart 
in 2011, has revealed erroneous assumpƟ ons of the world fi nancial system, some 
having clear poliƟ cal roots: the federal government guarantees for the risky cred-
it acƟ viƟ es of the banks.6 
The crisis coincided with poliƟ cal changes in America and the world at large. 
The laƩ er were connected with the eﬀ ects of the G.W. Bush presidency of 2001–
2009. American public opinion was increasingly Ɵ red of the both too widely and 
too narrowly planned Afghanistan and Iraq wars, forcing poliƟ cians to wind them 
down.7 Then there was the nasty break in transatlanƟ c relaƟ ons with the Euro-
pean Union, with their liberal-leŌ  elites defi ning mutual diﬀ erences not only in 
categories of policy diﬀ erences, but as civilizaƟ onal diﬀ erences.8 
There has been an addiƟ onal factor which modifi ed the geopoliƟ cal balance 
connected with the economic distribuƟ on of world resources with poliƟ cal impli-
caƟ ons. First it was the rise of China as a geopoliƟ cal player. China is connected 
with the United States by close economic Ɵ es excluding a possibility of both coun-
tries engaging today in an overt economic, let alone military confl ict. There is 
here a certain imbalance of exchange, with the U.S. selling China in 2010 “goods” 
worth about 82 billion dollars, imporƟ ng them for about 344 billion. For this rea-
son China has the greatest reserve assets of dollars esƟ mated at the level of 2.85 
6 See on that Viral V. Acharya, MaƩ hew Richardson, SƟ jn van Nieuwerburgh, Lawrence 
White: Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage 
Finance, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, pp. 11–30.
7 Some recent good accounts of all the issues relaƟ ng to a quesƟ on of winding down 
wars see Micheal E.O’ Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan (ed.) Toughing it Out in Afghani-
stan, Brookings InsƟ tuƟ on, Washington D.C. 2010, esp. pp. 79–112; Seth G. Jones, 
In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, Norton &Company, New 
York 2009; Audrey Kurth Cronin “How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline 
and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns”, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2009, esp. 
pp. 187–196.
8 The United States was portrayed as an aggressive, neo-colonial power, a kind of dan-
gerous anachronism in the modern world. Not only were the domesƟ c and foreign 
policies of the United States considered from the European elites’ point of view as 
erroneous, but the very culture of America was increasingly defi ned as having a kind 
of inherent fl aw, increasingly dangerous for the world order. This was then; now it 
cannot be treated seriously any more by such elites which observe their pet project of 
the European Union and its euro currency as having inherent, who knows if not incur-
able, fl aws. This hubrisƟ c and, to a certain extent, racist, aƫ  tude towards the United 
States, translated to greeƟ ng Barack Obama, the liberal-leŌ  president since 2009, as 
a savior of America and the prospecƟ ve architect of the new world order. See on that 
Andrzej Bryk “The United States, The European Union, Eastern Europe: Challenges 
and Diﬀ erent Responses to Modernity”, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, no 2, 
2008, pp. 109–228; also his “Od Reagana do Obamy” (From Reagan to Obama) in Piotr 
Musiewicz (ed.) Ronald Reagan: Nowa Odsłona w 100-lecie urodzin, Ośrodek Myśli 
Politycznej 2011, esp. pp. 290–313. 
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trillion.9 Both sides keep thus each other at bay, with the huge US market next to 
the UE being the main export outlet for China, with the export of the American 
producƟ on to it treated also as the expanding internal market for the American 
companies.10 China depreciates its currency, the yuan to facilitate its gargantuan 
export industry, and by some esƟ mates might be ready to oﬀ er the yuan as an 
alternaƟ ve currency.11 The Chinese model is based essenƟ ally on the pro-export 
model and fi nancing internal development by it, while locaƟ ng imported tech-
nologies and factories in China; the low value of the yuan is a consequence of it, 
which makes the imbalance of trade between America and China natural. Ameri-
cans are yet unable to convince China to appreciate its currency by 20–40%.12 
The picture is yet not unequivocal. True, China is rising rapidly as a fi nan-
cial market and may dethrone the United States in the next decade or so. Its 
constantly improving universiƟ es may become a leading factor in keeping talent 
inside of China, and drawing it from outside. But research and creaƟ vity are sƟ ll 
the main American assets and intellectual breakthroughs are likely to take place 
there.13 The quality of life is sƟ ll low in China in comparison to America and may 
9 According to the World Bank data, see hƩ p://date.worldbank.org.
10 China has billions of reserves in American bonds, not only because the dollar sƟ ll re-
tains its prominence as the reserve world currency, especially with the failure of the 
euro as its quick alternaƟ ve. Here the situaƟ on is nevertheless complicated. As a cur-
rency, the euro is an economic failure but not necessarily a poliƟ cal one, since it is 
guaranteed by EU governments, i.e. Germany. The European Union bureaucracy and 
elites will do everything to save it aŌ er the 2011 crisis and China knows this. That is 
why it tentaƟ vely decided to oﬀ er the EU 100 billions euros worth of help in Febru-
ary of 2012 to obtain the European bonds at a higher rate than the American ones. 
The laƩ er have very low interests rates, in between 0.1-3.4 depending on the period 
of buying them out. But infl aƟ on results in the majority of the American obligaƟ ons 
bringing losses. That is why China wants to buy Eurobonds which because of the crises 
are priced higher, beƫ  ng on the fact that eurozone will not go bankrupt. China is sƟ ll 
willing to buy conƟ nuously American bonds, because that allows them to keep the 
yuan underappreciated, thus facilitaƟ ng its export. For a good overview of Chinese 
European economic expansion see Teresa Wojcik “Pekin zdobywa Brukselę?”, Gazeta 
Polska, 2 listopada 2011, p. 21.
11 Americans, of course, are strong enough to use this policy of a weak dollar against 
others, for instance Europe and weaker economies. 
12 When, during a meeƟ ng with poliƟ cians and businessmen in September 2010 in New 
York, prime minister Wen Jiabao was confronted with this expectaƟ on, he responded 
that such a move would cause enormous number of bankruptcies, and thus social un-
rest. He agreed that in many parts of China the standard of living is sƟ ll very low with-
out basic infrastructure, such as running water and electricity, adding that a conver-
sion of China into a really modern society will sƟ ll last several generaƟ ons. Kazimierz 
Dadak “Złapał Chińczyk…”, in “Gazeta Polska”, 9 March 2011, p. 33.
13 According to the OECD data, in 2007 the U.S. had 15,883 so-called “triadic patents”, 
that is the ones registered at the same Ɵ me in the U.S., the EU, and Japan, while China 
had only 587 of them. For every million people there are 4663 scienƟ sts in R&D insƟ -
tuƟ ons, as compared to 927, and the U.S. spend for R&D 2.7% of its GDP, when China 
only 1.5% as a symbolic success of this intellectual drive China produced in 2010, the 
fastest supercomputer in the world, a slap in the face for the Americans. But, to be 
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take generaƟ ons, all things being equal, to catch up, with mistakes likely to be 
commiƩ ed.14 But although China is sƟ ll far away and chasing America, what is 
clear is the dynamic of the process and the quesƟ on whether America has sƟ ll 
enough vitality to keep the distance from closing too quickly.
There is yet another, underappreciated role of China, this Ɵ me detrimental to 
the “soŌ ” American world infl uence, even if poliƟ cally limited today. True, China’s 
Confucian tradiƟ on and long, uninterrupted cultural memory, might nudge the 
Chinese to look at the outside world as a periphery to be drawn to China, not 
as a terrain to be taken over. But China, whatever its regime, has always had 
a disƟ nct way of dealing with the West based on subtlety, indirectness, and stra-
tegic posiƟ oning.15 Some yet say, that the old ways of conducƟ ng poliƟ cs might 
prove useless for the Chinese. They will have to adapt to the postmodern world 
quickly, if they do not want to face the limitaƟ ons of their own culture and remain 
incapable of going beyond the iniƟ al stage of economic development.16 But Chi-
na’s poliƟ cs might also be confrontaƟ onal.17 Today, the Chinese play their game 
conservaƟ vely, but their internaƟ onal policies are profoundly driven by the long 
memory of a debilitaƟ ng humiliaƟ on by the West and a desire to get even.18 
precise, it was built from American components. Moreover the American research 
universiƟ es are the best and thousands of students write their doctorates there, and 
the large majority stays there for good; hƩ p://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx.
14 One of the huge investment projects which is likey to fail is the fast transportaƟ on 
system between Chinese towns which consumed billions of dollars. But the project, 
hasƟ ly executed and with permanent failures, looks likely to be built too late. The Chi-
nese are already dreaming about cars not fast trains. Here the number of cars for one 
thousand Chinese is 22 as compared with 451 in America, a consumpƟ on of electri-
cal energy for one person is 2332KWh to 13 638 KWh, and access to internet for one 
hundred people is respecƟ vely 6.29 to 24.02. The infant mortality rate for each one 
thousand people is 17 to 7. And GDP per head, adjusƟ ng the diﬀ erences in prices in 
China is 6890 to 45640 in America; hƩ p://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx.
15 The Westerners allegedly play poliƟ cs which resemble chess, a direct and confronta-
Ɵ onal game, the Chinese play poliƟ cs like wei qi – an ancient game in which a player 
wins by posiƟ oning himself and surrounding his opponent. This is, for instance, the 
main line of argument of Henry Kissinger’s On China, Penguin, New York 2011, a book 
otherwise one sided and self-serving.
16 See on that Charles Horner “Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Em-
pire in a New Global Context”, University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA 2009; also the 
New LeŌ  perspecƟ ve by Hui Wang “The End of RevoluƟ on: China and the Limits of 
Modernity”, Verso, London 2010; and Susan L. Shirk “China: Fragile Superpower”, Ox-
ford University Press, New York, 2010.
17 One may recall here the intervenƟ on in Korea in 1950s, or the surrounding of Taiwan 
with missiles in 1995 and 1996, or allowing the North Koreans to strike at South Korea 
whenever it wished. China’s brutality of dealing with internal poliƟ cal opponents or 
the destrucƟ on of Tibet as an example of its aƫ  tude towards internal minoriƟ es is also 
neither subtle or non-confrontaƟ onal. 
18 See on that Yong Deng “China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of InternaƟ onal 
RelaƟ ons”, Cambridge University Press 2008.
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When coming out of the debacle of the Cultural RevoluƟ on in the 1970s China 
was desperate to do business with the United States and the American “opening” 
to China by Nixon met them half way.19 One can argue that the Americans did not 
drive a hard bargain then and in 1989 at the Ɵ me of Tianamen square when the 
Chinese were sƟ ll experimenƟ ng with the alternaƟ ve way of Communist develop-
ment combining monopoly of power and the eﬃ  ciency of the market economy.20 
This process of Chinese-American collaboraƟ on had its own logic in the American 
fascinaƟ on with the “knowledge” economy and fi nancial markets, which caused 
a dismantling of their producƟ ve sector and transferring it to cheaper labor mar-
kets, including the huge market of China. Americans decided to rely on research, 
fi nance markets and consumerism as sources of economic growth.21 
Such a strategic economic development entailed two underlying axioms. One 
was an assumpƟ on of a peaceful world market without any strategic confl icts. 
The other was an expectaƟ on of the American military world preeminence to 
guarantee such a world market, paying for internaƟ onal public goods like secur-
ing the sea lanes. Both axioms can not be taken for granted any more. American 
isolaƟ onist tendencies in the wake of weariness of the decade of wars and eco-
nomic crisis, the Chinese strategic asserƟ veness, and the largely negaƟ ve poliƟ cs 
of PuƟ n’s Russia, are all changing the equaƟ on. China has emerged as a huge 
producing and consuming market in relaƟ ve terms and has understood well the 
value of proud elites, culturally idenƟ fying with their own tradiƟ on, probably the 
only modern naƟ on which has no problems with self-idenƟ fi caƟ on, their culture 
of ancient heritage.22 
19 China was afraid, however laughable such a fear might seem with hindsight, that Viet-
nam, despite being supported by China against America, might win the war against 
the United States, enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union and challenge China’s 
Asian hegemony. But with hindsight, due to Nixon’s obsession with the Soviet threat, 
China obtained more than it could have dreamed of: it deterred the Soviet aƩ ack, 
forced the US and essenƟ ally the world to de-recognize Taiwan, got a steady shipment 
of investment from America and demonstrated, by the puniƟ ve war of 1979 against 
Vietnam, that it would not cede its dominaƟ on over East Asia to it.
20 They studied here very carefully the lessons of the Polish transiƟ on, and the negaƟ ve 
lessons of the Gorbatchev reforms The idea that the capitalist economy will automaƟ -
cally push China towards democracy is quesƟ oned in Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism Without 
Democracy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2007.
21 One of the very few highly developed countries which has not commiƩ ed such a mis-
take was Germany, which in large measure retained and modernized, rather than 
transferred, its producƟ ve sector. 
22 The Chinese heavily invest in the university sector at the highest level, send students 
abroad to the best universiƟ es mainly to the U.S. confi dent that they may return. Pri-
vate Chinese art collectors also buy out cultural historical arƟ facts at aucƟ ons all over 
the world, paying exorbitant prices. They elevate prices to astronomical levels through 
fi cƟ Ɵ ous bids, probably sponsored by the government, to show that their cultural arƟ -
facts, once stolen by the colonizers, have no right to be outside China, aucƟ on moves 
which could be not tolerated or contemplated by anyone else. 
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There is another strategic, “soŌ  poliƟ cs” problem for the United States com-
ing from China. China has become an alternaƟ ve to the American, or the liberal–
democraƟ c model, at least for a while, of modernizaƟ on. It is consƟ tutes an ex-
ample of a non-democraƟ c but economically successful country, a model which 
the Soviet Union could never provide, let alone export, and which the Russia of 
today is incapable of providing. For all non-democraƟ c and non-liberal regimes 
China is funcƟ oning as a core around which a global coaliƟ on, which considers 
the United States a menace, might cluster.23 
China, in contrast to the European Union, does not wave the fl ag of human 
rights, or praƩ le about “global warming”. It acts as a maƩ er-of-fact, eﬀ ecƟ ve 
buyer and seller, both of goods and resources, no strings aƩ ached, for instance 
in Africa. It buys infrastructure and industries in America and Europe, also using, 
without fanfare, the Chinese diaspora to aid its economic, military and poliƟ cal 
aims. True, the success of China might be precarious. The social and cultural bar-
riers to a more sophisƟ cated development might bog China down. Ethnic prob-
lems might turn out to be intractable and repression in Tibet, against the Uighurs 
or ChrisƟ ans might backfi re. The successful recruitment of the best Chinese tal-
ent to the communist elites and the wealth it controls might also break down 
under the weight of corrupƟ on, repression and the unintended consequences of 
unequal consumerism.24 But that is a story for the future. 
At present there is sƟ ll the rising military expansion of China, aimed at taking 
control over Asia and its Pacifi c rim, with economic growth sucking the world into 
its orbit and a slowly successful bid to be a broker of economic internaƟ onal rela-
Ɵ ons.25 All this is happening in a situaƟ on in which America seems to be winding 
down. But the situaƟ on is equivocal. True, the diﬀ erence in the economic poten-
Ɵ al between China and the United States has been radically reduced. According 
to the World Bank, total American GDP, taking into consideraƟ on the diﬀ erences 
in prices, was in 2000 3–4 Ɵ mes higher than the Chinese at around 9.17 trillion $, 
but in 2009 only 1.5 Ɵ mes higher at around 14 trillion $.26 But objecƟ ve criteria 
do not necessarily defi ne decline. 
Decline may be a choice, and in case of America this winding down process is 
visible in two crucial spheres which have defi ned tradiƟ onal American strength. 
One factor is measurable, the folding of its military presence, even if the Pacifi c 
theatre of operaƟ on is being upgraded. The second factor is cultural, the faltering 
23 See, for instance Eric C. Anderson China Restored: The Middle Kingdom looks to 2020 
and Beyond, Praeger Press, New York 2010. Anderson argues, basing his research on 
extensive fi les in Chinese archives and contemporary insƟ tuƟ ons, that China is reluc-
tant to challenge America directly taking a gradual 3 step policy as its goal: recogniƟ on 
in the internaƟ onal community, the rise and modernizaƟ on of its military and the pro-
jecƟ on of the non-American poliƟ cal model as a point of reference to all considering 
American liberal democracy as unacceptable.
24 Guy Sorman “The Empire of Lies. The Truth about China in the 21st century”, Encoun-
ter Books, New York 2008; Wang “The End of RevoluƟ on”, op. cit.
25 A useful overview of this contest is in Randal Jordan Doyle “America and China: Hege-
mony in the Twenty First Century”, Lexington, Lanham, Md, 2007.
26 All data taken from www.worldbank.org.
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of confi dence in the superiority of American civilizaƟ on and the will to sustain 
its priority in the world. As St. AugusƟ ne said, naƟ ons fail because peoples fail, 
and peoples fail because they love the wrong things, change the objecƟ ves they 
follow and devote resources, physical as well as material, in a misconceived way. 
Any civilizaƟ on defi nes itself by what it loves and how much it wants to sacrifi ce 
to defend what it loves and to sustain resources and insƟ tuƟ ons necessary for 
such a defense. America was created not simply by wealth or technical creaƟ vity 
but heroism, virtues rooted in a disƟ ncƟ ve civil religion based on faith that the 
glory of America, this Lincolnian “last, best hope of man on earth”, is always in 
the future, not in the past. It is in the future because this was an injuncƟ on of the 
Covenant of “the chosen naƟ on”.27 
Such a virtue, irrespecƟ ve whether it is understood in religious or purely secu-
lar terms, is resistant to any intellectual “disenchantment”. It consƟ tutes a rock, 
on which one can lean at a Ɵ me of crisis and overcome acedia. The Americans 
throughout their history have insƟ ncƟ vely understood that theirs has been essen-
Ɵ ally a heroic, romanƟ c civilizaƟ on acƟ ng out of the fi rst moral principles rightly 
understood and applied for the transformaƟ on of their individual, as well as col-
lecƟ ve life. A successful response of a robust, vital civilizaƟ on facing gargantuan 
problems is not ulƟ mately dependent on pragmaƟ c, intellectual means, which at 
fi rst sight might not be found by reason. It is a cultural response, which confronts 
problems in an insƟ nctual way. The virtue of spiritual forƟ tude combined with 
hope to confront challenges is here the preeminent insƟ nct. This virtue has to 
be madly inculcated, unƟ l it becomes part of the cultural code and then all ap-
prehensions can be annihilated against acedia, this virus of any great, well oﬀ  
civilizaƟ on. 
A demoliƟ on of such a cultural code is the greatest danger to any great civiliza-
Ɵ on, and it is an open quesƟ on whether America is beginning to experience such 
a situaƟ on today. If so, this might be the greatest danger for its future, especially 
so because China, defi nitely not the European Union or Russia, seems to sing the 
fi rst tunes of the classical script of such cultural daring and vitality. Today’s un-
precedented problems of America, not easily defi ned, require a response which 
should refer to the great, thrilling myths of self-defi niƟ on, without which any po-
liƟ cal order cannot regenerate.28 If, to use Max Weber’s words, any civilizaƟ onal 
27 The idea of “the chosen naƟ on” was used for the fi rst Ɵ me by one of the New England 
assembly in a series of resoluƟ ons passed: “1. The Earth is the Lord’s and the fullness 
thereof. Voted. 2. The Lord may give the earth or any part of it to his chosen people. 
Voted. 3. We are his chosen people. Voted, Quoted in GarreƩ  Maƫ  ngley “Renaissance 
Diplomacy”, Chapel Chill, North Carolina University Press, 1955, p. 290; the Lincoln 
quotaƟ on and its context see Paul Johnson “The Almost-Chosen People” First Things, 
January 2006, p. 17–22.
28 It is fascinaƟ ng to see how such a cultural code as a source of regeneraƟ on is appealed 
to in a commercial with Clint Eastwood shown aŌ er the fi rst half of the Superbowl 
Game in January of 2012. The commercial, ostensibly showing the rebirth of the car 
industry aŌ er its catastrophe in 2008, may, in fact, be treated as a metaphor of Ameri-
can hope and daring. It elicited an enormous response. The commercial is available on 
the internet. 
American Military Strategy and the Economic Crisis 37
poliƟ cal order should be assessed through type of human being and culture which 
it defends and sustains, then America has for the last two hundred years created 
people worthy of the challenges confronƟ ng them. It may happen that China’s 
vitality is precarious, and soon it will be hindered. The Communist Party has been 
pressed on many fronts. China is surrounded by nuclear–armed states, has no 
real friends in the world, their shrewd diplomats do not know yet how to built 
coaliƟ ons and someƟ mes its reach exceeds its grasp around the world. 
Internally, rampart corrupƟ on, urban and rural disorder, economic specula-
Ɵ ve bubbles, capital fl ight, the accumulaƟ on of all the ills of rapid modernity with 
no high morale of the apparatchiks, all make high echelons of the party resemble 
more “a mulƟ family dynasty in which ‘princelings’ inherit their father’s poliƟ -
cal power and access to money that goes with it. The [Chinese] strategy is thus 
driven by insecuriƟ es. The government wants and needs a world that is safe for 
one-party dictatorships, just as the United States wants and needs a world that is 
safe for consƟ tuƟ onal democracies and free socieƟ es… [Some] fear that focusing 
on the nature of the [China] domesƟ c regime will undermine peaceful relaƟ ons… 
but [any idea] of a Pacifi c Community will remain chimerical as long as [China] is 
controlled by a Communist party that cannot abide even a discussion of the pos-
sibility of sharing power. This explains why no one in the United states agonizes 
over the rise of India. No American imagines that peace with democraƟ c India 
is problemaƟ c. From this perspecƟ ve, human rights and the rule of law are not 
mere preferences, they have profound strategic implicaƟ ons”.29 
But the emerging Asia is an unfamiliar terrain for Americans, existenƟ ally, eco-
nomically and poliƟ cally; the situaƟ on not dissimilar to the emergence of the So-
viet Union during the Second World War. Americans responded then iniƟ ally with 
categories of thought not suitable to the challenge. The road to success, which 
blossomed culturally in the Reagan years, came with the accumulaƟ on of teach-
ing provided by scholars who came from Europe, especially Eastern Europe.30 
With the end of the Cold War, and the discrediƟ ng of oﬃ  cial academic sovietol-
ogy, as opposed to the one provided by the above thinkers and translated into 
poliƟ cal acƟ on by Reagan, the new strategic opponent China cannot yet be read 
by the same methods. It takes Ɵ me to explain this civilizaƟ on to Americans, as 
it will take Ɵ me to explain Islam-based radical ideologies, the inadequacy of the 
laƩ er eﬀ ort so woefully visible in dealings with Islamic socieƟ es in Afghanistan 
29 Charles Horner “New World Order?”, The Claremont Review of Books, Fall 2011, 
p. 27.
30 They are represented by people like Adam Ulam (a graduate of the Polish Lvov high 
school), Richard Pipes (a graduate of the Polish Cieszyn high school), Zbigniew Brzez-
inski, Andrzej Korbonski, Madeleine Albright, and their students, not counƟ ng tradi-
Ɵ onal anƟ communist fugiƟ ves escaping from Communist Eastern Europe working in 
more obscure fi elds like philosophy, for instance Thomas Molnar, or fugiƟ ves from the 
radical camp such as WhiƩ aker Chambers, William Kristol, Norman Podhoretz. They 
understood their enemy. For instance the nature of German Nazi totalitarianism was 
explained to Americans by fugiƟ ves from Germany like Hannah Arendt or the original 
Frankfurt School associated with the New School for Social Research in New York.
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and Iraq since 2001. But radical Islamism is just a nuisance, although it may cause 
a lot of non-strategic trouble. China is a real challenger and America today has 
to learn about it the same way as it learned about the totalitarian powers of 
Europe. It seems that the Americans are responding to that need, which shows 
the wealth and fl exibility of the American universiƟ es as well as the elasƟ city of 
their response.31 
But the problems of intellectual, cultural categories to understand adversaries 
is one thing. The exorbitant self-infl icted problems of America are another. These 
include high unemployment by its standards at around 9%, the acceleraƟ ng debt, 
military overextension slowly being scaled down, and the increasing confi dence 
and expansion of its opponents. Other economic indicators also show problems. 
In 2011 America experienced the most dramaƟ c decline in real estate market 
prices, a drop of roughly 33% in relaƟ on to the peak level prices. This means that 
they dropped 2% below the greatest decline during the Great Depression of the 
30s. Unemployment under the Obama presidency is higher that the unemploy-
ment under F.D. Roosevelt. 
The social cost for the federal budget of the enƟ tlements per year is currently 
higher that the revenues which are fl owing in, which means that a simple reduc-
Ɵ ons of expenses will not reduce the growing defi cit signifi cantly. The number 
of employees in the federal and state bureaucracy is twice as big as the number 
of people working in the producƟ ve sector. Every sixth ciƟ zen is receiving gov-
ernment food assistance. The health plan which passed through Congress in an 
unprecedented situaƟ on of Congress sharply divided along party lines, a situa-
Ɵ on not known in America in generaƟ ons and contrary to the tradiƟ on of poliƟ cal 
compromise, naƟ onalized 16% of the American economy. It created an addiƟ onal 
number of roughly 200 thousand bureaucrats, complicaƟ ng the system and in-
troducing into it ineﬃ  ciency, arbitrariness and a negaƟ ve impulse to medical re-
search, causing widespread resistance to it also among the supporters of Obama. 
Such fears might be exaggerated. America sƟ ll has the largest economy in 
the world consuming the largest amount of other naƟ ons’ exports, and the only 
global military power with the logisƟ cal means of response at every corner of the 
world. The preeminent posiƟ on of the dollar as the only real reserve currency in 
the world has been defended, even if infl aƟ on might be a result of a huge print-
ing of them. Its research universiƟ es are sƟ ll the best and employing the most 
31 The list of the faculty catalogues of the American universiƟ es indicate that teaching 
about China in the United States is rapidly becoming “the province of people who, in 
one way or another are products of the Chinese world… [Their world ] is in the East 
and not in the West, and this cannot be inconsequenƟ al. Is there any way to compare 
how a product of the old European empires thinks about America’s connecƟ on to his 
forebears’ home to how a scion of the Manchu Empire thinks about the same thing?. 
In the 20th century, the European-Americans who developed [American] AtlanƟ c strat-
egy were determined to save Europe from itself. In the 21st century – the Pacifi c Cen-
tury – the Americans who will help rescue China from the [People’s Republic of China] 
may be those who, because of their own unique heritage, are best prepared for the 
task”, Charles Horner “New World Order?”, The Claremont Review of Books, Fall 2011, 
p. 27.
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brilliant minds from all over the world, with the new technological fronƟ ers de-
fi ned sƟ ll in America without any signifi cant challenge from anyone else.32 And so 
far it has had cultural resources to rebuild itself aŌ er every defeat, roughly every 
generaƟ on. The fi nancial crisis of the American fi rms today might yet smoothly 
turn massive investments which will boost the economy and with it the prospects 
of the world. 
Yet, the challenges are new and tradiƟ onal responses to crises may turn out 
to be dubious and need experimentaƟ on. For some, the United States resembles 
the BriƟ sh Empire right before the First World War, or Greece during the Pelopon-
nesian Wars or Rome in the third century A.D., when the empire seemed robust 
but economic and cultural exhausƟ on was beginning to be felt.33 To reverse such 
a trend is diﬃ  cult, since the causes may not be recƟ fi ed by immediate poliƟ cal 
or economic means. They may be ulƟ mately cultural, civilizaƟ onal. Some of the 
causes, in addiƟ on to the ones menƟ oned above, are of course obvious: overex-
tended American military limes, consumerism and credit mentality which drains 
away economic investment and makes a delayed graƟ fi caƟ on to catch a “deeper 
breath” diﬃ  cult. 
There is also a growing chasm between the rich and the poor and social mo-
bility has stagnated. Diﬀ erent social ills corroborate this general strategic picture. 
The crime wave is not as high as in the 90s, but it is sƟ ll substanƟ al by European, 
let alone Asian standards, and its stabilizaƟ on has causes connected with demo-
graphic aging. Wastefulness and gluƩ ony increase social costs, and enormous 
resources applied to “green energy” seem to be driven not by reason but by the 
craziness of the new “religion” of humanity of which “global warming” is a sacra-
ment. Americans are beginning to experience a state of uneasiness, which Jimmy 
Carter, in all his helplessness of not knowing what to do with it, called in the 70s 
a state of “malaise”. In general America’s problems have been mulƟ plying, and 
the end result has been the inability of America to deliver the results it wanted 
to achieve. 
The iniƟ al sign of imperial Ɵ redness is usually a state of denial that the danger 
is real and needs a drasƟ c response. The fi rst challenger to the American em-
pire was Great Britain, militarily defeated in the War of Independence between 
1775–1781, economically at the turn of the 20th century. The second challenger 
was the Soviet Union. It was defeated not so much by military means, as by fi rst 
defi ning it as a dangerous, morally illegiƟ mate world power to be checked and 
demolished, a moral and character operaƟ on which horrifi ed the convenƟ onal 
32 The challenge of the euro to the dollar has, so far, turned out to be illusory. The euro 
crisis in 2011 caused a fl ight to the dollar. Only in the third quarter of 2011 the share 
of the dollar in the reserve assets of the central banks which publish such data has 
risen to 61.7% from 60.3 in comparison to the second quarter, when the share of the 
euro in the same period dropped to 25.7%, the lowest level since 2008. Data from the 
InternaƟ onal Monetary Fund. 
33 A symbolic, popular novel published in 2011 in the United States by Victor Davis Han-
son The End of Sparta, Bloomsbury Press 2011, analyzes this problem with a clear 
allusion to the American cultural predicament.
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cognoscenƟ . Such a daring move was executed by Reagan, since he believed in 
America without hesitaƟ on. Moreover, he had the great support of Margaret 
Thatcher and John Paul II.34 The transatlanƟ c civilizaƟ on under the leadership of 
the United States sƟ ll existed then as a bloc with one enemy. This is not the case 
anymore today. 
The European Union defi nes itself culturally increasingly in adversary terms, 
while craving the military help of the United States, waiƟ ng for America’s civi-
lizaƟ onal change so it will eventually become like Europe.35 The cultural fi ssure 
separaƟ ng America and Europe might be yet real and irreparable in the long run, 
contribuƟ ng to the weakening of both. Europeans, at least Western Europeans, 
no longer “grow up thinking of Americans as liberators, and Americans no lon-
ger grow up thinking of Europe as their spiritual home. Strong cultural and de-
mographic forces are pulling the two conƟ nents in diﬀ erent direcƟ ons”.36 The 
transatlanƟ c relaƟ ons might sƟ ll be rebuilt, aŌ er all the economic Ɵ es between 
Europe and America consƟ tute the nerve system of the global economy, but that 
would require poliƟ cal eﬀ ort, abandoning resentments and dreams of utopian 
anƟ -American alternaƟ ves.37 
The third challenger, China, is a long range one but real. China does not ques-
Ɵ on the rules of the game. It parƟ cipates in the world economy, without any 
overt military claims, trying not to elicit the ire of any great players, establishing 
a long range strategy of modernizaƟ on, and thinking in terms of decades. But 
China’s spectacular economic growth is accompanied by poliƟ cal clout. The fact 
that China has replaced the United States as the largest source of imports for 
Japan, South Korea and Europe will defi nitely limit the West’s poliƟ cal maneuver, 
let alone any eﬀ ecƟ ve human rights pressure on China. 
The United States defi nitely posseses assets which the old empires did not 
have and can contain China. It is a big, conƟ nental and potenƟ ally self-suﬃ  cient 
country. Here, the energy security of the United States is a maƩ er of applying 
poliƟ cal will and prioriƟ es to its own largely self-suﬃ  cient reserves.38 America, 
34 The best account of that triumvirate is John O’Sullivan The President, The Pope and the 
Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World, Regnery, Washington D.C.2008.
35 On the sources of such wishful thinking and the long tradiƟ on of European AnƟ -Amer-
icanism see James Caesar “The Philosophical Origins of AnƟ -Americanism in Europe in 
Paul Hollander (ed.) Understanding AnƟ -Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home 
and Abroad, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago 2004, pp. 45–64.
36 “Wooing the World”, The Economist, March 29, 2008, p. 14.
37 See Fergusson “Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire”, Penguin, New 
York2005, pp. 227–257.
38 Only 6–7 years ago the gas terminals in the American ports were equipped to import 
gas from outside. Now it exports the shale gas on an industrial basis, at a lower price, 
for instance, than the Russian gas sold to Europe. Moreover, the United States have just 
perfected the technology of extracƟ ng shale oil without signifi cantly increasing tradi-
Ɵ onal drilling oﬀ shore or in such places as Alaska, with prospects of being self suﬃ  cient 
in oil in the next decade or so. Shale oil extracƟ on is more expensive than tradiƟ onal 
drilling, and subject to cost-eﬃ  ciency analysis. But shale oil is the best, “light” fuel and 
the point is that the reserves are there and extracƟ on of it rapidly growing in the U.S.
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unlike Britain in the beginning of the 20th century, has the advantage of being 
a strategic leader in new technologies.39 One troubling change, analogous to the 
previous failing empires is a change from the producing sector to a fi nancial sec-
tor, with the rising power of producers from other parts of the world.40 Neverthe-
less the Americans decided recently to slowly rebuild their industrial, producƟ ve 
sector.41 But this will take Ɵ me. SƟ ll, nothing lasts forever, and the strategic cor-
relaƟ on of forces might change.
In the meanƟ me it was the fi nancial sector which caused the present com-
prehensive crisis. The fi nancial market, encouraged by governmental guar-
antees, created fi cƟ onal, derivaƟ ve products which began to feed their own 
demand causing an enormous bubble and speculaƟ ve market assessments. 
The tradiƟ onal ways of emerging from crisis, such as lowering interest rates to 
accelerate consumer drive and the building industry as the engine of invest-
ment are not eﬀ ecƟ ve and do not lower unemployment. Bankruptcies fl ooded 
the market with new, unused properƟ es. The building industry collapsed for 
years, causing a drasƟ c limitaƟ on of individual and corporate consumpƟ on and 
a danger of recession.42 Moreover with high unemployment and low domesƟ c 
consumpƟ on, the price of goods does not go down, since the demand for them 
is global. Asian consumpƟ on, especially in India and China, drives demand and 
raises prices.43 
39 Great Britain at the beginning of the First War in 1914 was heavily dependent on coal, 
steel and shipping industries and missed the opportunity to invest heavily in between 
the wars in new technologies. 
40 As one of the observers noƟ ced sarcasƟ cally, even if only parƟ ally accurately, America 
“lost… enthusiasm for the exploraƟ on of space. Faced with cheap labor oﬀ shore and 
coming across the borders, we failed to deploy our experƟ se in computers and robot-
ics to meet the challenge with tradiƟ onal innovaƟ on and mechanizaƟ on. We have 
ceded manufacturing to China, orbital transportaƟ on to Russia, engineering to for-
eign naƟ onals, energy independence to medieval dictatorships, the Panama canal to 
Panama, the automoƟ ve market to Japan, and the Big Board to Germany. Up to 30 
ships, the largest ever constructed, each capable of carrying 18000 containers, will 
be launched in South Korea. We will neither build, own, nor man them. They will not 
even call at our ports, which will not be large enough to receive them”, Mark Helprin 
“Anchors Away”, Claremont Review of Books, Summer 2011, p. 94.
41 For instance, the car industry, near bankrupt in 2008, and bailed out by the federal 
government, and in 2012 madly compeƟ Ɵ ve and producing excellent cars, is just one 
such case.
42 The tax breaks for the house owners who could not pay credit, guaranteed by the 
federal government do not work as usual, since the prices of the houses, in America, 
the most important wealth asset of the American family, went drasƟ cally down and 
they are worth much less than when the contracts for buying them were signed. This 
causes individual households to Ɵ ghten their belts and reduce consumpƟ on.
43 This explains the phenomenon of the high price of energy resources but fi rst of all food 
which suddenly began to be a rare commodity and may cause hunger in some parts of 
the world, a situaƟ on caused in some measure by the conversion of land from produc-
ing food to bioenergy, eliminaƟ ng at the same Ɵ me atomic energy in the United States 
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Such a situaƟ on makes tradiƟ onal macroeconomic policy, whether of Keynes-
ian or Friedman’s variety, unworkable. This in turn causes the nervous reacƟ ons 
of the poliƟ cians who seem (the case of Europe is here spectacularly visible), to 
have run out of ideas and policies, with an endless fl ow of summits of no palpa-
ble use. In case of America a response to a crisis has always been driven by a fear 
of the repeƟ Ɵ on of the 30s crisis.44 This crisis was ended not by the New Deal re-
forms but by the economic producƟ on of the Second World War, the demand of 
a devastated Europe aŌ er the war and sending millions of returning soldiers into 
colleges, which gave the United States a producƟ ve, intellectual and technologi-
cal boost and accelerated unprecedented consumpƟ on at home. But the crisis 
of the 30s was caused essenƟ ally by a defl aƟ on policy, acƟ vated by depression, 
caused in turn by the bursƟ ng of the stock market bubble. 
Today the situaƟ on is diﬀ erent. The federal government instruments tradi-
Ɵ onally employed are not working since they essenƟ ally move within the circle 
of the fi nancial market without being converted into the demand capabiliƟ es of 
individual consumers burdened with debts. This would require a drasƟ c amnesty 
of debts in the property market (the ancient echo of the Athenian Solon is heard 
here), and an enormous breakthrough in R&D delineaƟ ng new economic fron-
Ɵ ers, a tradiƟ onal American intellectual improvisaƟ on. The military sector might 
be one obvious possibility here. 
There are two ways of approaching military spending during an economic 
crisis, depending essenƟ ally on the imaginaƟ on and will of the poliƟ cal and mili-
tary leadership. One way is to assume that military spending should follows the 
economy, in which case the military must wait for the economy to recover. This 
was the main line of Barack Obama’s speech in the summer of 2010 at West 
Point when he said that at “no Ɵ me in human history has a naƟ on of diminished 
economic vitality maintained its military and poliƟ cal primacy”.45 But this is not 
necessarily so. The other way of approaching military spending during a Ɵ me 
of economic crisis is the opposite of the above. The military does not have to 
wait for the economy to grow. Two examples of recent history tesƟ fy to that. 
One is the Great Depression era, when the United States, severely economically 
crippled for the twelve years 1929–1941, with the economy cut nearly in half, 
became the engine of democracy, defeated Germany and Japan, helped Britain 
and the Soviet Union win the war, imposed its dominaƟ on over the oceans, and 
freed half of Europe in World War II.46 
and Germany. The Western world was sold the utopia that it can run the 21st century 
economy, and consumpƟ on brought about by it, with medieval technology. 
44 As German response has always been condiƟ oned by the fear of hyperinfl aƟ on of the 
20s.
45 Quoted in Mark Helprin “The Common Defense”, The Claremont Review of Books, 
Winter 2010 – Spring 2011, p. 118. 
46 Rearmament was an engine of producƟ on and a powerful organizing principle. Aver-
age GDP from 1931 to 1940 was close to 78 billion, and average unemployment 19%. 
By the end of the war in 1945, GDP increased 271% to 210 billion, with unemployment 
dropping to 1.2. In the meanƟ me personal disposable income more than doubled, all 
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The other example is the military build-up of Ronald Reagan aŌ er 1981 at 
a Ɵ me of the great economic slump of the 70s. Both eﬀ orts paid oﬀ  economically, 
despite the fact of the iniƟ al, especially in the fi rst case, huge defi cits, because 
they were connected with a massive rehauling of the economy.47 The peace ben-
efi t aŌ er it paid oﬀ  handsomely. Thus both eﬀ orts paid oﬀ  economically, despite 
the iniƟ al, especially in the fi rst case, huge defi cits, because they were connected 
with a massive rehauling of the economy. Thus the military does not necessarily 
have to wait unƟ l the economy recovers, but is itself an engine of recovery. 
One may argue that the situaƟ on today is diﬀ erent and that the military does 
not remain in such a “posiƟ ve” relaƟ on to the economic sector as was the case 
during the Second World War, or under Reagan, when there was no war but 
its threat was real. But that is not necessarily true. For the economy to follow 
the military one crucial moral, one economic and one poliƟ cal factor must be 
met. The moral is, that America as superpower has to have a sense of disƟ ncƟ ve 
poliƟ cal mission coming from its cultural self-idenƟ ty. Money follows vision and 
leadership, not the other way around. The economic factor to be met is that the 
intellectual and industrial basis for such a military recovery that is the military 
sector, must be the naƟ onal one. 
In comparison with its compeƟ tors only the United States has such a R&D ba-
sis and industrial potenƟ al of applicaƟ on.48 The poliƟ cal factor must be the coun-
try’s democraƟ c form, and the military is here necessary to guarantee the invio-
lability of the correlaƟ on of forces in the world, with the United States securing 
the democraƟ c world.49 Its military physical presence and potenƟ al provide a se-
curity zone to the enƟ re world order, for instance by securing public internaƟ onal 
goods such as the sea trade lanes or shielding other countries from blackmailing 
that with GDP spending just slightly under 40% and 86% of the Federal Budget on de-
fense, starƟ ng from a situaƟ on when marginal discreƟ onary income was non-existent. 
The debt incurred during the war was quickly liquidated by the rebuilding of Europe 
and its defense for 50 years, with a massive expansion of the civil sector and consump-
Ɵ on in the US. See on the Great Depression recovery Niall Fergusson The War of the 
World, Penguin, New York 2006, pp. 245–308.
47 A good overview see W. Elliot Brownlee, Hugh Davis Graham (ed.) The Reagan Presi-
dency: PragmaƟ c ConservaƟ sm and Its Legacy, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence 
2003.
48 Russia and China sƟ ll have to rely heavily on imports. True, Russia is, next to the U.S., 
the main exporter of armaments, but in some strategic areas, as for instance tanks, 
specialized combat ships, or military soŌ ware, its industry and R&D are lagging sig-
nifi cantly behind. This forces Russians to switch from its own industry, expensive and 
ineﬃ  cient, to imports, especially from Western Europe, like the Mistral assault ships 
from France, soŌ ware for command centers from Siemens and now, possibly Leopard 
tanks from Germany, which are much beƩ er and cheaper than Russian T-90s exported 
in turn to India or other countries. 
49 This might be called “the imperialism of anƟ -imperialism”. See on that Niall Fergusson, 
Colossus, op. cit., pp. 61–104.
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pressures and acƟ ons of the non-democraƟ c countries. Such blackmailing or po-
tenƟ al acƟ on might directly or indirectly cripple the United States economy.50 
The United States is the regime which fulfi lls the above condiƟ ons. It has 
a self-contained potenƟ al, and it is democraƟ c, guaranteeing the security of the 
democraƟ c global zone and its economic security. Despite all complicaƟ ons and 
challenges America is sƟ ll the pace-seƫ  ng country of the world, meaning the 
history-seƫ  ng country, unless it abdicates this posiƟ on, the stability of which 
depends as ever on a large, modern and aŌ er all convenƟ onal military. But the 
understanding of this fact, and the will to act on it, is essenƟ ally a maƩ er of self-
percepƟ on and character, the values which precede decisions. They have liƩ le to 
do with intellectual, let alone economic calculaƟ ons.51 Thus, US defense spending 
in Ɵ mes of crisis might not be a threat to its economy, but a sƟ mulus. It should 
be done not only because economic reason dictates it, but also because this is 
congruent with the defense needs of the United States, on which the econom-
ic well-being of the United States depends. A substanƟ al military limitaƟ on of 
spending should not be a remedy for the United States economic crisis, let alone 
a response to a global threat. 
Obama’s response to such economic-military consideraƟ ons is the new, of-
fi cial doctrine of the United States allowing for a drasƟ c reducƟ on in military 
costs. For the president it consƟ tutes just a redefi niƟ on of principles sought in 
foreign and military policy areas more a maƩ er of cuƫ  ng down waste and re-
defi ning the military’s role. In his inaugural address in January 2009, when the 
credit and banking crisis was already developing, Obama sounded fairly tradi-
Ɵ onal, suggesƟ ng that the military would be at the very center of American stra-
tegic interests. He recalled “the founding fathers”, an unusual statement from 
a very liberal-leŌ  president at the beginning of the 21st century and added that 
“we will not apologize for our way of life nor will we waver in its defense”. He 
quoted Thomas Paine’s words from his fi rst tract wriƩ en during the revoluƟ on-
ary crisis, the words which Washington, whom Obama termed “the father of our 
naƟ on”, allegedly read to his troops before leading his army across the Delaware 
on Christmas night in 1776: “Let it be told to the future world that in the depth 
50 The threat of Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz for shipping the transport of oil, the 
posiƟ oning for ArcƟ c resources of Russia, the blackmail by China of Taiwan and South-
East Asia are examples of such behavior. 
51 One can recall here a comment made by George Bush to one of his interviewers. 
Bush’s “aide said that guys like [an interviewer] were in what we call the reality–based 
community. Which he defi ned as people who believe that soluƟ ons emerge from your 
judicious study of discernable reality’. I nodded and murmured something about en-
lightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me oﬀ .’ that’s not the way the world re-
ally works anymore’ he conƟ nued. ‘We ‘re an empire now, and when we act, we create 
our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we’ll 
act again, creaƟ ng other new realƟ es, which you can study too, and that’s how things 
will sort out. We’re history actors… and you, all of you, will be leŌ  to study what we 
do”, Ron Suskind “Without a Doubt”, New York Times Magazine”, October 17, 2004; 
see also Fergusson Colossus, op. cit., p. VII.
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of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the 
country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet it”.52 The words 
were reminiscent of those of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s words from the same 
Paine’s pamphlet in his radio speech couple of months aŌ er the Japanese aƩ ack 
at Pearl Harbor in 1941.53 
The speech was also reminiscent of Ronald Reagan’s inaugural address of 
1981 at the Ɵ me of another economic crisis. It pushed the president on a re-
orientaƟ on of the economy and a massive military build up. ConservaƟ ves and 
neoconservaƟ ves expected that Obama might change internal poliƟ cs but that 
foreign policy would be backed by a strong military around the world, a return to 
robust cold war liberalism, abandoned in the wake of the Vietnam war when lib-
eralism began to be conciliatory even towards the avowed enemies of the United 
States.54 
Obamas policies soon changed, and his gestures towards the avowed en-
emies of the United States, like Russia, the Arab countries or even Iran, his ac-
ceptance of parity in the allegedly exisƟ ng “community of naƟ ons” belied this 
idea, with suspicions that his liberalism would not be “a fi ghƟ ng faith, unapolo-
geƟ cally patrioƟ c and strong in defense of liberty”.55 He became heavily criƟ cized 
from all quarters.56 The economic crisis caused Obama to sƟ mulate the economy 
52 Quoted in William Kristol “Will Obama Save Liberalism?”, “The Weekly Standard”, 
January 26, 2009. 
53 The president quoted the most famous of Paine’s words: “These are Ɵ mes that try 
men’s souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink 
from service of their country: but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and 
thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this 
consolaƟ on with us, that the harder the confl ict, the more glorious the triumph”.
54 As a Harvard poliƟ cal philosopher stated in 1978: “From having been the aggressive 
doctrine of vigorous, spirited men, liberalism has become hardly more than a trem-
bling in the presence of illiberalism… Who today is called a liberal for strength and 
confi dence in defense of liberty?”… Why do liberals have so much trouble defending 
themselves? Liberalism… implies a body of doctrine, a more or less consistent whole 
more or less closed to doctrines inconsistent with itself. But it is evident that liberal-
ism, if it is a whole, is a whole that is afraid to be a whole –and therefore has diﬃ  culty 
in rousing parƟ sans to its defense. To defend oneself it is necessary to recognize the 
enemy, and thus to have defi ned oneself against the enemy. Liberals, however, [have 
become] tolerant, and to show their tolerance they favor a large and various society 
in which all groups, even enemies, are encouraged to take an interest… Liberalism has 
a reasonable fear of being or becoming a whole. Liberal society not only thrives on 
variety, but requires it for survival… Yet it remains true that liberalism must defend it-
self as a whole, and hence collecƟ vely… Radicalism oﬀ ers [yet] a view of liberal society 
as a whole which may be grasped and then defended as the true liberalism against 
the confused so–called liberals”. Harvey Mansfi eld, Jr, The Spirit of Liberalism, Harvard 
University Press 1978, pp. Vii, 16–19.
55 Kristol Kristol, “Will Obama Save Liberalism?”, op. cit.
56 The most intellectually infl uenƟ al Charles Krauthammer criƟ cized Obama for a total 
lack of character in foreign policy decisions, and his need to ingraƟ ate himself with 
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by essenƟ ally federal, non-producƟ ve, plans, which entailed an enlargement 
of bureaucracy, taxes and heavy cuts everywhere, including the military. This 
prompted one commentator to observe that “the strange suicidal convicƟ on now 
fashionable among the elites is that the customary vast reserves of power with 
which America maneuvers in the internaƟ onal system and, in extremis, wields in 
its defense, have become irrelevant to security and detrimental to the economy… 
For a naƟ on that has lost the unapologeƟ c drive to defend itself cannot escape 
the consequences no maƩ er how deŌ  its self-decepƟ ons or the extent to which, 
in contradicƟ on of history and fact, error is raƟ fi ed by common belief. What ar-
guments, what savings, what economy can possibly oﬀ set the costs and heart-
breaks of a war undeterred or a war lost?”.57 
The Obama administraƟ on decided to reduce dramaƟ cally American military 
power. There are several assumpƟ ons which underlay the American military doc-
trine presented in the Pentagon in January 2012, immediately aŌ er withdrawing 
American troops from Iraq, a move essenƟ ally supported by both the Republi-
cans and the Democrats. Obama announced that the United States budget would 
sƟ ll be higher than the budgets of the next ten countries which spent most on 
their military. Nevertheless, the main points of the reducƟ on proposed by the 
plan are:
1. The Pentagon budget will be reduced within the next 10 years by 487 billion 
dollars. AddiƟ onal reducƟ ons of 500 billion dollars will be applied automaƟ -
cally at the beginning of 2013, if the Democrats and Republicans do not make 
an agreement how to reduce defi cit by other means.
2. The army will be reduced by 10–15%, roughly by around 100 thousand.
3. Cuts were announced in producing and commissioning some sophisƟ cated ar-
maments. This has been done gradually over the last years with, for instance, 
F-22 Raptor fi ghter strike cancelled altogether. The purchase of the latest F-35 
fi ghter / Joint Fighter Strike / will be postponed. These cuts are deep. One 
should remember that the armored equipment of the US army, tanks and 
transporters, originaƟ ng from the 80s, is obsolete by American standards.
4. One American brigade, roughly 4 thousand soldiers will be reduced in Europe 
in 2013, a strategy of the so-called “wide reorientaƟ on“. Another brigade will 
be reduced in 2014.58 
other people’s views, including world leaders: “Does anything he says remain opera-
Ɵ ve beyond the fading of the audience applause?”, Jay Nordlinger “CriƟ c-in-Chief”, 
NaƟ onal Review, November 23, 2009, pp. 28.
57 Helprin “The Common Defense”, op. cit., p. 118. 
58 Announcing the reducƟ on, Gen Raymond T. Odierno did not say which brigades but 
they turned out to be the 170th Infantry Brigade in Grafenwohr in Bavaria, and the 
172nd Infantry Brigade in Baumholder in Nieder-PalaƟ nate. These are so called “heavy 
brigades”, which despite oﬃ  cially being infantry brigades, have tanks, armored car-
riers and arƟ llery units. Today Americans have four brigades in Europe, three in Ger-
many, the third one in Vilseck in Bavaria and one in Vicenza, Italy. With other forces 
they count together 81 thousand soldiers, of which 41 thousand are the land forces. 
These units are roughly between 3–5 thousand strong, but with service personnel, 
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5. Obama stressed a development of modern, smart weapons and the adjust-
ment of the arms to the exigencies of the modern military confl icts, with 
prioriƟ es centered around terrorism, the proliferaƟ on of nuclear weapons, 
and intelligence. But this talk of “smarter”, more “agile” weapons, that would 
“evolve” to meet military exisƟ ng commitments across the globe are euphe-
misms for retreat [as many observers noƟ ced, since] the problem with the 
country’s warriors is not that they lack technological sophisƟ caƟ on, but that 
they are too few. The [American] combat mission in Iraq may be over, but 
the peace is fragile and violence conƟ nues. In Afghanistan, an accelerated 
withdrawal and negoƟ ated peace with the Taliban are likely to create more 
naƟ onal security threats than they eliminate. The Arab world remains a giant 
powder keg, and a destabilized North Korea, a radicalized Pakistan, a nucle-
ar Iran, and even a suddenly unpredictable Russia could also pose serious 
threats.59 The cuts will remove 27,000 soldiers and 20,000 Marines from ac-
Ɵ ve duty, taking force levels to the Clinton years. 
6. UnƟ l Obama’s plan, the oﬃ  cial doctrine of the United States had been based 
on an axiom of the military being able to fi ght and win the war with two en-
emies at the same Ɵ me and a “brushfi re” confl ict. AŌ er the Cold War and the 
“peace dividend” the doctrine was even extended: two major theater wars 
and a series of “brushfi re” confl icts, which stretched the American forces in 
places from Yemen, to air support in Libya in 2011, not counƟ ng Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The new strategy aims to engage and defeat one enemy, while 
merely disrupƟ ng another, a move from a “win-win” to “win-spoil” plan. 
This is a radical change of strategy. As a visible disengagement of U.S. power 
this will defi nitely cause global actors to adjust their strategies and acƟ ons ac-
cordingly. But this will change American thinking as well, since such a decreased 
capacity tends to change behavior to match the capacity. The strategy was an-
nounced by Secretary of Defense Leon PaneƩ a, who conceded that a reducƟ on 
of the army and its potenƟ al will mean an inability of the U.S. to wage more than 
one ground war. Diplomacy, especially “soŌ  power” diplomacy will be a tool to 
make up for that. Nevertheless PaneƩ a expressed his fear that such a drasƟ c 
reducƟ on of the military budget in 2013 will be dangerous. 
PaneƩ a was right to note that debt was also a naƟ onal-security issue, thus fi s-
cal recƟ tude was necessary, especially by reducing bureaucracy. One commenta-
tor observed yet that “a bank looking to reduce overhead does not start by fi ring 
guards and cuƫ  ng corners on vaults. When General MarƟ n Dempsey, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ  was asked how the United States would carry on as the 
world’s great power with a shrunken military as this one and incommensurate to 
civil personnel and families their real number is higher. For instance, in Baumholder, 
where the 172nd infantry brigade is located, there are 13 thousand Americans and 
only 4 thousand Germans. The decision caused economic panic in these German com-
muniƟ es, both because the US Army is the biggest employer there, and the American 
spending power keeps the economy there going. 
59 “Indefensible” in NaƟ onal Review, February 6, 2012, p. 16.
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this role, he avoided the quesƟ on by answering that it would be commensurate, 
adding ‘This is not a strategy of military decline’”.60 
Several implicaƟ ons and inconsistencies of such a military policy are visible. 
The fi rst is an assumpƟ on that the Americans will never face two major enemies 
at once. The second, that the era of convenƟ onal warfare is over, despite the fact 
that the American response to the insurgency has been mostly convenƟ onal. The 
third assumpƟ on is probably the most worrying. It claims that military spending 
is a proper refl ecƟ on of American military might, and since the Americans spend 
the equivalent of the military budgets of the 10 next naƟ ons, there is nothing to 
worry about. 
But the military spending by Americans can not be gauged just in relaƟ on 
to the others who spend less. By the very nature of American power it should 
take into account the nature of American responsibiliƟ es and commitments, the 
size of America, its geographic and geopoliƟ cal posiƟ on and the needs of its eco-
nomic security. It should also consider the fact that the military contribuƟ ons of 
the allies are declining, at least in Europe. Nothing indicates that this situaƟ on 
will change, since the causes of such a lagging are essenƟ ally cultural, mental 
not economic. Even NATO in such a case is not a reliable point of reference. As 
Afghanistan showed, NATO is unsure what it wants to be.61 
There are addiƟ onal doubts about the new Obama military doctrine. The 
American army is a voluntary, professional army, conscripƟ on was ended aŌ er 
the Vietnam War, and will not return. The strength of the volunteer army de-
pends thus even more on this army being perceived as a ciƟ zens’ army in uniform 
by professional proxy. This is the condiƟ on of the army having legiƟ macy for its 
prolonged, strategic service from the society at large. Such a legiƟ macy under 
the conscripƟ on system broke down during the Vietnam War. Today the all-vol-
unteer (AVF), professional army is having other problems during prolonged wars, 
without clearly defi ned aims, such the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.62 A total 
60 The data and facts from the Obama press conference are based on oﬃ  cial press and 
internet releases; also “Indefensible”, op. cit.
61 For a good overview of this problem see Sarwar A. Kashmeri NATO 2.0:Reboot or De-
lete?, Free Press, New York 2011 and Gulnur Aybet, Rebecca Moore, Lawrence Freed-
man “NATO in Search of a Vision”, Georgia University Press, Athens, GA 2011; Good 
arguments for staƟ ng that the future of NATO depends on a retenƟ on of a coherent 
cultural noƟ on of the West, as against the onslaught of the mulƟ cultural, postmod-
ernist ideologies are put forth in Stanley R. Sloan “Permanent Alliance: NATO and the 
TransatlanƟ c Bargain from Truman to Obama”, ConƟ nuum, New York 2010, pp. 267–
291. For a conservaƟ ve, Burkean argument to that eﬀ ect, explaining that NATO is just 
another chapter of Western idenƟ ty and its Grand NarraƟ ve, and thus its existence 
depends on a retenƟ on of both, see David Gress From Plato to NATO: The Ideology of 
the West and its Opponents, Free Press, New York 1998, esp. pp. 503–560.
62 In Iraq there was a visible evoluƟ on of the changing raƟ onale for the invasion. First it 
was the prevenƟ on of nuclear arms being used by Saddam Hussein, then there was 
“naƟ on building”, and “democracy naƟ on building” especially, curiously supported 
more by the Republicans than the Democrats, who tradiƟ onally, since Woodrow Wil-
son, focused on a doctrine that was to “make the world safe for democracy”. Then it 
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indiﬀ erence might happen on the past of the American society living its own indi-
vidual lives. More spending will not improve the situaƟ on here automaƟ cally, but 
more spending rightly located and explained might keep the army as one of the 
most important elements of creaƟ ng the civil ethic.63 
In addiƟ on, purchasing power parity is not a good criterion of assessing the 
spending level if treated without further qualifi caƟ ons. The sheer military spend-
ing is not an adequate measurement and might be outwardly misleading.64 One 
may also add here the military trajectories of American rivals, for instance “mask-
ing eﬀ ects of oﬀ -budget outlays and occult expenditures”, exchange rate distor-
Ɵ ons. Thus military spending is of limited uƟ lity to gauge a parƟ cular county’s 
military capabiliƟ es. They are nevertheless useful if they are taken as a measure 
of decline or progress in relaƟ on to its own wealth, and as a measure for com-
parison with other countries. The dynamic of such a relaƟ on might be rising or 
declining within the budget of a parƟ cular country, but it is only by examining this 
tendency as compared with similar tendencies in other countries that a general 
picture might be relevant. And here the American dynamic is relaƟ vely declining 
in relaƟ on to, for instance, China.65 
was simply stability, all that mixed with a raƟ onale which might be the fi nal and the 
only real one in terms of actual consequences, that is toppling a bloody dictator, with 
all other objecƟ ves coming to naught.
63 See on that Suzanne C. Nielsen, Don M. Snider (ed.) “American Civil-Military RelaƟ ons: 
The Soldier and the State in a New Era”, Johns Hopkins University Press, BalƟ more 
2011; also Bruce Fleming Bridging the Military-Civilian Divide: What Each Side Must 
Know about the Other-and about Itself, Potomac Books, Washington D.C. 2011. 
64 There are perennial problems of the American army paying exorbitant prices for army 
trivia. This is a universal army problem elsewhere, but what is exorbitant in America 
may not even be thought about, for instance, in Russia or China, or vice versa, what 
is exorbitant in Russia may be trivial for Americans. Of course, the Russians and Chi-
nese might have a problem of exorbitant costs but they stem from corrupƟ on, in large 
measure supported by the safety net of the state over its heavily subsidized military in-
dustry. But even Russia recognized that problem as sapping the economy at large and 
in February 2002 decided to cut drasƟ cally the military budget, cut substanƟ ally state 
support for the ineﬃ  cient home military sector, discarded its earlier commissioning of 
the French Mistral assault ships, and decided to rely more on imports. The last move 
was caused both by the eﬃ  ciency of costs consideraƟ ons, as well as the inability of 
the Soviet industry to match Western, mainly American sophisƟ caƟ on, especially con-
cerning electronics. For instance the Russian Sukhoi T-50 jet fi ghter oﬃ  cially shown 
at the air show in 2011, thought to be a match for American F-22 Raptor, might be 
more agile, carry more arms and have a longer range but is no match for its American 
counterpart in terms of electronics, which nullifi es all its advantages.
65 From 1940 to 2000 average American annual spending was 8.5% of GDP. In war and 
mobilizaƟ on years 13.3%. Under Democrat administraƟ ons 9.4%, under Republican, 
7.3%.In the peaceƟ ne 5.7%. Today Americans spend 4.6%, but less purely operaƟ onal 
war costs, amount to 3.8% which means 66% tradiƟ onal peaceƟ me outlays. In 1929 
GDP was 103 billion dollars, in 1933 55 billion $, a decline of 46%. In 2007, GDP was 
14.061 trillion dollars, in 2010, 14.870, Helprin The Common Defense, op. cit., p.118. 
One may argue that the GDP is incomparably higher, even if adjusƟ ng for infl aƟ on, but 
so it is higher than that of America’s adversaries.
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China is here the main contender, although not exactly for reasons of it tak-
ing the lead in the world, which it is not capable of doing today, and probably 
will not be able to do so in the future. It has many severe internal problems and 
probably it will get old before it will get rich.66 But China might contribute might-
ily to a diminishing of American power as no.1 in the world without subsƟ tuƟ ng 
anything as an alternaƟ ve. Nothing can replace the United States of today and in 
the foreseeable future in tasks it performs.
The European Union has aƫ  tudes rather than poliƟ cs and is increasingly ma-
nipulated by its oligarchic bureaucracies orchestrated by Germany into believing 
that a paternalisƟ c federal state is the best and the only soluƟ on to its economic, 
social and cultural problem with the naƟ on states defi ned as obstacles to that 
aim.67 This might cause yet a resistance of the naƟ ons concerned or a price paid 
for such a compliance in increased consumerism, which is unlikely. The only real 
harm which the European Union could do to the United States at the moment 
is to create an alternaƟ ve currency, the euro. But the euro, being a response to 
a poliƟ cal desire of federal Europe, imploded in 2011 while at the same Ɵ me it 
has so far showed its real economic nature of a fi nancial tool of the stronger Eu-
ropean economies to dominate the European Union peripheries. 
Europe is experiencing its fi rst wake-up call from a situaƟ on in which its cul-
tural and poliƟ cal decline was not discernible which the new utopia devised by 
the generaƟ on of 1968 now governing the European Union was to stop. But 
such dreams could fl oat around because the European Union had a false sense 
of security guaranteed by American power. This power was real and it could be 
perceived as paternalisƟ c, thus the tremendous resentment of the old European 
Union elites. But it was not dangerous even if imperial. The United States was 
an empire, but paradoxically, a “non-imperial” empire; its legions did not pacify 
Europe but liberated it twice, its “colonial” legions did not exploit the colonized 
people like the old colonial powers. 
America was for Europe like an older, stronger, streetwise brother who treated 
his younger brothers, Germany, Italy or even France as allies, as a precious giŌ  un-
der its protecƟ on. Europe got a tremendous, spectacular “free ride” for America 
66 China’s policy of diminishing its populaƟ on during the last decades, with its brutal and 
criminal aborƟ on policy is responsible for more than the rising aﬄ  uence of the young 
middle class. The Chinese leaders are realizing the dead end of it, but it might be too 
late. One can recall a response of one of the Singapore leaders in late 50s when meet-
ing with the Western “experts” of populaƟ on control, advising him how to get out of 
poverty by drasƟ cally reducing the populaƟ on by aggressive techniques of all sorts. To 
that he smiled and responded: “You want us to be crippled by destroying our greatest 
asset. This is our gold mine, the most vital source of our possible wealth and develop-
ment”. I owe this story to prof. Jeﬀ rey Sachs during a discussion at Harvard University 
in August 1991 devoted to the strategy of modernizaƟ on for Eastern Europe.
67 See on this an excellent analysis by Pierre Manent A World Beyond PoliƟ cs: A Defence 
of the NaƟ on-State, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006; also his Democracy 
Without NaƟ ons? The Fate of Self-Government in Europe, ISI Books Wilmington, De 
2007.
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money, while at the same Ɵ me being for America, as at the end of the 19th cen-
tury, or in the 20s of the 20th century, a dreamed about point of intellectual ref-
erence for the American university and media elites. For them, to paraphrase 
the memorable Groucho Marx, whatever America was for they were against it. 
The generaƟ on of such American intellectuals who came out of the 60s and its 
turmoil, who imbibed all contagious intellectual European fads revolving mainly 
around the mantra word of “deconstrucƟ on” translated to poliƟ cal “emancipa-
Ɵ on” in the name of equality, has become bent on changing American “excep-
Ɵ onalism”. And if the European “disease” is ravaging the character of European 
elites full of conceit and arrogance towards their own ciƟ zens sheepishly content 
with the welfare state as a price for it, this disease might contaminate the United 
States governing elites as well. They are yet, as of today, sƟ ll partly immune to 
the longings of its cultural and media elites for centralizaƟ on of the economy and 
governmentalizaƟ on of individual liberty, treated as a giŌ  from government, not 
an inherent right.
It might happen that such “europeizaƟ on” of America will hasten the laƩ er’s 
decline, a price paid for a mesmerizaƟ on with the European way of development. 
American decline might be a long process but, as every civilizaƟ onal decline, it 
starts with cultural exhausƟ on. This means that the virtues which are oﬃ  cially 
prided upon and inculcated and which created the greatness of a parƟ cular civi-
lizaƟ on are in fact less and less pracƟ ced and even less and less esteemed.68 That 
is why the Obama presidency might consƟ tute a real change. This is probably the 
fi rst modern American president who is a cherished “child” of the new university 
and media elite expecƟ ng him to change America, defi ed by them as “problem-
aƟ c” civilizaƟ onally and morally. That is why the Obama presidency might be so 
crucial for the future course of the United States as a superpower and his military 
policy should be viewed from such a perspecƟ ve.69 
What the Americans are facing is a problem which Britain experienced aŌ er 
the Second World War., and which consƟ tuted the most visible corroboraƟ on of 
68 Such virtues as self-reliance, courage in face of unexpected challenges, individual ini-
Ɵ aƟ ve, moral responsibility for one’s choices in life, local self-government, reliance 
on voluntary associaƟ ons, tolerance of diﬀ erence and oddity, hard work, respect for 
religion and tradiƟ on while believing in material and moral progress, a deep and inces-
sant suspicion of authority and with that treaƟ ng the state as an outside enƟ ty subser-
vient to the people, an intolerance of any paternalisƟ c aƫ  tudes of the elites towards 
the people at large have been the American virtues. The best, and one of the fi rst ex-
posiƟ ons of them, is the famous speech of Edmund Burke in the BriƟ sh parliament in 
1775 on the eve of the American revoluƟ on, a warning and a plea to the BriƟ sh elites 
to make amends to the colonies, which, if they rebel, will never be defeated. Edmund 
Burke “Speech on ConciliaƟ on with America”, ed. Joseph Villiers Denney, ScoƩ , Fores-
man, Chicago 1898, pp. 25–126.
69 For an extended exposiƟ on of this argument see Andrzej Bryk “Konserwatyzm ame-
rykański od Reagana do Obamy”, “American ConservaƟ sm from Reagan to Obama”, 
in Piotr Musiewicz (red.) Ronald Reagan: Nowa odsłona w 100-lecie urodzin, Ośrodek 
Myśli Politycznej, Kraków 2011, pp. 191–318. 
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its decline as an empire.70 A global military securing strategic interests or Euro-
sized enƟ tlements is a real not a phony choice. You cannot have both at the same 
Ɵ me for a simple reason that the size of the “suﬃ  cient enough” enƟ tlements 
depends on psychological and comparaƟ ve factors. The law of rising expectaƟ ons 
exceeding the ability to deliver goods is one of the symptoms of decline and it 
rises from generaƟ on to generaƟ on. 
But the global military is perceived at the same Ɵ me as a given, something you 
have to be convinced about, the eﬀ ort which depends largely on cultural factors, 
an understanding of human nature and the nature of internaƟ onal relaƟ ons com-
ing from that understanding, as well as of one’s self-percepƟ on. If these change, 
the global military might be considered a simple, wasteful burden and every con-
fl ict a “warmongering” adventure against people with just interests or peace lov-
ing and fi ghƟ ng aggressors. A government which cannot meet its promises, and 
cynical poliƟ cians, are in the liberal-democraƟ c world today as Roman Caesars at 
the end of the empire, capable of winning the consumerist and corrupted populus 
70 Between 1951 and 1997 the proporƟ on of government expenditure on defense de-
clined from 24% to 7%, while the proporƟ on on health and welfare rose from 22 to 
53%, in the period sƟ ll before the Labor Government took power to change this pro-
porƟ on further at the expense of defense. But that went hand in hand with the psy-
chological acceptance of decline, despite the fact that the BriƟ sh were “on the right 
side of all great confl icts of the last century [unlike] the German people [who] in two 
generaƟ ons became just as obnoxiously pacifi st as they once were menacing naƟ onal-
ist. … You’d hardly be recepƟ ve to pitches for naƟ onal greatness aŌ er half a century 
of Kaiser Bill, Weimar, the Third Reich, and the Holocaust… [But BriƟ sh] have been, in 
the scales of history, a force for good in the world. Even as their colonies advanced 
for independence, they retained the English language and English legal system, not to 
menƟ on cricket and all kinds of other cultural Ɵ es. And even in imperial retreat there 
is no raƟ onal basis for late 20th century Britain’s conclusion that it had no future other 
than as an outlying province of a centralized Euro nanny state dominated by naƟ ons 
whose poliƟ cal, legal, and cultural tradiƟ ons are enƟ rely alien to its own. The embrace 
of such a fate is a psychological condiƟ on, not an economic one. Is America set for 
decline? It’s been a grand run. The country’s been the leading economic power since 
it overtook Britain in the 1880’s… Nevertheless…, Detroit went from the world’s indus-
trial powerhouse to an urban wasteland, and the once-golden state of California at-
rophied into a land of government run by the government for the government. What 
happens when the policies that brought ruin to Detroit and sclerosis to California be-
come the basis for the naƟ on at large? Strictly on the numbers, the United States is in 
the express lane to Declinistan: unsustainable enƟ tlements, the remorseless govern-
mentalizaƟ on of the economy and individual liberty, and a centralizaƟ on of power that 
will cripple a naƟ on of this size. Decline is the way to bet. But what will ensure it is if 
American people accept decline as a price worth paying for European social democ-
racy. Is it hard to imagine? Every Ɵ me I recall the latest indignity imposed upon the 
‘ciƟ zen’ by some or other ConƟ nental apparatchik, I receive emails from the heartland 
poinƟ ng out, with much reference to the Second Amendment, that it couldn’t happen 
here because Americans aren’t Euro–weenies. But nor were Euro-weenies once upon 
a Ɵ me” Mark Steyn “Welcome to Rome”, NaƟ onal Review, January 25, 2010, pp. 36, 
38, 40.
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by promising welfare, facing the dilemma whether to cut the costs of the “ab-
stract” military or the costs of the “human needs” of ordinary people.71 
Welfare and military spending are now moving along opposite trajectories 
and the point at which the former will overtake the laƩ er does not depend so 
much on reasoned argument or interests. They will ulƟ mately be based on po-
liƟ cal decisions dependent on the culture and character of a parƟ cular naƟ on, 
and by implicaƟ on on the cultural code which is being inculcated in a process of 
public educaƟ on, the media, or academe. It is interesƟ ng to observe that war, 
the military, and the resulƟ ng expenditure, are incessantly being portrayed in 
the leading media and academia in the liberal-democraƟ c world today as “prob-
lemaƟ c”, or “redundant” for a proper organizaƟ on of the world. For instance in 
many American university history departments military history has been reduced 
drasƟ cally or eliminated altogether.72 This touches also on subtle mechanisms 
71 The American enƟ tlement programs today per year exceed the revenues of the federal 
government, which means that whatever the cuts in other spending, such as military, 
educaƟ on, crime prevenƟ on or environment, they do not maƩ er much. Two opƟ ons 
are necessary. Either to cut drasƟ cally enƟ tlements costs together with other expen-
ditures, or to raise revenues by taxes, or by economic growth, possibly also by some 
technological breakthroughs. The division between Europe and the United States 
today is also along those lines, Europeans, by inclinaƟ on favoring taxes, Americans 
growth. See R. Salam “Where Jobs Aren’t”, NaƟ onal Review, 18 April 2011, pp. 22–
24. 
72 Moreover it is diﬃ  cult to establish a chair of military history by solely private dona-
Ɵ ons, as has been proved during the last years in many instances. Such a move is 
treated as teaching “violent” behavior, or geƫ  ng students interested in a subject 
which should be progressively eliminated as part of a poliƟ cally correct vision of the 
world. This is also connected with the post-1968 liberal leŌ  educaƟ on as a means of 
inculcaƟ ng not so much knowledge but aƫ  tudes like “gender equality” and eliminat-
ing wrong aƫ  tudes, for instance “manliness”, and the dominance of feminist educa-
Ɵ on. On this fascinaƟ ng topic see, for example, ChrisƟ ne Sommers The War Against 
Boys: How Misguided Feminism is Harming Our Young Man, Simon &Schuster, New 
York 2000, esp. pp. 207–214; also Harvey C. Mansfi eld “Manliness”, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2006, pp. pp. 72–78, 229–244 and F. Carolyn Graglia Domes-
Ɵ c Tranquility: A Brief Against feminism, Spence Publishing Company, Dallas 1998, esp. 
pp. 55–59, 308–20. With that came a ubiquitous equaƟ on of power and violence with 
evil, as if desire to exercise violence was tantamount to commiƫ  ng evil, which meant 
the eliminaƟ on of a thought that power, ”the sword” might be for something. The 
other side of such negaƟ ve teaching was of course a conclusion there is no thing worth 
fi ghƟ ng for any more. In other words the issue in general is connected with a decline 
of heroism as part of the Western cultural outlook, educaƟ on of moral aƫ  tudes and 
senƟ ments instead of morality and character formaƟ on, and the eliminaƟ on of the 
noƟ on of sacrifi ce for anything, including military sacrifi ce, as culturally suspicious, 
limiƟ ng one’s self-realizaƟ on. See on that Andrzej Bryk “Western jako amerykańska 
Odyseja” (Western as an American Odyssey), in Grzegorz Babinski, Maria Kapiszewska 
(ed.) “Zrozumieć Współczesność”, Kraków 2009, pp. 491–530. All in all, power and 
violence are increasingly defi ned as “obsolete” in the internaƟ onal context, the idea 
of negoƟ aƟ ons, “soŌ  power” and law has taken their place, with a taken for granted 
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of delegiƟ mizaƟ on, by treaƟ ng, for instance, such concepts as “patrioƟ c” as the 
equivalent of “naƟ onalisƟ c”, “naƟ on” as the equivalent of “warring tribe”, and 
“war” as the equivalent of “ritual murder”.73 
If America accepts the European Union’s internal cultural outlook and geo-
poliƟ cal disposiƟ on to withdraw, then a quesƟ on has to be raised as to who will 
become the next America, in other words who will fi ll the geostrategic void? Eu-
rope praƩ ling about its own military force and defense spending is strong eco-
nomically and might yet take advantage of that long cushioning by America which 
contributed to what Europe is today, and provide for its own defense. But there is 
no one to cushion America if it abandons its defense as the leading world power. 
It is obvious that the US military is the strongest war making, and peace winning 
machine, and cannot be a peacekeeping naƟ on-building force as it tried to do 
in Iraq or Afghanistan. But there will be no neutrality towards America even if 
it does not intervene. Resentments live for generaƟ ons, being cultural codes of 
naƟ ons’ self-percepƟ on. This non-neutrality of the outside world will be a fac-
tual impossibility because of the sheer size, infl uence, eﬃ  ciency and the values 
America cherishes. It will be hated by many not for what it does but for what it 
is. Ending the wars and withdrawing does not mean that the old good Ɵ mes will 
be back, with no eﬀ ort and challenges, living a dream life out of humanitarian, 
socialist, libertarian or generally European textbooks.74 
aƫ  tude that a human being is essenƟ ally not a creature marred by nature by evil 
impulses, something which ChrisƟ anity terms “original sin”, but a creature with the 
wrong educaƟ on at every level of its acƟ on within a context of wrongly devised in-
sƟ tuƟ ons, beginning with the family and ending with internaƟ onal insƟ tuƟ ons, the 
essenƟ ally Rousseauesque anthropology.
73 The great English lexicographer and wit of the 18th century Samuel Johnson once said 
that “patrioƟ sm is the last refuge of the scoundrel”. But according his secretary who 
wrote down the story of Johnson’s life to Boswell he meant only false patrioƟ sm, jin-
goism. But his quote has been the standard argument of those who want to discredit 
patrioƟ sm. They would beƩ er read George Orwell. In fact, accusaƟ ons against patrio-
Ɵ sm are too oŌ en the arguments of nihilists and self-serving egoists, who love usually 
just themselves. The essence of patrioƟ sm is also beƩ er visible within a context of 
a realizaƟ on that there is also a community of duƟ es with culture and history, the du-
Ɵ es which we then oﬀ er for others outside this community. To equate thus patrioƟ sm 
with naƟ onalism and confront it with allegedly universal cosmopolitan world com-
munity or humanity as such is a fi cƟ on masquerading as reality and manipulated by 
power holders, also using the concept of bastardized human rights ideology and inter-
naƟ onal governance. To a certain extent this is a poliƟ cal and cultural equivalent of the 
old philosophical contest between universalists and nominalists. The essence of the 
argument is whether there is only a singular human being, or there is also a commu-
nity of values. In the fi rst case it may happen that that which is called usually progress 
of the world community is essenƟ ally a progress of the autonomous imperial Self, its 
moral autocreaƟ on, which means usually a desire.
74 America cannot say like Greta Garbo: “I want to be [leŌ ] alone”. Even in steep, ir-
reversible decline and global retreat, the United States would remain for the rest of 
the world and for a long Ɵ me the biggest, the most cherished target, viewed with 
resentment and accused of everything as Britain has been. America cannot aﬀ ord to 
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Who will be then number 1? The dreams about taking this role by world Islam 
are just that, dreams. Islam has a tremendous potenƟ al of geƫ  ng into the midst 
of the declining cultures, for instance Europe, but has no capability of creaƟ ng 
dynamic civilizaƟ on aƩ racƟ ve to others in such a way so its spread will be com-
mensurate with the exigencies of a benign empire.75 We do not know what the 
evoluƟ on of Islam will be, but the belief that the West can consƟ tute a model for 
the Islamic world into which the Islamic world will mold itself willingly or with 
American help is highly doubƞ ul, the result of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 tesƟ fi es 
to that. The Islamic civilizaƟ on of the Middle East has for centuries struggled with 
the West, but defi nitely lost its creaƟ ve parity in the 16th century, having been 
unable to make up for scienƟ fi c innovaƟ ons, the baƩ le of Lepanto of 1573 being 
the turning point. It lost also insƟ tuƟ onally, unable to introduce into the poliƟ cal 
realm the sacrum and profanum disƟ ncƟ on of ChrisƟ anity. For over half a century 
Islam has controlled the world’s most valuable resources and operaƟ ng within 
the context of the naƟ on states. But aŌ er the colonial dominance it has dreamed 
of revanche. Finally the revanche has come but only in the form of a relaƟ ve 
decline of the West, in the eyes of Islam a sign of corrupƟ on and decadence, but 
from here to any civilizaƟ onal resurgence is a long way.76 
be isolaƟ onist, even if it wanted to. Thus “Luxembourg can vote for a quiet life, but not 
a naƟ on of 300 million people whose cultural infl uence, for good or ill, is everywhere. 
To modify Trotsky, you may not be interested in the world, but the world is interested 
in you. And ‘America: Love us or leave us be’ is especially unpersuasive when your 
future’s mortgaged to foreigners, and everything in your house is made overseas. This 
is isolaƟ onist and liberatarian narcissism… as banal as any other strain… Know-nothing 
parochial delusion is not the soluƟ on”. But at the same Ɵ me it does not mean that 
“ten years of desultory, inconclusive, transnaƟ onally constrained warmongering is 
[not] a problem… Uncle Sam has now spent a decade running around the Hindu Kush 
building grade schools and shoveling taxpayer-funded Viagra to every elderly village 
headman with one too many child brides. According to the World Bank, the Western 
military/aid presence accounts for 97 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP. And within a week 
of the West’s departure, it will be as if that 97 percent had never been there, and all 
that remains will be the same old 3 percent tribal dump of mullahs, warlords, poppy 
barons, and pederasts, all as charmingly unspoiled as if the U.S. and its allies had quit 
48 aŌ er toppling the Taliban in 2011. [True] it is two-thirds of a century since the 
alleged hyperpower last ambiguously won a war, and that ought to prompt a liƩ le 
serious consideraƟ on of the maƩ er.[ But] instead we have [only criƟ cs saying that] 
all would be well if we stopped ‘endlessly bombing’ ‘these countries’”. Mark Steyn 
“Happy Warrior”, NaƟ onal Review, February 6, 2012, p. 52. 
75 See on that David P. Goldman “How CivilizaƟ ons Die (And Why Islam is Dying Too)” 
Regnery, Washington D.C. 2011.One of the book’s thesis is that Muslim faith is waning 
and with that ferƟ lity rate, in contrast to ChrisƟ an America.
76 See on that works by probably the best and most realisƟ c analyst of Islam today, 
Bernard Lewis. For instance his “Faith and PoliƟ cs: Religion and PoliƟ cs in the Mid-
dle East”, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010; and “The Crisis of Islam: Holy War 
and Unholy Terror”, Modern Library, 2009. It is probably that a real dialog with such 
a civilizaƟ on on the part of the West will not be possible unƟ l the West will come to 
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As far as Russia is concerned it has no chance of being a global player, ex-
cept in negaƟ ve terms. It is essenƟ ally posturing as a superpower, having four 
real assets: territory, energy resources, nuclear power and diplomacy. Russia sƟ ll 
defi nes America as the number one enemy in the world in its oﬃ  cial military 
doctrine. But is has no potenƟ al to take the lead or to create any lasƟ ng insƟ tu-
Ɵ onal, poliƟ cal or economic alternaƟ ve. It can mess enormously in the American 
backyard, it can sabotage American interests successfully in the Middle East, in 
Southern Asia, or in the European Union but it can do nothing to be an acƟ ve 
mover of world events. It has, of course, excellent diplomacy at least since the 
18th century and a consistent applicaƟ on in its foreign policy of a reversal of the 
famous dictum of Clausewitz that the war is an extension of poliƟ cs. For Russia 
poliƟ cs has always been an extension of war. 
terms with its own aggressive, coming from the French RevoluƟ on, atheisƟ c culture 
looking at religion, mainly ChrisƟ anity as a threat to poliƟ cal freedom. This colossal 
intellectual blunder, coming from the prejudice of the secular, liberal mind of treaƟ ng 
religion as synonymous with violence, prevents any dialogue with a culture which has 
violence as part of its religion, but nevertheless can negoƟ ate its repeal only from the 
religious basis, not from the secular basis. The West has increasingly, more in Europe 
than in America, equated the liberal regime with the total separaƟ on of religion and 
the public sphere, instead of separaƟ ng it from direct governance but, not the public 
sphere, which makes the Western regimes alien not only poliƟ cally but fundamentally 
culturally with no chance of building bridges. See on that an excellent study by Wil-
liam T. Cavanaugh “The Myth of Religious Violence”, Oxford University Press, New York 
2009, esp. pp. 181–230; this is one of the reasons why the Republican administraƟ on 
that tradiƟ onally hated “naƟ on building” adopted it aŌ er 2001 with “the zeal of the 
converted because it didn’t know what else to do”, it had no means of communicat-
ing with the Islamic world.” Mark Helprin “The Central ProposiƟ on, The Claremont 
Review of Books, fall 2011, p. 12. This was an applicaƟ on of the old Wilsonian dream 
of making the world safe for democracy combined with ProtestanƟ sm as a religion 
of democraƟ zaƟ on, with American ProtestanƟ sm turning, in the wake of European 
biblical criƟ cism, into liberal social gospel ProtestanƟ sm, making its metaphysical aims 
converge with the aim of the liberal–democraƟ c regime, and progressivism as the 
main ideology of that regime. See Richard M. Gamble The War for Righteousness: Pro-
gressive ChrisƟ anity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic NaƟ on, ISI Books, 
Wilmington, Del. 2003, esp. pp. 25–68, 233–252; But such an applicaƟ on of “naƟ on 
building” was possible towards devastated Europe in the aŌ ermath of the First and 
Second World Wars., it was even possible towards the rest of the world at the turn 
of the 20th century, the very essence of successful colonialism, or neo-colonialism. 
The successful colonial policy benefi ted simply from luck and condiƟ ons inaccessible 
today. The Europeans in the 19th century, so Americans in the fi rst half of the 20th cen-
tury found themselves at the peak of their power within the world context of divided, 
decadent poliƟ cs. Americans were disciplined, wealthy, organized, full of the zeal of an 
ascendant powerful naƟ on, their energy “bursƟ ng outwards like solar energy”, while 
the Islamic world at hand was stagnated and queƟ sƟ cally at rest, the situaƟ on, by the 
way, taken care oﬀ  by Zionist seƩ lement as well. Such a situaƟ on does not exist any 
more. 
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So we are leŌ  with China, a real heavyweight and recognized as such by the 
United States. Its role as the rising economic superpower, a fi nancial caller of 
shots of sorts, has been recognized. The Ɵ ming of American decline might be 
very much in Chinese hands, since they may determine when the dollar ceases 
to be the world reserve’s currency. And this economic capability may become 
a potent changing element of the geomarket. But it has no chance to subsƟ tute 
for America’s role in the global context. China, judging from what we know about 
its culture, even if poliƟ cally liberal, will not be a benign “liberal” empire, like 
America is. It is a collecƟ ve culture as opposed to individualisƟ c, liberal American 
culture, which maƩ ers a great deal in contacts with the outside world. Aﬄ  uence 
may change such a cultural code, but this would require a profound change of an 
incredibly old civilizaƟ on, large enough to sustain its own regeneraƟ on. 
China has also no willingness to play the role of a global player, unless it sheds 
its cultural isolaƟ onism stemming not from its parochialism, but exactly from the 
opposite feeling of being the center of the world. This will be a long, if possible, 
change, going into the very core of Chinese idenƟ ty.77 If China is thus not likely to 
play such a role of imposing the rules of global order, the likely outcome is that no 
one will, meaning order will give rise to no order, unpredictable and anarchisƟ c, 
based on ad hoc coaliƟ ons of states, not unlike the Orwellian vision.78 In such 
a “no-order” situaƟ on peƩ y dictators will have a fi eld of maneuver to develop 
nuclear armaments, and the wealthiest naƟ ons will have diﬃ  culƟ es organizing 
their ad hoc defenses with helpless internaƟ onal, phony organizaƟ ons. This will 
77 It may be yet that the most potent cultural-religious infl uence which in the long run 
can change China’s cultural code, at least enough to prompt it to be outward looking, 
is ChrisƟ anity. ChrisƟ anity’s growth in China is a spectacular factor despite persecu-
Ɵ ons of ChrisƟ ans, the support for the “oﬃ  cial” Catholic Church as against the one 
faithful to Rome. But this might be just a nuisance. It is esƟ mated that ChrisƟ anity 
“enters” Chinese culture easily, as it entered Korean culture, in comparison to the 
diﬃ  cult to penetrate Hindu culture. We do not know how this conjuncƟ on will play 
out. What is promising is the anƟ -collecƟ vist nature of ChrisƟ anity essenƟ al to its self-
understanding, a radical separaƟ on between sacrum and profanum, the correspond-
ing individualisƟ c rule of law and a conceptual destrucƟ on of the monisƟ c concept 
of power, the very contribuƟ on of ChrisƟ anity to the rise of eﬀ ecƟ ve human rights 
culture and consƟ tuƟ onal government. This laƩ er innovaƟ on might be nullifi ed in the 
West by a gradual subsƟ tuƟ on for the ChrisƟ an culture of the monisƟ c concept of the 
jealous sovereign state from the 16th century. In other words ChrisƟ an religious free-
dom might be crucial to the poliƟ cal freedom of the West as well. See on that Harold 
J. Berman Law and RevoluƟ on: The FormaƟ on of the Western Legal TradiƟ on, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1983.; also Richard J. Neuhaus, The Naked Public 
Square, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids 1984. Looking from another angle, the Judeo-Chris-
Ɵ an concept of God, as translated to humanity in the First Commandment is based on 
a simple injuncƟ on that God exists so nothing else, or no one else could become god.
78 It is usually forgoƩ en that the Orwellian nightmare of “1984” was not only based 
on the internal totalitarian order, but on the internaƟ onal order of three endlessly 
fi ghƟ ng superpowers which divided the world. Such a warring situaƟ on may assume 
changing parƟ cipants. 
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not prevent the United States from being the main target of hatred and resent-
ments. 
Such resentments last long and are directed against the most well oﬀ , since 
“imperial resentments linger long aŌ er imperial grandeur… The fi rst vicƟ ms of 
American retreat will be the many corners of the world that have benefi ted from 
an unusually benign hegemon. But the consequences of retreat will come home, 
too. In a more dangerous world, American decline will be steeper, faster, and 
more devastaƟ ng than Britain’s – and something far closer to Rome’s. In the mod-
ern era, the two halves of ‘the West’ form a mirror image. ‘The Old World’ has 
thousand–year-old churches, medieval street plans and ancient hedgerows but 
has been distressingly suscepƟ ble to every insane poliƟ cal fad, from Communism 
to fascism to the European Union. ‘The New World’ has superfi cial novelty – you 
can have your macchiato tweeted directly to your iPod – but underneath the 
surface noise it has remained truer to old poliƟ cal ideas than ‘the Old World’ 
ever has. Economic dynamism and poliƟ cal conƟ nuity seem far more central to 
America’s sense of itself than they are to most naƟ ons’. Which is why it is easier 
to contemplate Spain or Germany as a backwater than America. In a fundamen-
tal sense, an America in eclipse would no longer be America… [But] ‘decline is 
a choice’ [and] ‘civilizaƟ ons die from suicide not from murder… Permanence is an 
illusion… mighty naƟ ons can be [fast] enƟ rely transformed. But more important, 
naƟ onal decline is psychological – and therefore what maƩ ers is accepƟ ng the 
psychology of decline’”.79
This may yet happen, and that is why the military context of this challenge 
for the United States, and the world as well, is crucially important. Here there 
is another problem with the complicaƟ ons and tensions of the military-civil re-
laƟ ons with the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” of American preeminence. 
Already OperaƟ on Desert Storm in 1991, romanƟ cized in popular image as “the 
fi nest hour” of the American military aŌ er the Second World War, and prudent 
use of the military, indicated this. Tensions, of course, have always been there 
at least since the Korean War and General MacArthur’s dismissal by Truman or 
Dwight D. Eisenhower warning about the Military-Industrial Complex.80 Since the 
Vietnam War, new problems have emerged, even if iniƟ ally suppressed by the 
logic of the Cold War.81
79 Mark Steyn “Welcome to Rome: Commit naƟ onal suicide, shall we?”, NaƟ onal Review, 
January 25, 2010, p. 40. “Decline is a choice” is a phrase used by Charles Krautham-
mer, “civilizaƟ ons die from suicide not from murder”, by Arnold Toynbee. One can 
recall here a statement of Cardinal Richelieu, the fi rst minister of France under Louis 
XIII, that only God is eternal, France is always in danger. 
80 See Michael D. Pearlman, Truman and MacArthur: Policy, PoliƟ cs, and the Hunger for 
Honor and Renown, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2008; James LedbeƩ er Un-
warranted Infl uence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military Industrial Complex, Yale 
University Press, New Haven 2010.
81 A useful account is H.R. McMaster DerelicƟ on of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert Mc-
Namara, the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ , and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, Harper Perennial, 
New York 1998. 
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The creaƟ on of the All-Volunteer Force aŌ er the Vietnam War introduced 
new problems. The AVF has turned out to be professional and fl exible, reinvent-
ing itself also to all kinds of counterinsurgency exigencies increasingly felt, espe-
cially aŌ er 9/11 aƩ ack, as one of the prioriƟ es of the military, an ability lacked in 
Vietnam.82 
Two things yet changed. One has poliƟ cal as well as consƟ tuƟ onal implica-
Ɵ ons. America has now a standing army, all volunteer, professional and “impe-
rial”, not the temporary armies of the “ciƟ zens in uniforms”, a fact which would 
have terrifi ed the American founders of the republic.83 The U.S. forces are sta-
Ɵ oned, defending or establishing outposts along extended “fronƟ ers”, eastward 
across Eurasia to the Hindu Kush, and then further across the Pacifi c to Korea 
and Japan, not counƟ ng the naval and the air forces. With its global mission it 
is a strikingly small force by tradiƟ onal standards, based on less than 1% of the 
American populaƟ on, even counƟ ng reserve forces. Such a situaƟ on worries to-
day both the liberal-leŌ  and the right. Among the laƩ er many treat it as part of 
the military-bureaucraƟ c Leviathan, a worry intensifi ed aŌ er the 9/11 aƩ acks.84
82 Beth Bailey American Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 2009. 
83 On the evoluƟ on of the American military see a good overview Russell F. Weigley 
“Armed Forces” in Jack P. Greene (ed.) Encyclopedia of American PoliƟ cal History, 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 1984, pp. 69–82; also John Whiteclay Chambers 
The Oxford Companion to American Military History, many ediƟ ons.
84 The liberal-leŌ  would expand the bureaucraƟ c Leviathan, although not exactly the 
military part of it. The liberal-leŌ  aŌ er the 60s revoluƟ on essenƟ ally has treated strong 
American power in defence of liberty, a stance of the post World War II American liber-
alism, as a liability, a drag on social progress inside. This concerns both the radical leŌ , 
like Noam Chomski or the late Howard Zinn, as well as the moderate one. Few liberal 
leŌ  commentators, even aŌ er the 9/11 aƩ ack, supported stong military response as 
a permanent feature of American world presence, with the excepƟ on of intellectuals 
such as Paul Berman or Michael Walzer. See Paul Berman Terror and Liberalism, New 
York 2003. On the Right, including the conservaƟ ve one, the situaƟ on is more com-
plicated. The paleoconservaƟ ves oppose “the hunƟ ng of dragons overseas” to use 
John Adams’ phrase. The republic should not turn into empire using the military for 
managing it. See Patrick Buchanan Where the Right went Wrong: How Neoconserva-
Ɵ ves Subverted the Reagan RevoluƟ on and Hijacked the Bush Presidency, New York, 
Thomas Dunne Books 2004. The connecƟ on between the expansion of the bureau-
craƟ c state and the military as part of that expansion is explicated in books of such 
paleoconservaƟ ves as Claes G. Ryn America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and 
the Quest for Empire, TransacƟ on Books, New Brunswick, N.J. 2003, also Edward Got-
ƞ ried AŌ er Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 1999; a libertarian criƟ que is Michael D. Tanner “Leviathan on the 
Right: How Big Government ConservaƟ sm Brought Down the Republican RevoluƟ on”, 
Cato InsƟ tute, Washington D.C. 2007. The American “empire” has been criƟ cized by 
such poliƟ cians as Buchanan and libertarians like Ron Paul. The main quarrel within 
the Right is between the tradiƟ onal Right and the neoconservaƟ ves who allegedly 
took over Bush’s understanding of foreign policy as an eﬀ ort to transform the dicta-
torial world by means of the American military into a “democraƟ c” world, with not 
only aƩ acking enemies and punishing them but with “naƟ on building” by means of 
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The other thing which changed has been the tenuous relaƟ onship between 
the army and the civilians, between ciƟ zenship and the military.85 The present 
“bargain” between the American society and the military cannot go forever. From 
its shaky beginnings it has been subjected to cultural changes connected with 
the increasing individualizaƟ on of society itself and a gradual anƟ -militarizaƟ on 
of consciousness. This bargain needs renegoƟ aƟ ng, since in strategy and war, 
“the means of power are inseparable from the ends of power, and the principal 
tools of American statecraŌ  – despite all the popular talk about ‘soŌ  power’ and 
‘smart power’ and ‘reƟ cent power’ – are suﬀ ering from neglect: material neglect, 
as measured in aging weapons, insuﬃ  cient manpower and budget restricƟ ons, 
but especially the poliƟ cal neglect of the elite classes… The link between ciƟ zen-
ship and military service is increasingly tenuous. With the end of the draŌ … “the 
United States military has assumed a character closer to that of the long-term 
enlistee on the Western American fronƟ er or serving in China or the Philippines 
during the early twenƟ eth century than to the true ciƟ zen-soldier who serves 
during an emergency and then returns to civilian life”.86
The current American volunteer army is diﬀ erent from the tradiƟ onal image 
of the ciƟ zen-soldier ideal on several counts. The Army is adverƟ sed as a kind of 
insƟ tuƟ onalized self-realizaƟ on, “self-actualizaƟ on therapy”. The message is not 
Shakespeare’s Henry V “comrades in arms” image but a highly individualized self-
development cut oﬀ  from the general aims of what an army is for and whom it 
ulƟ mately serves. The old soldiers were either mercenaries seeking employment 
for life, as was the case for instance with John Wayne’s soldiers in his movies, like 
Fort Apache. 
The soldiers of today are professionals expecƟ ng by law promoƟ on, decent 
pay and lifeƟ me benefi ts. It is a job like any other, subject to individual choices, ca-
reer moves and connected more with bureaucraƟ c consideraƟ ons than with the 
concept of duty, honor, country, let alone God. These rewards may be defi nitely 
earned by service, potenƟ al sacrifi ce, even death. But they consƟ tute also ele-
ments of “special interest” which, psychologically, are only tenuously connected 
with general naƟ onal interest and duty.87 Such a volunteer army, fully professional 
the military. See on that Andrzej Bryk “Neokonserwatyzm amerykański na przełomie 
XX/XXI wieku (American NeoconservaƟ sm at the turn of the 21th century) in Maria 
Borucka-Arctowa (red.) Państwo – Władza – Społeczeństwo – Polityka, Toruń 2006.
85 See Peter D. Feaver, Richard H. Kohn (ed.) Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil –Military Gap 
and American NaƟ onal Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2001.
86 Thomas M. Donnelly “The People’s Military”, NaƟ onal Review, May 2, 2011, p. 52.
87 See on the fascinaƟ ng problem of relaƟ ons between the military and civilians Macku-
bin Thomas Owens “U.S. Civil-Military RelaƟ ons AŌ er 9/11: RenegoƟ aƟ ng the Civil-
Military bargain”, ConƟ nuum, New York 2011; also Risa A. Brooks Shaping Strategy: 
The Civil-Military PoliƟ cs of Strategic Assessment, Princeton University Press, Princ-
eton 2008; as a comparison see a descripƟ on of a diﬀ erent world view within which 
the civil-military relaƟ onships rested, two generaƟ ons ago: Samuel P. HunƟ ngton The 
Soldier and the State: The Theory and PoliƟ cs of Civil-Military RelaƟ ons, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass.1957; also Arthur A. Ekirch Jr The Civilian and the Mili-
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and bargaining for enƟ tlements, becomes a lucraƟ ve profession, one of the rea-
sons why groups which would never be willing to join before, like women and 
homosexuals, decided to do so waving a fl ag of “discriminaƟ on”.88 That is why any 
discussion of cuts in the military today concerning troops and arms is connected 
also with hard bargaining with professional soldiers about enƟ tlement spending 
and also many issues concerning social policy inside the military as for instance 
aﬃ  rmaƟ ve acƟ on thinking. 
Moreover, the American army today is diﬀ erent from a tradiƟ onal ciƟ zen-
republican model sƟ ll lingering in the mass consciousness and popular culture, 
also because “the noƟ on that the military represents a true demographic cross-
secƟ on of American society is fi cƟ Ɵ ous, as the repeal of the “don’t-ask-don’t tell” 
law prevenƟ ng open homosexuals from serving reveals. Harvard may, in turn, 
have repealed its ban on Reserve Oﬃ  cers’ Training Corps units on campus, but 
Ivy League universiƟ es are unlikely to be a major commissioning source in the 
near future; it has been generaƟ ons since American elites believed they had an 
obligaƟ on to take up arms in service to their country. And the military will not 
be enthusiasƟ c about invesƟ ng precious recruiƟ ng dollars in the Northeast. It is 
much easier and more culturally congenial to look for young oﬃ  cer candidates in 
the South and Southwest”.89
This has another consequence of the army being staﬀ ed and supported pre-
dominantly along party lines in an uneven way, with parƟ cular voƟ ng paƩ erns in 
it.90 The All-Volunteer Force has also created a disƟ nct, deeply ingrained idenƟ ty 
among the soldiers and the oﬃ  cer corps, separaƟ ng them physically, but also 
tary: A History of the American AnƟ militarist TradiƟ on, 1956, the latest ediƟ on by The 
Independent InsƟ tute, Washington D.C 2010.
88 This is not to say that among those people there is no sense of duty or gallantry, as 
among anyone else, but the army which has tradiƟ onally been a tool of a naƟ on bent 
on the most eﬃ  cient defense becomes then a place of social experimentaƟ on sub-
jected to the same sort of experimentaƟ on as in the civil sector, even to the point of 
compromising the eﬃ  ciency of the army. This is defi nitely a case with women, who at 
the end are mainly concentrated in some sectors of the army at the expense of others, 
for instance in case of the baƩ le units, thus making “discriminaƟ on” by other means 
tolerable. This is, some say, also a compromise of inƟ macy in case of homosexuals, 
accepted openly with a repeal of a policy ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ by the execuƟ ve order 
of President Obama in 2011, since the sexual tension between homosexual and het-
erosexual men and simple humiliaƟ ng ogling on the part of the homosexuals towards 
heterosexuals would suggest separate quarters for both groups as is the case with 
women soldiers, including showering etc, which in itself is a kind of “discriminaƟ on” 
violently opposed by the homosexual lobby as “sƟ gmaƟ zing”. Women make up about 
15% of the total force. 
89 Donnelly “The People’s Military”, op. cit. p.52. It is in the Northeast where the promi-
nent universiƟ es, with the predominantly liberal-leŌ  leaning elites are located, such as 
Harvard, MIT, Yale, Princeton, Brown, Dartmouth College, Bowdoin College, Amherst 
College, Columbia, Williams College.
90 A recent survey of the army oﬃ  cers found that self-idenƟ fi ed Republicans outnumber 
Democrats in the oﬃ  cer corps by 60% to 18%. See Michael Nelson “Soldiers and CiƟ -
zens”, The Claremont Review of Books, Winter 2011/12, p. 53. 
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psychologically from civilian life. The American ideal of the tradiƟ onal ciƟ zen-sol-
dier was provisional and temporal; at the same Ɵ me he was part of innumerable 
households, a sign of communal duty towards the country, a role to be discarded 
once the war was over.91 But aŌ er the AVF was introduced, not only has the pro-
fessional idenƟ ty become permanent, but it is oŌ en passed from father to son 
to grandson.92 
The American way of war in many aspects remains the same, especially its ag-
gressiveness, passing iniƟ aƟ ve to oﬃ  cers of lower ranks, self-confi dence, techno-
logical intensity, placing one’s opponent at a signifi cant disadvantage in materiel. 
But the AVF changed the nature of mobilizaƟ on and thus a relaƟ onship to society, 
strikingly visible aŌ er the 9/11 aƩ acks. Since then, the United States went to war 
with “an army of champions and a populaƟ on of spectators. There was no call to 
arms, no summoning of volunteers for the duraƟ on of the fi ght… no talk, much 
less consideraƟ on, of reintroducing conscripƟ on. The bureaucracies were staﬀ ed 
not by ‘dollar a day men’ but by the same civil servants as in the past”.93
The Americans made thus a bargain between the military and society at large. 
They agreed to tolerate a standing, professional army, large by other naƟ on’s 
standards, so as to meet the needs of defending America, which today means 
more a defense of strategic interests around the world. But that was done with 
an expectaƟ on that this acƟ vity should be “clean”, that is to say professionalized, 
eﬃ  cient, cost-eﬀ ecƟ ve, and the least disrupƟ ve to society. As with the old people 
who should be taken care of by professional nursing homes, so wars and all such 
messy aﬀ airs as prevenƟ ve strikes or counterinsurgency tacƟ cs, were to be dealt 
with by professional services, at minimal psychological and economic costs, let 
alone massive disrupƟ ons to the civilian “pursuit of happiness” declared to be 
the basic American right in the DeclaraƟ on of Independence of 1776.94 
Americans seem to believe that war is but “a small divergence from the norms 
of civilian life, and that the extraordinary acƟ vity required can be met by normal 
91 One can recall here a nearly total and quick demobilizaƟ on of the millions of the 
American soldiers to civilian life aŌ er the Second World War, and a massive redirec-
Ɵ on of them to civilian life, part of which was the so-called GI Bill which awarded those 
who wanted to study a federal grant for this purpose.
92 Thus the saying “Once a Marine, always a Marine”.
93 Eliot Cohen “The Military” in Peter H. Schuck, James Q. Wilson (ed.) Understand-
ing America: The Anatomy of An ExcepƟ onal NaƟ on, Public Aﬀ airs, New York 2008, 
pp. 271–272. 
94 Of course this isolaƟ on is not at the level of mass culture. The military is open to all 
fads, beginning with pop music and chocolate cookies, triumphal returns of soldiers 
in parades in liƩ le towns, lack of popular mass condemnaƟ on unacceptable acƟ ons 
on the part of soldiers, in contrast to poliƟ cians, and a widely popular genre of sol-
diers’ memories, the fact used by them with alacrity to receive aƩ enƟ on, especially 
aŌ er combat. In that sense, in comparison with the European military, the American 
military remains a popular force. During the wars the American fl ags on homes, or 
placards in frontyards proclaiming “We support our troops” are ubiquitous. But this is 
more a cheering of an audience in a theatre. 
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eﬀ orts. The government wages war, and ciƟ zens seem to think one exists, with-
out any noƟ ceable sacrifi ce, or indeed much more eﬀ ort, other than the spend-
ing of a few hundred of billions of dollars, fi nanced by defi cits rather than tax 
increases or compulsory savings, than peace.”95
Such an aƫ  tude was visible unƟ l the end of the fi rst decade of the 21th cen-
tury, and there is no guarantee that it will work indefi nitely if the economic crisis 
lasts too long. It may not work if greater eﬀ ort is required, both to wage war and 
to make greater military presence in the world a necessity for securing strategic 
US economic and poliƟ cal interests against, for instance, China, or Russia in the 
ArcƟ c, or, who knows, Germany.96
Many other things changed in the art of conducƟ ng modern war, and compli-
cated further this relaƟ onship between the civilian world and the military in the 
United States. The military has been professionalized, more independent from 
civilian life, but in other respects it has become more constrained. Economically 
the army is dependent on new weapons in a much more complicated and sophis-
Ɵ cated way. In previous wars, the last such war being probably the Vietnam War 
of 1965–73, perhaps the Gulf War of 1991, the armaments delivered to the army 
were relaƟ vely easy to produce, lasted longer than the Ɵ me needed for their 
technological and research input, and could be produced on a massive scale. The 
cost of armaments for the classical type of war was relaƟ vely lower, because of 
the eﬀ ect of scale. Moreover, the raƟ o of technological research and Ɵ me of use 
of such armaments was signifi cantly longer. Today all that has changed, also un-
der the impact of two events, the 9/11 aƩ acks and American diﬃ  culƟ es in deal-
ing with the counterinsurgency in Iraq. The Americans declared a “War on Terror” 
with the army essenƟ ally unprepared for this role.97 
95 Cohen “The Military”, op. cit., p. 273. 
96 If Germany decides that the European Union ceases to be a poliƟ cal and economic 
zone commensurate to its ambiƟ ons and power potenƟ al, then it might abandon it 
and begin to act as a global player. Germany is preparing for such a role. President 
Kohler’s remark in 2010 that the German military should be a tool of securing German 
economic interests in the world was not a slip of the tongue, but a betrayal of strategy. 
German export to Asia, especially China, is rising spectacularly and the European mar-
ket is no longer vital for its economic well-being. China will be the major export market 
of Germany in 2013. What Germany wanted to get from Europe it has goƩ en. The Ger-
man army builds now huge transoceanic 7000 thousand tons frigates, an essenƟ ally 
strategic military buildup, to guard transatlanƟ c sea lanes. See Andrzej Talaga “Niemcy 
rozkwitną i bez Europy (Germans will blossom even without Europe)”, Rzeczpospolita, 
9–10 luty 2011. 
97 One can imagine no more inept a term for the tasks which faced Americans in military 
and strategic terms. The war should have been with terrorists who aƩ acked America 
and countries which harbored them. In fact this war of terror Ɵ ed Americans to all 
countries which were inimical to America and who fought their own terrorists or peo-
ple defi ned by such countries as terrorists tying American hands and playing their own 
game. So the Chinese got a free hand to deal with Tibetan and Uighur “ terrorists”, the 
Russians with Chechnya’s and all their Islamic “terrorists” etc. 
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Counterinsurgency changed the prioriƟ es in R&D, forcing Americans to re-
consider tradiƟ onal weapons.98 The United States industry sƟ ll conƟ nues, for in-
stance, the producƟ on of tanks or armored vehicles which were designed thirty 
or forty years ago. New electronics systems have been put into them, but devis-
ing new concepts is extremely costly. A signifi cantly diﬀ erent raƟ o of Ɵ me and 
money to moving from concept to design is necessary today. It takes decades 
now, not years, to develop them. It is also dependent on the constantly changing 
ideas of what they are to be for, whether they should be at all, and who will pay 
for them, when a mistake seƫ  ng prioriƟ es is more costly than ever and subject 
to fi erce lobbying from all sides.99
Psychologically, cultural changes complicate the fi nancing of the army. Heavy 
losses are no longer acceptable. The reasons for this change are many, but one 
is the exorbitant cost of qualifi ed military personnel and also a middle-class mili-
tary. Soldiers are now individuals, no longer anonymous “cannon fodder”. They 
are extremely expensive to train and equip, more powerful in the fi eld despite 
their radically diminished numbers. Soldiers must be sophisƟ catedly trained and 
educated both in the army and in the civilian sector, being more like extremely 
expensive feudal knights, than the “cannon fodder” of the absoluƟ st era.100
98 This also caused a change of command in Iraq. In November 2006, aŌ er nearly four 
years of insurgency chaos in Baghdad and its environs, George Bush fi red secretary 
of State Donald Rumsfeld and launched so-called “surge”. 20 thousand addiƟ onal 
troops were sent on a newly defi ned counterinsurgency mission to clear and secure 
neighborhoods with the overreaching aim of protecƟ ng the populaƟ on. Bush, in an 
unprecedented move, at least since Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, assumed 
responsibility for the Iraq strategy and pracƟ cal operaƟ ons, nominaƟ ng general David 
Petraeus as the commander of the forces in Iraq. Petraeus later would be charged by 
president Obama with bringing order in Afghanistan, with some, albeit lesser, suc-
cess. See Nelson Soldiers and CiƟ zens, op. cit. p. 53. Also Brooks Shaping Strategy, op. 
cit.; for an account of that situaƟ on seen from Rumsfeld’s perspecƟ ve see Known and 
Unknown: A Memoir, SenƟ nel 2011, from Bush’s perspecƟ ve see his Decision Points, 
Random House, New York 2010. When Petraeus became popular in the US, as MacAr-
thur under Truman, Obama, paranoid that Petraeus might challenge him in the next 
elecƟ on moved him to head the CIA. Petraeus also caused a small revoluƟ on in the 
military colleges in the U.S., retooling the methods of teaching, when he realized that 
the Afghan and Iraq wars had not greatly infl uenced the thinking of the military teach-
ers and cadets.
99 See on that Eliot A. Cohen Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in 
WarƟ me, Free Press, New York 2002.
100 This idea of “cannon fodder” was confronted as insane during the 19th century with 
the development of the modern means of destrucƟ on, and resulted in the replace-
ment of colorful uniforms by grey ones, development of internaƟ onal law of war, the 
Red Cross and modern military medicine with anƟ sepƟ cs introduced by the BriƟ sh 
doctor Lister and nursery care by Florence NighƟ ngale. But the idea of “cannon fod-
der” compromised itself totally only aŌ er the butchery of the First World War, espe-
cially during the Somme baƩ les in 1916. It was sƟ ll visible in the Soviet Army in the 
Second World War, consciously acceptable to even Marshal Zhukow, with Rokossowski 
being one of the few honorable excepƟ ons.
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This costliness of soldiers, and middle class sensiƟ vity, put pressure on the 
military not to go recklessly into wars or acƟ ons. The stress is more on safe arma-
ments which raises costs, and on “smart” weapons without the need for humans 
to operate them. This creates great economic and poliƟ cal pressure.
The outsourcing of every feasible service beginning with maintenance, guard 
posts, training and ending with professional educaƟ on is one outcome of such 
a cost-benefi t analysis, but this also prevents the army from being an insƟ tuƟ on 
of social cohesion, limiƟ ng it further to a smaller and smaller part of professional 
life.101
This has not been, of course, an American phenomenon only. Nearly all mod-
ern militaries and their supporƟ ng industrial systems have become “dependent 
on a combinaƟ on of sophisƟ cated technologies, elaborate contractor organiza-
Ɵ ons, and archaic development bureaucracies. The trend everywhere seems to 
be fewer plaƞ orms – whether they be tanks or fi ghter plans, destroyers or ar-
Ɵ llery tubes made more eﬀ ecƟ ve by informaƟ on technology, ever more lethal 
muniƟ ons, and highly trained personnel. Such military organizaƟ ons are suited to 
middling warfare: convenƟ onal contests that do not go on for more than a few 
weeks, albeit at high levels of intensity combat, on the one hand, or large-scale 
insurgency on the other. The debate about American troop levels in Iraq fi nally 
revolved, to a remarkable degree, on the quesƟ on of what the army could stand 
without overstressing a professional force, not about what was needed”.102 
Such cultural, economic and military consideraƟ ons strain the relaƟ onship 
between the professional army and poliƟ cians, as the gatekeepers of money. 
The laƩ er are hostages of poliƟ cal pressures from the electorate, as well as the 
media constraints subject to the new cultural fads, and a total lack of secrecy. 
This strain in civil-military relaƟ ons has been visible in Iraq and Afghanistan. One 
such a case was the 2006 “revolt of the generals” calling for the-then defense 
101 On this outsourcing of services see P.W. Singer Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the 
PrivaƟ zed Military Industry Cornell University Press 2003; CommenƟ ng on this trend 
Singer argues that, in fact, this dependence on privaƟ zed assistance is already a sine 
qua condiƟ on of execuƟ ng any operaƟ on in the fi eld. A consequence of the lack of 
adequate public and consequently congressional support, such dependency requires 
a total reconsideraƟ on of the original raƟ onale of outsourcing services. In 2007 a De-
fense Department study showed that what seemed like 160 000 troops in Iraq, which 
looked a fairly small number for the tasks at hand, was much more, in fact 340 000 
when contract employees were counted. AŌ er Obama pulled out the army from Iraq, 
there remained about 16 thousand Americans of which 2 000 were the state depart-
ment employees, 14 000 contract employees. See Nelson Soldiers and CiƟ zens, op. 
cit., p. 54. But the logic of specializaƟ on and separate skills is also infl uencing the fl ex-
ibility of the troops in the fi eld. For instance in the Polish army, a driver of an armored 
vehicle or a tank is also a mechanic, unless the task is too complicated to perform, 
in the American army where something happens to an armored vehicle the driver 
waits for the maintenance team. One may observe that this diﬀ erence may stem from 
a convicƟ on that the reliability and superiority on the part of the American side is 
never in doubt.
102 Cohen “The Military”, op. cit., p. 273.
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secretary Donald Rumsfeld to resign. The other, the generals’ resistance to the 
Obama review methods, resulƟ ng in the mulƟ ple general-fi ring by Defense Sec-
retary Robert Gates in 2009.103
An addiƟ onal important factor here is the military strategic thinking which 
changes rapidly and is subject to new constraints not encountered before. The 
army fi ghts with the people it gets from society. It is made up of the central slice 
of American life, but it is isolated. The military academies recruit from the same 
applicant pool as for instance the best Ivy League universiƟ es, but most of the of-
fi cer corps come, not unexpectedly, from large, not-eliƟ st state universiƟ es. The 
military in their situaƟ on might be also a good career move as contrasted with 
compeƟ Ɵ on in the civilian labor market with a Harvard or Yale law graduate. 
Some elite universiƟ es have, even if small, Reserve Oﬃ  cer Training Corps 
(ROTC) programs on campus. They have such programs also available to students, 
with addiƟ onal courses on the various aspects of the military oﬀ ered to all. But 
students of elite universiƟ es are not well represented in the oﬃ  cer corps. This 
means that the oﬃ  cer corps does not get candidates from the pool of the best 
people who rather prefer to enter the most prominent intellectual, economic, 
media or poliƟ cal elites. Such elites defi ne the culture and language of public 
discourse, but they are not in the army any more. This is acutely refl ected, for 
instance, in declining numbers of poliƟ cians who have had military experience 
which signifi cantly infl uences their thinking related to military maƩ ers.
This split is refl ected even more dramaƟ cally in the rank and fi le of the mili-
tary. There is nearly no one in it from the elite populaƟ on. The army is com-
posed of the intellectually less sophisƟ cated part of the society, much more, for 
instance, than was the case during the two World Wars, in the 50s and 60s; the 
sharp decline of the post Vietnam War years was nevertheless made up for in the 
80s. Now this trend seems to be constant. This new social and intellectual com-
posiƟ on of the army relates diﬀ erently to American society at large, especially as 
far as the fl ow of mutual understanding between the populaƟ on and the army 
and its presƟ ge is concerned. But fi rst of all it infl uences the possibility to recruit 
the best minds to devise strategies and tacƟ cs in the changing condiƟ ons of mod-
ern warfare, when a quick orientaƟ on in many fi elds not directly connected with 
the military requires an eﬀ ort to get them.104
103 See on that Owens “U,S. Civil-Military RelaƟ ons aŌ er 9/11”, op. cit.; Bob Woodward 
Obamas’s Wars, Simon & Schuster, New York 2010. The Obama White House has been 
always paranoid about the poliƟ cal infl uence of the generals, parƟ cularly the “surge” 
general David Petraeus, and his possible bid, forcefully denied by the general, for the 
presidency. 
104 Kathy Roth-Douquet, Frank Schaeﬀ er, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America’s 
Upper Classes from Military Service and How It Hurts Our Country, Collins, New York 
2006. The authors detail the liabiliƟ es of the present all-volunteer ‘corporate’ force: 
the impoverished policy-making ability of a civilian leadership without any real Ɵ es to 
the military, the weakening of the military itself because of it, and also “a sense of lost 
community”. This already consƟ tutes a threat to democracy, with society accepƟ ng 
such an inherently unfair situaƟ on as given. The authors propose some remedies:a 
loƩ ery draŌ , more eﬀ ort to convince young people to join and some form of naƟ onal 
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What this underrepresentaƟ on in the military of a cross secƟ on of America 
signifi es is not yet clear. Obviously, it has something to do “with the ability of 
the United States to tolerate casualƟ es and the strains of prolonged expediƟ on-
ary warfare abroad. The residents of the Upper East Side in ManhaƩ an or the 
tonier suburbs of Boston, Chicago or Los Angeles do not, by and large, send their 
sons and daughters oﬀ  to Afghanistan. Those who go are volunteers, and both 
they and their families, with few excepƟ ons, have the kind of patrioƟ c zeal, or 
at the very least stoicism, that gets them through such trials. Nor does the mili-
tary draw, as some believe, from the deprived strata of society: it sƟ ll recruits its 
enlisted personnel overwhelmingly from high school graduates of middling to 
high intelligence scores on the standard tests and recruits its oﬃ  cer corps from 
college graduates. But the tone, including the intellectual tone, is sƟ ll largely that 
of middle America. The profi le is certainly socially and poliƟ cally more conserva-
Ɵ ve than America’s elites, more religious, and less academic. Again, it is not clear 
what diﬀ erence this makes in the end: the American military is a diverse orga-
nizaƟ on, and includes oﬃ  cers of many diﬀ erent backgrounds and interests. But 
since 9/11 it has faced a world in which its previous rouƟ nes and concepƟ ons of 
war, molded largely in the period between Vietnam and the fi rst Gulf War, have 
proven inadequate for a very diﬀ erent set of confl icts. The hard fact is that the 
American military leaders have not, with some notable excepƟ ons, been able 
to arƟ culate strategic issues and prioriƟ es nearly as well as their civilian coun-
terparts. The issue is not, to repeat, diﬀ erences in raw intelligence and certainly 
not ability, but rather the ability to move smoothly and eﬀ ecƟ vely in the realm of 
debates that are, of their nature, oŌ en abstract and theoreƟ cal. It in some mea-
sure refl ects the nature of the American military: a pracƟ cal, workmanlike slice 
of American society; a good representaƟ on of a middle class that is intelligent, 
hardworking, and impaƟ ent with theory and theoreƟ cians as well”.105 
civil service. Otherwise, they argue, American foreign policy will have no connecƟ on 
to the military with the laƩ er stretched thin and increasingly employed in situaƟ ons 
approaching breaking point, constantly being repeated. This proporƟ onal lack of the 
elite is visible in the behavior of G. Bush Senior as contrasted with his son G.W. Bush. 
AŌ er Pearl Harbor in 1941 Bush Senior informed his father that he did not want to 
stay in college to put oﬀ  his draŌ . He argued that as a representaƟ ve of the American 
elite he had a moral duty to enlist. Bush became a dive-bomber pilot, served honor-
ably, was shot down over the Pacifi c and saved miraculously by a passing-by American 
submarine. His son served during the Vietnam war in the Home Guard and avoided 
service in the fi eld. No one proved during the campaign that he was there hiding in-
tenƟ onally, but the diﬀ erence is signifi cant. 
105 Cohen The Military, op. cit. p. 270. It is thus a false impression that the American 
military is not ethnically representaƟ ve. This was the case during the Vietnam war, but 
since it became professional the military is 75% white, 13% black, 87% non-Hispanic 
and 13% Hispanic. MinoriƟ es are underrepresented in the military, including the com-
bat arms. Women, who are a majority, but treated as if they were minority, make up 
15%. Ibid. 268. One may add that we enter here a very sensiƟ ve issue of aﬃ  rmaƟ ve 
acƟ on. One may argue that the military is a specifi c kind of a job based on the basis 
of interest, but on the other hand it may be treated as an insƟ tuƟ on having a task of 
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Strained civil-military relaƟ ons, translated into successful lobbying to obtain 
a beƩ er hearing among poliƟ cians, have been also visible during the last years 
in the lower ranks, especially mid-level oﬃ  cers most heavily engaged for years 
in constant operaƟ ons. They have been more distanced from domesƟ c poliƟ cs, 
and due to instant communicaƟ on acutely aware that their eﬀ ort has been taken 
for granted, an invisible task of mercenaries paid to do their dirty job. Subjected 
also to pressures of poliƟ cal correctness, they feel increasingly as being used in 
a game the rules of which are not clear. 
This also results from Ɵ me to Ɵ me in nearly open resistance of the oﬃ  cer 
corps, convinced of their beƩ er professionalism trumping civilian amateurish 
posturing. This concerns not so much civilian choice of targets or combat op-
eraƟ ons planning, but seƫ  ng the military’s goals in a conquered country, the 
military being burdened with tasks which oŌ en have liƩ le to do with tradiƟ onal 
duƟ es of an occupaƟ on army but with a conversion of the army into an army of 
engineers, policemen, community leaders, teachers and what you will.106 
This causes sense of a malaise, if not of moral decline, of the armed forces in 
general. The quality of senior oﬃ  cers, in contrast to senior non-commissioned 
oﬃ  cers advancing through exams, results from advancement via ‘eﬃ  ciency re-
ports’ that is “from pleasing superiors. It starts with generals and admirals chosen 
for compaƟ bility with the ruling [elite] rather than for winning wars. Below that, 
the command and general staﬀ  colleges and the war colleges help fi lter out the 
warriors at the fi eld–grade level. The fact that more oﬃ  cers who have fi nished 
their iniƟ al military obligaƟ ons (Army and Marine captains, Navy lieutenants) 
now choose to leave the military than new oﬃ  cers choose to join is an accurate 
barometer of their discontent. They, and the military families that discourage 
their children from becoming oﬃ  cers, blame the top brass for designing opera-
Ɵ ons that please poliƟ cians at the cost of wasted lives and lost wars. Endorsing 
the military nonsense of the War on Terror has become the prerequisite for suc-
cessful military careers… [In the fi eld] the occupaƟ on habituated the U.S. armed 
forces to regard it as normal to bleed without prospect of victory. Oﬃ  cers who 
commanded their troops to operate in replenished minefi elds and who enforced 
‘rules of engagement’ that make troops vulnerable to un-uniformed enemies un-
Ɵ l these took acƟ on, profi ted by turning their backs on soldierly ethics that are as 
fundamental to the profession of arms as the HippocraƟ c oath is to the medical 
profession. At home, the occupaƟ on of Iraq became an occasion for biƩ er par-
Ɵ san warfare… more harmful yet [it] sapped the patrioƟ c generosity with which 
the American people had supported the War on Terror”.107
integraƟ ng the communal sense of a society and for this reason alone the issue of 
more or less proporƟ onal representaƟ on might be important. See Andrzej Bryk “Akcja 
Afi rmacyjna, doktryna różnorodności a plemienna koncepcja społeczeństwa liberalne-
go”, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe 2006, no 2. 
106 See Owens US Civil-Military RelaƟ ons AŌ er 9/11, op. cit. 
107 Angelo M.Codevilla “The Lost Decade”, The Claremont Review of Books, Fall 2011, 
p. 15, 17.
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Today the mood in the military and in America in general is subdued but far 
from opƟ misƟ c. True, the Americans oﬃ  cially withdrew from Iraq in December 
of 2011, fi nally ending the war without end but achieving limited accomplish-
ments. But even if the Afghanistan war will be over soon, there is no end to the 
economic crisis and the crisis in foreign policy objecƟ ves. In the laƩ er case they 
refl ect the divisions within the foreign policy establishment as well as within the 
establishments of the major poliƟ cal parƟ es. For a decade since 9/11, the Ameri-
can foreign policy has been focused as its main objecƟ ve on the “War on Terror”. 
In consequence the military has been converted into police, administraƟ ve and 
engineering type operaƟ ons, with “democracy building” declared as the major 
aim of that war. Other objecƟ ves and dangers were neglected and tradiƟ onal 
adversaries and enemies were classifi ed according to a simplisƟ c division along 
the line of fi ghƟ ng “terrorists”. 
Like the Soviet Union before, which incessantly “fought for peace”, the Ameri-
cans have not aƩ ained their objecƟ ves, while straining their fi nances, psychologi-
cal resolve and the military’s potenƟ al beyond anything imaginable. The world 
has not become even remotely safer, and a demand for American “cavalry” com-
ing to rescue wherever there is a crisis, like in Libya in 2011, caught Americans 
unable to respond, with the European Union in fact helplessly waiƟ ng for them. 
During the decade aŌ er 9/11 aƩ ack U.S. military operaƟ ons have resulted in 
about 6000 American soldiers killed and roughly 30 000 disabled, and hundreds 
of thousands of foreign casualƟ es, with a cost, depending on the esƟ mate, be-
tween 2–3 trillion dollars. 
But the threat from the terrorists has not been eliminated, while the security 
restricƟ ons on Americans imposed by the federal government turned out to be 
worrying even for its most lenient criƟ cs. Worse, aŌ er a decade of incessant, 
costly operaƟ ons, with others gaining from them, such as Russia in Central Asia, 
or China in Tibet or the Uighur region, there has been a growing percepƟ on of 
America as a declining economic and military power, defi ned as an irreversible 
trend with profound poliƟ cal consequences. 
What began during the Vietnam war and what has become dramaƟ cally vis-
ible in the decade which followed 2001, has been a gradual transformaƟ on of the 
American military into kind of a police force. Its aim was not to hit the enemy and 
defeat it, but to turn the military into in fact occupaƟ onal forces which were to 
turn hosƟ le people, of essenƟ ally alien culture incomprehensible to Americans, 
into friendly people. This was to be done in a process of “naƟ on-building”, with-
out at the same Ɵ me any ability or poliƟ cal will to seal oﬀ  such territories from 
an incessant infl ux of fresh anƟ -American reinforcements in people or materiel, 
for instance from Pakistan or Iran, aƩ empƟ ng to disrupt such an eﬀ ort. Thus the 
American army in Iraq was constantly bleeding, the situaƟ on slowly taken for 
granted, without any prospect of winning the war with the fi nal withdrawal and 
the country divided, in fact, into three zones.108
108 For a long Ɵ me the Americans have accepted a division of Iraq into de facto Kurdistan 
in the North, the Shia rule from north of Bagdad to the Persian Gulf fi rmly Ɵ ed to 
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The diversion of funds into such “naƟ on building” operaƟ ons lasƟ ng for 
a decade has not only been exorbitant, but also forced the American military 
to change its prioriƟ es and ask quesƟ ons as to the kinds of arms needed in the 
growing defi cits condiƟ ons, and fi nally the economic crisis which hit in 2008 Es-
senƟ ally it has been a change from a potenƟ al fi ght with the global players to 
fi ghts with small, skillfully designed, sophisƟ cated urban and counterinsurgency 
equipment. The United States let the logic of the “War on Terror” divert eco-
nomic resources, R&D, tacƟ cs and strategy into not one of the possible wars, but 
the war which overshadows all other military consideraƟ ons. This has crippled 
materially American ability to deal with any other kind of war and strategic en-
emy with tradiƟ onal arms, if only for the purpose of prevenƟ ng Americans from 
thwarƟ ng their economic or poliƟ cal goals.109 
The end result have been both the dubious results of the “War on Terror” 
devised as a way of “naƟ on building”, and a decline of the American military 
overall capacity for dealing with strategic enemies. Another pernicious eﬀ ect of 
the wrongly devised “War on Terror”, has to do with taking for granted assump-
Ɵ ons about the nature of the world order in 2001, and the goals to ensure the 
permanent existence of such a world order. The assumpƟ on in 2001 was that 
America was hit by terrorists as Rome was hit by, lets say, the pirates of the 
Mediterranean, a powerful disrupƟ ng force for all within the orbit of the Pax 
Iran, and the dispersed but well armed Sunni enclaves, all waiƟ ng for the Americans 
to withdraw so to start cuƫ  ng their throats again. Americans were moving in that 
terrain hunƟ ng for “insurgents” and “terrorists”. The fabled “surge” stabilized the situ-
aƟ on because the Americans began successfully to bribe the local clan elders to sort 
things out in between themselves. What was designed as “naƟ on building” turned 
into a pragmaƟ c move of “live and let live” with no clear aim in sight except withdraw-
ing, leaving behind weak and divided government. In Afghanistan the situaƟ on has 
been even worse. It started as an operaƟ on to punish Arab terrorists with the Taliban 
hesitaƟ ng to turn in Osama bin Laden because of the money they got from him to 
fi ght Uzbeks and Tajiks. But the Taliban was not anƟ -American at fi rst, but aŌ er the 
invasion they switched to anƟ -Americanism and the protracted war started. American 
“naƟ on-building” means economic aid which exceeds Afghanistan’s GDP, with millions 
of Afghans being anƟ -American, American money being used oﬃ  cially or unoﬃ  cially 
to build the fortunes of diﬀ erent Afghan warlords, with the resentments of those who 
have not got on the bandwagon. There was even more resentment against the Ameri-
can crude tacƟ cs of response to hit and run tacƟ cs of the Taliban forces, let alone the 
presence among the Afghans of rich foreigners, consciously or subconsciously exhibit-
ing a superiority complex towards the locals, unable to provide them either prosperity 
or security. 
109 The huge money spent on the “War on Terror” armaments, with a faulty logic behind 
it, was exemplifi ed by just one of many items, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
Vehicle (MRAP) of which 15 thousand were ordered at the cost of 20 billions dollars, 
so to make American troops safe from mines in Iraq and Afghanistan, where most of 
casualƟ es came from such weapons of terror. But such MRAPs “don’t work against 
shaped charges designed to penetrate them… They cannot make sense out of the 
criminal nonsense of operaƟ ng in perpetually replenished minefi leds. Codevilla “The 
Lost Decade”, p. 15.
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Romana. So as Rome dispatched Pompey to restore order within the confi nes 
of the Pax Romana, so Americans dispatched its expediƟ onary force to restore 
order by “naƟ on building” within (an assumpƟ on taken for granted) the world of 
the permanent post-Soviet Pax Americana, with terrorists disrupƟ ng its smooth 
operaƟ on. True, there were China and Russia on the horizon, which eventually 
might cause trouble, and the Muslim world which was anƟ -American by insƟ nct 
and resentment, but these dangers were far oﬀ . It was exactly the aim of the 
“War on Terror” to engage in “naƟ on building” so to prevent the dangers of such 
regimes as China or Russia from ever gaining the upper hand strategically in the 
world. This was a risky gamble uniƟ ng around it, due to fury, fear, and the desire 
for revenge aŌ er 9/11 of the American biparƟ san elites, among them the State 
Department establishment, the foreign policy realisƟ c schools analysts as well as 
“Young Turks” from the neoconservaƟ ve movement.
The world a decade aŌ er 9/11 does not look as it was meant to. It is far more 
dangerous for Americans than in 2001, even if the Americans are not responsible 
for the majority of menaces threatening them. For one, China’s economic rise 
has translated into an overt poliƟ cal goal of challenging the post-1945 Ameri-
can imposed Peace of the Pacifi c. Its long-term goals of expelling the Americans 
from the Western Pacifi c and also to prevent Taiwan from gaining a measure of 
internaƟ onal poliƟ cal and military maneuver have now become clear and are 
supported by a strong military presence. There are warnings that the U.S. should 
not interfere with China’s pressure on other Pacifi c islands. China is beginning to 
exercise its veto on moves within its self-declared sphere of interest.110
Russia has emerged of the Yeltsin “smuta” with PuƟ n, defi ned the United 
States in the neo-Soviet image as the enemy number one, and received numer-
ous concessions from America in missile programs, with a removal of the anƟ -
missile shield from Poland and the Czech Republic. It uses diplomacy well to put 
Americans on the defensive and exercises its veto in the UN to protect anƟ -Amer-
ican dictators. At the same Ɵ me Russia is playing a successful game of pushing 
Americans out from Europe, thus aiming at making NATO to all pracƟ cal purposes 
impotent, with the self-conceit of the poliƟ cally corrupted and demoralized bu-
reaucraƟ c elites of the European Union. 
In the meanƟ me it cut oﬀ  Ukraine and Bielorussia from the European way 
of development forming in 2011 with others post-Soviet republics, like Kazak-
stan, its own equivalent economic EuroasiaƟ c union, and eﬀ ecƟ vely showing in 
Georgia in 2008 that military acƟ on would not result in any serious retaliaƟ on. 
All such hesitaƟ ons earned Americans, Ɵ ed down in Iraq and Afghanista, only the 
contempt of Russia, and the convicƟ on that the United States was a declining 
superpower. Russian policy has always been one of contempt for an accommo-
daƟ ng enemy, since, as menƟ oned earlier, diplomacy has been for it a reverse of 
Clausewitz’s dictum, that is the extension of war by other means.111
110 See on that a comprehensive analysis Baogang Guo, Sujian Guo “Thirty Years of Chi-
nese – U.S. RelaƟ ons: AnalyƟ cal Approaches and Contemporary Issues”, 2011. 
111 This aƫ  tude was shown towards the Polish government and its decision to grant Rus-
sia exclusive inquiry into the catastrophe in Smolensk in April 2010. What they got 
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The Islamic World is as divided and as anƟ -American as ever, with Iran an ad-
diƟ onal threat in the region. Saudi Arabia can be considered an ally only by a real 
stretch of imaginaƟ on. The countries of the Arab Spring of 2011, nowhere turn-
ing closely to the image of American democracy, even aŌ er democraƟ c elecƟ ons 
will be Islamic. The Islamic world will be torn by its own dysfuncƟ ons inherent in 
its cultures and governments. It will not be subject willingly to the Hegelian law of 
history of modernizaƟ on to emulate the West and its liberal-democraƟ c system, 
let alone be subject to such a law by a measured compulsion from outside. 
The events of the last decade were impossible to foresee in 2001 for Ameri-
cans, even if they realized that Pax Americana would not last forever. But the 
Americans’ undertaking of “naƟ on-building” so as to make it a catalyst for change 
in the Arab world and then possibly in other non-democraƟ c countries so they 
can become pro-American zones was as utopian as it was fateful in terms of cost, 
reorientaƟ on of prioriƟ es and endangerment of American interests. The conse-
quences of trying to change the world instead of aiming to manage it by guarding 
vital US strategic interests, have turned out to be highly equivocal. 
In that decade huge defi cits have accumulated. In 2001 U.S. government ex-
penditure was 1.86 trillion but in 2008,when the mortgage backed securiƟ es ex-
ploded, it was 2.9 trillion. Then Congress appropriated 800 billion in 2008 for the 
Treasury to buy up “toxic assets” and fi x the problem. AŌ er that more was put 
into the banking system, and by the middle of the Obama administraƟ on the debt 
had risen to 3.7 trillion, which meant doubling federal expenses in a decade, and 
spiraling the American debt to a staggering 14 trillion, equal to America’s GDP.112
The prolonged crisis which engulfed the American society over the last de-
cade was deep because American elites mesmerized with its “War on Terror” 
constantly “doubled its bet” on the tried and failed policies, showing a spectacu-
lar example of a self-referenƟ al mindset. Such a policy has even been pursued 
more during the Obama presidency, which has engaged in a huge expansion of 
instead was a falsifi ed report, with a message to the Western elites, including the 
NATO commanders to whom Polish generals died in the crash belonged, that one of 
the major causes of the accident was essenƟ ally the interference by a drunk Polish 
general in the cockpit. The message to the elites of the European Union was simple: 
see, those tribes in Eastern Europe cannot govern themselves in a civilized way, even 
their NATO generals are drunk and recklessly causing costly accidents. So, why don’t 
we and you impose a civilized order on them together. What a nice deja vu of the old 
friendship of the gravediggers of Poland in the 18th century, Frederick II and Empress 
Catherine of Russia, the policy which at the economic and poliƟ cal level is probably 
a strategy of Germany as well.
112 By 2011, out of every federal dollar spent 40% was borrowed. The 2010 census also re-
ported that in 2009 the infl aƟ on-adjusted median family income was $49,445, where-
as in 2001 it was $51,161.The oﬃ  cial unemployment rate hovers around 9-9.1 but 
only 45.4% of Americans of working age are employed full Ɵ me, which may amount to 
a handy defi niƟ on of depression. See, for instance, a good overview of that problem in 
Angelo M. Codevilla, The Ruling Class: How They Corrupted America and What We Can 
Do About It, Beaufort Books, 2011; also Thomas L. Friedman, Michael Mandelbaum 
That Used To Be Us, Simon, Farrad, Giroux, New York 2011. 
American Military Strategy and the Economic Crisis 73
the federal government with no clue what to do next, except raising taxes and 
borrowing more money, exhibiƟ ng an arrogance of the highest order, unusual in 
America, permanent in the European Union, of treaƟ ng people as ignorant.113
Wrongly defi ned prioriƟ es, exorbitant costs, and the wrong responses to the 
costs, resulted in the American military strategy of dramaƟ cally reducing tra-
diƟ onal weapons needed to counter challenges by other strategic enemies of 
America, who in the meanƟ me have gained the advantage. This pracƟ cal situaƟ on 
have gone hand in hand with a colossal loss of self-confi dence, a consequence of 
two generaƟ ons’ neglect of naƟ onal interest. As many commentators observed 
during that Ɵ me the American industrial base was exported abroad, mainly to 
China, space transportaƟ on in some measures to Russia, engineering delegated 
to foreign engineers bought from abroad, energy security to dictatorships and car 
producƟ on to Japan, with a dramaƟ c decrease in incoming and outgoing ships, 
for some of which the American ports are too shallow now. This radical decrease 
in manufacturing and engineering capabiliƟ es coupled with the reducƟ on of the 
number of American warships as well as warplanes created a situaƟ on in which 
America has become, in relaƟ ve terms, strategically vulnerable to others. 
If we take into consideraƟ on the fact that 95% of the U.S. and 90% of world 
foreign trade moves by sea, than we may conclude that America is essenƟ ally an 
inland naƟ on. This means that the abdicaƟ on of the sea lanes endangers stra-
tegic American interests. MariƟ me blockade or simply disrupƟ on of such lanes 
remains the quickest way of strangling any given naƟ on, a situaƟ on which would 
require an immediate response. The United States has taken over from Great 
113 When people rebel as in a populist movement like the Tea Party, there has been some-
Ɵ mes a tendency to treat them as terrorist or simply criminal or racist, standing in the 
way of the right policies. This was a comment with which Obama’s vice-president Joe 
Biden labeled the Tea Party. To be sure such an aƫ  tude came much earlier, possibly 
with the post 9/11 legal-poliƟ cal security state with an image of the president as the 
commander in chief as having a mandate of unlimited power, and defi ning the war as 
about people’s safety, a process essenƟ ally without end and without restricƟ ons, lim-
ited only by what the government can get away with. PoliƟ cal power is then treated 
as a legiƟ mate means to goals which do not have to be controlled since safety is the 
supreme law, with the people, as one of the poliƟ cal analysts observed, “becoming 
accustomed to being herded, while others have become accustomed to doing the 
herding. For all, it means suppressing the knowledge that terrorists have been almost 
exclusively Muslims, while indulging the poliƟ cally correct fantasy that one’s neighbor 
could be a terrorist. The facile misapplicaƟ on of the term ‘terrorist’ leads naturally 
fi rst to labeling and then to treaƟ ng domesƟ c poliƟ cal compeƟ tors as enemies. Thus 
does war prosecuted indefi nitely and incompetently against foreign enemies make for 
real war among fellow ciƟ zens… ‘Homeland security’ grew into a quarter trillion dollar 
public-private industry that changed life in America so quickly, with so liƩ le debate, 
because it followed the template established a generaƟ on earlier by the Nixon Ad-
ministraƟ on’s response to the fi rst aircraŌ  hijacking. For the American people home-
land security means badges and procedures, ritual humiliaƟ ons of grandmothers and 
children at the hands of people who would melt at the sight of an actual terrorist. 
ConfronƟ ng terrorists is not what [such] ‘security ‘ people sign up for”, Codevilla The 
Lost Decade, op. cit. pp. 18–19.
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Britain the task of guaranteeing the freedom of the seas and, as one of the most 
percepƟ ve military analysts observed, “the nature of this task demands a large 
blue–water fl eet that cannot be ‘downsized’. With the loss of a large number of 
important bases worldwide, if and when the U.S. projects military power it must 
do so most of the Ɵ me from its own territory or the sea. Immune to poliƟ cal cross 
currents, economically able to cover mulƟ ple areas, immune to resƟ ve popula-
Ɵ ons, and safe from insurgencies, the fl eets are instruments of undeniable uƟ lity 
in support of allies and in response to aggression. Forty percent of the world’s 
populaƟ on lives within modern naval gunfi re range of the sea, and more than 
two thirds within easy reach of carrier aircraŌ . Nothing is beƩ er than naval pow-
er and presence to preserve the oŌ en fragile reserve among naƟ ons, to protect 
American interests and those of [its] allies, and to prevent the wars aƩ endant to 
imbalances of power and unrestrained adventurism”.114
America has now the smallest navy in a century which has shrunk from 
about 1000 ships of fi Ō y years ago, to about 600 combat ships a decade ago and 
284 in 2011. Of these even fewer are capable of controlling the open seas.115 
This might create a situaƟ on in which China will monopolize the Western Pacifi c 
Rim, without a U.S. fl eet strong enough to contest them. At the same Ɵ me the 
American surface fl eet “can no longer venture confi dently where the Russians 
don’t want it”.116
The reducƟ on of the fl eet is not only a result of the “peace dividend” and 
the expected sense of security, or the greater capacity of newer ships, allegedly, 
to perform the tasks of the older ones. The 17% reducƟ on since 1998 has had 
nothing to do with the “peace dividend”. The technological upgrade of fewer and 
fewer ships to make up for reduced numbers might be for nothing, since a ship 
“could be in only one place at a Ɵ me.” One may thus say that in relaƟ on to the 
rise of China’s navy and the decline of the American “not that far in the future 
the trajectories will cross. Rather than face this, [Americans] seduce [themselves] 
with redefi niƟ ons such as the vague concept that we can block with relaƟ ve ease 
the straits through which the strategic materials upon which China depends must 
transit. But in one blink this would move us from the canonical BriƟ sh/American 
control of the sea to the insurgent model of lesser navies such as Germany’s in 
World War I and II. If [Americans] cast themselves as insurgents, China will be 
driven even faster to construct a navy that can dominate the oceans; a complete 
reversal of fortune”.117
114 Mark Helprin “The Decline of U.S. Naval Power”, The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 
2011; also his “Anchors Away”, The Claremont Review of Books, Summer 2011, p. 94.
115 Some projects are downsized even if their technology does not match the Russian or 
Chinese technology, like Virginia-class submarines.
116 Codevilla The Lost Decade, op. cit., p. 15; The Russians have also secured their de facto 
veto power on any NATO, let alone American installaƟ ons, east of the Oder River, that 
is in the post-Soviet territory named by them as “the close borderlands” with a defi ni-
Ɵ on of their fronƟ er as one with Germany.
117 Helprin “Anchors Away”, op. cit., p. 94. 
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It may happen that the United States Navy may follow the Royal Navy’s trajec-
tory. The laƩ er, aŌ er decommissioning its only aircraŌ  carrier recently, will not 
have another one for another decade or so. But this is more a maƩ er of choosing 
a paƩ ern of decline for which the economic crisis is just an excuse. Americans 
have fi ve Ɵ mes the populaƟ on of Britain, six Ɵ mes its GDP and are not exhausted 
by the World Wars and their debts. 
The United States does not depend, as Britain did, on an empire now lost. 
Defi cit reducƟ on may be here both a reason as well as an excuse for such a de-
cline of the ocean fl eet. Although defi cit reducƟ on is important, more important 
is “abdicaƟ ng [America’s] more than half-century stabilizing role on the oceans, 
neglecƟ ng the military balance, and relinquishing a posiƟ on [Americans] are fully 
capable of holding [the change which] will bring tectonic realignments among na-
Ɵ ons and ulƟ mately more expense, bloodleƫ  ng, and heartbreak than the most 
furious defi cit hawk is capable of imagining. A technological naƟ on with a GDP of 
14 trillion and an ancient and also the most advanced and innovaƟ ve naval tradi-
Ɵ on can aﬀ ord to build a fl eet worthy of its past and suﬃ  cient to its future. Pity 
it, if it does not”.118
The same apprehensions apply to drasƟ c reducƟ on of American airpower and 
self-propelled, remote-controlled arƟ llery, all reduced as they are seen as unnec-
essary in the event of an urban, counterinsurgency fi ght with terror, according to 
the secretaries of state since Donald Rumsfeld at least. Thus, in 2009 Congress 
cancelled the F-22 Raptor, the world’s best fi ghter-bomber plane with no more 
than 187 built, a reducƟ on of the iniƟ al commission of over 700 hundred. The 
raƟ onale for that was that the Chinese and Russians were slower than expected 
in building comparable planes.119 When such comparable planes are built, so the 
logic of the argument goes, they will be opposed with the F-35, a cheaper and 
less capable plane. The strategy was that the sophisƟ cated fi rst class opponent 
will never be America’s challenger, both in war as well as in strategic maneuvers 
and confl icts by proxy.120
Wars and hard Ɵ mes usually force elites to respond in ways which prove their 
abiliƟ es to govern according to the interests of their countries, or, to the contrary, 
their inepƟ tude in defi ning the dangers, means of response and Ɵ me frame of 
their applicaƟ on. The American ruling elite, the percepƟ on is more or less visible 
everywhere, even if not stated clearly, have failed in this regard, and the Obama 
Presidency’s wayward policies and haphazard moves have only corroborated 
that process. The “War on Terror” response was as decisive as it was, in the long 
run, probably counterproducƟ ve in its objecƟ ves, since the world in 2012 is, so 
it seems, even less congenial to America and Americans than a decade earlier. 
Here, the erosion of sympathy has been observed even in the countries which 
118 Ibidem. 
119 That is technically true. The Russian T-50 Sukhoi fi ghter will not be ready for normal 
service earlier than in 6–8 years. The Chinese fi ghter even later. Both were shown in 
2011 in public but their commissioning is a long way oﬀ .
120 Codevilla The Lost Decade, p. 15.
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tradiƟ onally, because of the Soviet dominance, have been very friendly towards 
America. East-Central Europe is here an obvious example. 
There are presidencies which even if taking wrong decisions can avoid being 
detrimental to America’s fate. 19th century presidencies were of that sort, with 
the possible excepƟ on of Buchanan’s. There are good presidencies which pre-
vent the consequences of a prolonged crisis from turning into a naƟ onal catas-
trophe and which acƟ vate a great potenƟ al of rebirth dormant in the American 
demos. F.D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, both in diﬀ erent Ɵ mes and employing 
diﬀ erent means, belonged to such a category. There are also great presidencies 
which fi nd themselves at the fundamental crossroads of history and which save 
America. Lincoln was probably the greatest of them. 
Obama’s presidency might just as well be at such a juncture of history. This is 
possible, because not only is America facing today a fundamental strategic chal-
lenge, but also the large enough secƟ on of the American people may not care 
much about that. This means that cultural exhausƟ on might become the decisive 
factor blocking rebirth, a factor which cannot be modifi ed by simple poliƟ cs. This, 
of course, we do not know for sure. And it is for this very reason that Obama’s 
behavior and poliƟ cs have been for a large secƟ on of the American elites and 
society at large at least doubƞ ul. 
As every president, especially during a crisis, he is expected to be up to the 
job he holds. This requires fi rst of all tapping the deepest American cultural re-
sources so to acƟ vate them. This means either taking this treasure for granted, or 
seeing it as a challenge to be confronted. It might be strategically late for America 
to confront challenges, but Obama’s behavior is perceived by many as if accept-
ing decline as inevitable and acƟ ng to make it inevitable. This for many is deeply 
troubling. We do not know whether the American people chose him because he 
already represented them, in the deepest cultural sense, as people who subcon-
sciously gave up, or as the people unsure of themselves who chose a leader who 
was to respond to their deepest longings about America and acƟ vate them. 
Whatever the moƟ ves of the electorate, Obama behaves more as Aeschines 
than Demosthenes from the ancient story of the two famous Athenians orators 
debaƟ ng the looming confl ict with Philip of Macedon. The speech of Aeschines 
was thoughƞ ul and well construed and he was persuading the Athenians to wel-
come the enemies to avoid a protracted and unpredictable war and make ac-
commodaƟ on with them. The listeners applauded politely and the speech was 
reported: “How well he spoke”. Demosthenes delivered a rousing call to arms, in 
defense of liberƟ es and freedom, and it was he who moved the Greeks to acƟ on. 
When he fi nished speaking, the Athenians said, ”Let us march”.121 
121 The story is recalled by one of the observers in a context of the crucial 1976 presiden-
Ɵ al elecƟ on, when the Republican NaƟ onal ConvenƟ on nominated president Gerald 
Ford as a candidate, and at which the defeated contender Ronald Reagan gave a rous-
ing speech which prompted many to conclude that the convenƟ on chose the wrong 
candidate. See Craig Shirley Reagan’s RevoluƟ on: The Untold Story of the Campaign 
That Started it All, Nelson Current, Nashville, Tenn. 2005, p. XXIV. 
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Maybe Obama has it right and the Americans were waiƟ ng for such a stance 
as performed by Aeshines. Europe is full of such Aeschineses. This is a psychologi-
cal stance which equates military with violence, and violence with evil by defi ni-
Ɵ on. In such a perspecƟ ve the military or power as many commentators have 
observed are just for nothing. They are for nothing if nothing is believed in, if 
nothing is worth fi ghƟ ng for, as if America’s confl icts have been by defi niƟ on for 
nothing, and the American empire has been unanimously a force of evil in this 
world. True, oŌ en enough this power has been mismanaged and wrongly applied, 
if more by gross miscalculaƟ ons or unlawful insubordinaƟ on, than willful poliƟ cal 
acƟ on. But that power and the military has always been trained for something. 
It was created not to be aggressive or imperialisƟ c, it was there to protect some-
thing. If that “something” is no longer believed in and if America is to decline, it is 
unlikely that someone else will take up the cause of that “something”. 
Nothing else reveals the perversity and decadence of the Western elites than 
the fact that they are increasingly incapable of defi ning clearly what that “some-
thing” is, and that they defi ne power, and the ability and willingness to use it as 
being tantamount to evil. This might be the fi rst generaƟ on of Europeans and pos-
sibly Americans when such an aƫ  tude, an aƫ  tude of essenƟ ally degraded and 
delegiƟ mized “manhood”, might be subconsciously circulaƟ ng in the increasing 
number of people mesmerized with consumpƟ on and an acedic aƫ  tude towards 
character and values which created condiƟ ons for it. This acedic stance tends to 
have an image of power in the service of evil only. It is incapable of imagining it in 
the service of character and the good. 
But perhaps this is too bleak a picture of contemporary Americans, and read-
ing the eternal words of G.K. Chesterton they would understand what he was 
talking about. As he said, “a true soldier fi ghts not for what is ahead of him, but 
for what is behind him, not for empire but for home”. It might be that the survival 
of this Western home of freedom would require a sustenance and sacrifi ce of the 
American benign “empire”, if for no other reason but a simple realizaƟ on that 
there is no volunteer to take this role. And last but not least, such an aƫ  tude to 
possess power and to have a will to use it if need be, would require a resistance 
to the reigning modern liberal-leŌ  “metaphysics” or psychology of evil, or to put 
it diﬀ erently, a lack thereof. 
It would require a rejecƟ on of modern ideologies explaining the reality of evil 
not as an inevitable constant of human nature, but rather by subsƟ tuƟ on theo-
ries of social or psychological maladjustment. Such a maladjustment is projected 
not only at the personal, but also at the internaƟ onal level, another equivalent of 
the utopian dream of the KanƟ an peace and the world governance according to 
the principles of jusƟ ce and human rights.122
122 See on this utopian liberal thought an excellent study Pierre Manent A World Beyond 
PoliƟ cs, op. cit.; also Chantal Delsol Unjust JusƟ ce: Against the Tyranny of InternaƟ onal 
Law, ISI Books, Wilmington, Del 2007; on a more pracƟ cal level in connecƟ on with 
the U.S. foreign policy see Jeremy Rabkin, Law without NaƟ ons? Why ConsƟ tuƟ onal 
Government Requires Sovereign States, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2005.
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Permanence is an illusion and wise people know that it is always later than 
we realize. Americans might be awakening to that mood as well. Or are they? For 
too long they have been living with the thought that only other naƟ ons have his-
tory, and their history has been one of incessant power and greatness. In other 
words, Americans have exhibited a subconscious refl ecƟ on similar to how Arnold 
Toybee expressed his feelings as a child towards Victorian Britain. For him the 
BriƟ sh were comfortably siƫ  ng outside of history, that history which had been 
happening to other people with all the nasty things which could never happen 
to the Empire. Are the Americans sƟ ll harboring that mental universe or are they 
already leaving it? 
But there is one opƟ misƟ c observaƟ on about the United States, which bodes 
well for the future. It is a growing impaƟ ence, the rising roar of a confused naƟ on 
which does not yet know what to do with this new self-realizaƟ on of its vulner-
ability and the menace from all sides, internally as well externally, but who wants 
a president to lead them to their inner strengths and convert them into great 
people of freedom again. America is a naƟ on which does not tolerate mediocri-
Ɵ es incapable of taking decisive acƟ on in Ɵ mes of crises, leaders who do not 
know what they believe in and what they are aiming at. This is the basic crisis 
of the Obama presidency, even if masked perfectly at the rhetorical level of this 
Harvard lawyer.
The last decade of wars has worn Americans out. But this is a weariness not 
similar to the Vietnam syndrome, aŌ er all there was 9/11 which provided sure 
legiƟ macy for all that eﬀ ort. The weariness comes from a realizaƟ on that these 
wars might come to naught, well short of the objecƟ ves they were to meet, 
with a drained economy, huge defi cits and the incessant parƟ ng at home, while 
America – the Titanic, has been on a collision course. Thus disillusionment and 
isolaƟ onist tendencies mount among the ordinary people and a feeling of de-
spondency is engulfi ng the American elites. Whether America will shake oﬀ  this 
feeling, rebuild itself internally, decisively defi ne its prioriƟ es, reassert its patrio-
Ɵ sm purifi ed of hubrisƟ c jingoism and will lead the world, we do not know. Its 
military is sƟ ll a potent tool of capable leadership. But this not a quesƟ on posed 
alone for America. It is a quesƟ on essenƟ ally for the civilized world, especially the 
Western one, which has nothing in stock ready to replace it.
Piotr Patalong
Fighting the Illicit Trade 
and Trafficking of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons 
– A World Priority 
for the 21st Century
Introduction
One of the most important and least studied internaƟ onal security problems 
since the Cold War Era is the uncontrolled proliferaƟ on of small arms and light 
weapons (SA/LW). Throughout the twenƟ eth century, our main focus has been 
concentrated on major and sophisƟ cated weapon systems: aircraŌ , ships, mis-
siles and tanks. But in the late 20th century the main instruments of war have 
changed.
The increasing number of local and civil wars, ethnic violence and global ter-
rorism have shiŌ ed the demands for military equipment. Now assault rifl es, ma-
chine guns, land mines and explosives, light mortars and hand grenades are the 
most wanted products in global trade. They are “cheap, widely available, lethal, 
simple to use, durable, portable, concealable, they have legiƟ mate military, po-
lice, and civilian uses, making them easy to cross borders, legally and illicitly”.1 
1 Jeﬀ ery Boutwell and Michael Klare “Special Report: A Scourge of Small Arms” (Scien-
Ɵ fi c American: 2000), p. 30–35.
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There is no one universal and fully accepted defi niƟ on of small arms and light 
weapons (SALW). But the defi niƟ on which has gained wide currency seems to be 
the OSCE SALW defi niƟ on. According to it: “Small arms are broadly categorized 
as those weapons intended for use by individual members of armed or security 
forces. They include revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifl es; sub-machine guns; 
assault rifl es; and light machine guns. Light weapons are broadly categorized as 
those weapons intended for use by several members of armed or security forces 
serving as a crew. They include heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and 
mounted grenade launchers; portable anƟ -aircraŌ  guns; portable anƟ -tank guns; 
recoilless rifl es; portable launchers of anƟ -tank missile and rocket systems; por-
table launchers of anƟ -aircraŌ  missile systems; and mortars of calibres less than 
100 mm.”2
Simply stated, SALW are any weapon that can be carried by a single person or 
a small group of people, both military weapons as well as commercial fi rearms. 
The scale of trade and direcƟ on of the global fl ow of SALW is sensiƟ ve to 
changes in the internaƟ onal system, depends also on demand, technological ca-
paciƟ es and access to cash and credits. During the Cold War the United States and 
the Soviet Union competed in the SALW trade. The main fl ow of weapons went to 
their allies and clients in the so-called ‘Third World’. That process generally was 
possible to trace and in several circumstances easy to stop. With the end of the 
Cold War most superpowers’ subsidizaƟ on of arms transfers were terminated. 
But at the same Ɵ me new possibiliƟ es for arms trade and traﬃ  cking emerged. In 
some former Warsaw Pact countries large stockpiles of SALW became no longer 
necessary. As a result, arms fi rms newly privaƟ zed and uncontrolled by states, 
opened new SALW markets with a signifi cant increase in the illicit trade and 
fl ow of fi rearms into the black market.3 Because of increasing demand for cheap 
weaponry from the newly created states (e.g. Former Yugoslavian countries), and 
from countries where confl icts were fought mainly by irregular forces and miliƟ as 
(e.g. Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Rwanda, Sudan etc.) the proliferaƟ on of SALW 
rose hugely. So the Cold War stockpiles of SALW became ready for legal and illicit 
trade4, aƩ racƟ ng organized crime groups and easy to possess by terrorist orga-
nizaƟ ons. Due to this, many internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons see “the proliferaƟ on, 
widespread availability and illicit traﬃ  cking of (SALW) and their ammuniƟ on as 
one of the most dangerous challenges and threats to global stability and security, 
as well as to economic and social development and prosperity. The easy avail-
ability of SALW, their associated ammuniƟ on and explosives is a fuelling factor for 
the vast majority of confl icts”.5
2 OSCE “Best PracƟ se Guide on NaƟ onal Controls over Manufacture of SALW”, (2003), 
p. 2.
3 Michel T. Klare “The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the InternaƟ onal System in the 
Post–Cold War Era”, (1995), p. 36.
4 SAIS Review Rachel Stohl “FighƟ ng the Illicit Traﬃ  cking of Small Arms” (2005), p. 60.
5 UNSC “Open debate on SALW, Statement on behalf of the EU”(2008), p. 1.
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This paper will show that the illegal trade, transfer and use of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (SALW) has become one of the world’s main security issues for the 
next century. It examines diﬀ erent kinds of SALW trade and transfer, its impact 
on four military confl icts from diﬀ erent parts of the world, and the internaƟ onal 
legal response to this phenomenon. Possible links between illicit SALW transfer 
and the rise of terror and organized crime acƟ viƟ es will be examined as well. 
1. Small Arms and Light Weapons production, trade, 
transfer; Beneficiaries and customers 
The word’s military expenditure is esƟ mated to have been $1339 billion in 2007 
and it has increased since 1998 by 45 percent.6 Following military expenditure, 
global arms producƟ on has increased too. Arms sales by the major arms produc-
ing companies in the world (so called SIPRI Top 1007) amounted to approximately 
315 billion dollars in 2006. 
The total value of the authorized SALW trade is esƟ mated to be at least 4–6 
billion USD a year8 and is sƟ ll growing. The United States, European Union, Brazil, 
China, Canada, Japan and the Russian FederaƟ on are the main producers of SALW. 
The illicit small arms sales are almost impossible to assess. That number could 
reach 20 percent of all the world SALW trade9, from 2–10 billion USD a year10. 
Small arms and light weapons are traded and transferred through a variety 
of internaƟ onal channels. Government to government transfers are sales or giŌ s 
of light weapons by one government to another. Another channel is commercial 
sales, the legal sales of SALW by governmental or private commercial fi rms in one 
country to such agencies in another country. Such sales are usually regulated by 
the government of the supplying country. Both those channels are recognized as 
legal transfers.
ClandesƟ ne operaƟ ons cover the transfer of light weapons by the govern-
ment of one country to the military or separaƟ st forces in another country to en-
hance their capabiliƟ es. Diﬀ erent state organizaƟ ons, private agencies or brokers 
are employed to make the transfer unrecognizable or to conceal the origin of the 
weaponry. Those transfers are usually moƟ vated by poliƟ cal, ideological, religious 
or other consideraƟ ons and someƟ mes called illicit grey market transfers. 
One of the most dangerous channels of SALW transfer are black market sales, 
by criminal or corrupt organizaƟ ons from one country to unauthorized recipients 
in another. These include sales of SALW without legal and licensing requirements 
usually to a country under UN arms embargo, to terrorists, organized crime or 
6 Peter Stalenheim, Catarina Perdomo, Elizabeth Skons “Military Expenditure” SIPRI 
“Yearbook 2008”. 
7 Those dates do not include Chinese arms companies. 
8 Small Arms Survey 2005, “An upgrade on Small Arms Transfers”, Chapter 4.
9 Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 167–168.
10 hƩ p://www.iansa.org “Small arms are the weapons of mass destrucƟ on”.
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separaƟ st organizaƟ ons. ClandesƟ ne operaƟ ons and black market transfers are 
the main cause of Small Arms and Light Weapons’ proliferaƟ on worldwide. Trac-
ing the fl ow of illegally sold weapons is extremely diﬃ  cult, and requires interna-
Ɵ onal cooperaƟ on.
One important diﬀ erence between Small Arms and Light Weapons and other 
convenƟ onal armaments is that the armed forces of states are only one of a va-
riety of types of SALW holders and users. Besides state security services such as 
the police, border and coast guards, many categories of Non–State Actor (NSA) 
legiƟ mately possess fi rearms. The growing privaƟ zaƟ on of security, the rise of 
private security and military companies, is contribuƟ ng to a huge demand for 
light weapons, not always legal. Social, poliƟ cal and economic disorder within 
many states has even led individuals to acquire fi rearms for their own and their 
family’s protecƟ on11. 
Another factor which dramaƟ cally increases the black market and prolifera-
Ɵ on of SALW within such a NSA as organized crime groups and arms traders is 
globalizaƟ on and the global underground economy. SALW are a major interna-
Ɵ onal crime business, generaƟ ng billions of dollars every year.12 Terrorists and 
terrorist organizaƟ ons are other Non-State Actors for whom Small Arms and Light 
Weapons became the favorite weapon of choice. It is esƟ mated by US State De-
partment that in recent years, half of the 175 idenƟ fi ed terrorist aƩ acks were 
commiƩ ed with small arms or light weapons. 13
In our century small arms and light weapons are tools of war and crime. The 
huge demand for SALW for diﬀ erent ‘customers’ makes their producƟ on and 
transfer very profi table. The human cost of this proliferaƟ on of SALW is never 
taken into account.
2. SA/LW impact on civil wars, regional conflicts, ethnic 
clashes, international terrorism and organized crime 
About 640 million SALW are esƟ mated to be in circulaƟ on worldwide14. Their im-
pact diﬀ ers, depending on the type of confl ict, its length, and methods of fi ght-
ing. But they were always the ‘fuel’ which kept the confl ict ‘engine’ going.
Light weapons in South America – Internal confl ict in Colombia
Very few internal confl icts around the world have the longevity, complexity 
and intensity of the confl ict in Colombia, one of LaƟ n America’s oldest in which 
11 Chistopher Lousise “The Social Impact of Light Weapons Availability and ProliferaƟ on” 
(United NaƟ ons Research InsƟ tute for Social Development: 1995), p. 18–22.
12 Michel T. Klare “The Global Trade…”, p. 39.
13 FederaƟ on of American ScienƟ st “The Illicit Arms Trade” briefi ng paper p. 1, hƩ p://
www.fas.org/asmp/campaign/smallarms.
14 Barbara A. Frey “Small arms and light weapons: the tools to violate human rights” 
(2004), p. 37, hƩ p://www.unidir.org.
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a historically weak and corrupt state has faced a variety of powerful and illegal 
armed organizaƟ ons. Confl ict shows how the illicit transfer of SALW can sƟ mulate 
its intensity.
The civil war at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 50s between 
the two main poliƟ cal parƟ es – the ConservaƟ ves and the Liberals – started en-
demic poliƟ cal violence in Colombia, followed by leŌ ist guerrillas rising up against 
the state at the beginning of 1960s. Both confl icts enjoyed relaƟ vely liƩ le “out-
side” support parƟ cularly concerning the supply of weapons. 
That situaƟ on has changed radically, parƟ cularly aŌ er the end of Cold War. 
The fl ow of weapons in the 1980s from South Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe 
to the black markets in Central America15 opened an easy access to illegal arms 
for Colombian guerrillas. It is esƟ mated that about 80 % of arms which enter 
the country illegally went to guerrilla groups like the Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), the NaƟ onal LiberaƟ on Army (ELN) or the paramilitary groups such as the 
United Self-Defense Group of Colombia16. 
The diverse sources of illegal weapons’ supply and diﬀ erent operaƟ onal re-
quirements are refl ected in the various types of arms used in combat by the guer-
rillas and paramilitary groups. The most common weapons remain G3s, Galils, 
Uzis and M-60s. But more and more frequently Russian AK-47, PKM machine 
guns, US-made M16 and AR-15s are used, and also Russian–made RPG rocket 
grenade launchers, US M -72 light area weapons LAW, Man Portable Air Defense 
Systems (MANPADs), sniper rifl es and light mortars. 
The illegal weapon supply network has reached not only rebel groups in Co-
lombia but also drugs producers, narcoƟ cs dealers and other crime organizaƟ ons. 
To defend their interests crime organizaƟ ons acquire expensive and technologi-
cally advanced small automaƟ c weapons17 for bodyguards and urban fi ghƟ ng, 
machine and assault rifl es to protect processing plants and airstrips in remote re-
gions. The growth and power of narcoƟ c dealers make them signifi cant importers 
of illicit arms. AŌ er reaching Colombia,18 illegal weapons due to regional interests 
oŌ en change owners. In some parts of the country guerrilla insurgents join the 
well-fi nanced drug producers, while in others narcoƟ c lords become sponsors of 
paramilitary groups by sending equipment (mainly weapons) to fi ght the rebels. 
To confuse the picture even further there are approximately one million fi rearms 
in the hands of private ciƟ zens
15 Weapon was transfer to such countries as Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Pana-
ma.
16 United NaƟ ons Oﬃ  ce on Drug and Crime “Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Traﬃ  cking 
in Colombia” (Bogota: 2006), p. 26.
17 The favourite submachine gun is the German made MP-5. 
18 It is esƟ mated that around 50% of the air shipment of illicit arms come across the 
Colombia–Brazil border. Rivers are used mainly in the Orinoquio region, in the south-
ern porƟ on of Colombia–Venezuela border, along the border with Brazil, and to the 
lesser extent along the borders with Peru and Ecuador United NaƟ ons Oﬃ  ce on Drug 
and Crime “Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Traﬃ  cking in Colombia” (Bogota: 2006), 
p. 35.
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Colombia has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Most of these 
killings (80 percent) involved fi rearms, and close to 90 percent of those were at 
short range – less than one meter – where light arms are most lethal. “Between 
1988 and 1993, there were approximately 150,000 murders in Colombia… Al-
though 16,000 of these were thought to be poliƟ cally related, and an addiƟ onal 
7,000 occurred during combat between government forces and guerrillas, the 
vast majority – 85 percent – were due to social violence, delinquency, and peƩ y 
crime”.19 In addiƟ on more people are killed by guerrillas’ indiscriminate aƩ acks 
on civilians, extrajudicial execuƟ ons and kidnappings. Drug dealers and paramili-
tary groups murder their civilian opponents. AƩ acks on non-military targets such 
as electricity plants and oil pipelines and the widespread use of mines also have 
a huge impact on the civilian populaƟ on.
The biggest problem which Columbia is facing today is that the State does 
not have a monopoly on the use of force. The main task of the Government in 
Bogota seems to be to reduce violence by the disarmament of rebels and orga-
nized crime structures. Due to this task Colombia has iniƟ ated the most profound 
process of poliƟ cal, economic, and cultural change, rewriƟ ng its ConsƟ tuƟ on, 
seeking to strengthen its judicial system and has begun to negoƟ ate peace seƩ le-
ments with several guerrilla groups. The armed forces and the police have been 
reconstructed in order to fi ght drug dealers and other criminal organizaƟ ons. The 
special program which has been launched to seize and confi scate illegal fi rearms 
seems to be very eﬀ ecƟ ve.20 
Small arms and light weapons in Europe – Wars and confl icts in Former 
Yugoslavia (1991–2001)
One of the major events which had a worldwide impact on small arms and light 
weapons’ proliferaƟ on aŌ er the Cold War Era were the 1991–2001 wars and 
confl icts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. AŌ er the Second World War the 
former State of Yugoslavia had become a global weapons producer. The combina-
Ɵ on of the developed arms industry, the high level of demand for arms and the 
huge profi ts to be made, encouraged the country to expand its domesƟ c weap-
ons producƟ on. The Golden Era of weapons producƟ on even increased aŌ er the 
Berlin Wall collapsed.
Before the wars of secession the diﬀ erent republics produced many civilian 
and military goods jointly. But when tensions erupted, arms producƟ on and stra-
tegic stockpiles began to be consolidated in Serbia.21 In addiƟ on to large weap-
19 D. Garcia and P. Jaramillo “Light Weapons and Internal Confl ict in Colombia” (American 
Academy of Arts and Science: 1995).
20 According to Colombia Department for the Arm Trade – only in year 2005 over 17000 
of illegal guns were seized or confi scated.
21 Priority was given to seƫ  ng up producƟ on lines for baƩ lefi eld equipment at four loca-
Ɵ ons in Serbia Morava Valley: Cocac, Lucani, Trstenic, Uzice, Valjevo. Ian Davis “Small 
arms and light weapons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The nature of the prob-
lem” (Safeworld: 2002), p. 46.
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onry producƟ on it is “esƟ mated that before confl ict in 1989 more than 6 million 
small arms were available to Yugoslav ciƟ zens, the equivalent of every third ciƟ -
zen being able to carry arms in the war”.22 
The Yugoslavian war had its roots in the country’s mulƟ -ethnic makeup, and 
long-lasƟ ng poliƟ cal and demographic dominaƟ on by the Serbs. Fundamental to 
the tensions were the oppression and human rights abuses by the Serbs aŌ er the 
First World War, followed by the genocide of the Serbian and Bosnian populaƟ on 
during the Second World War by the CroaƟ an Ustasha Groups.23 AŌ er the Second 
World War the communist–led anƟ fascists created the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY), composed of all the ethnic groups in the area. Despite the 
federal structure of the new Yugoslavia, there was sƟ ll tension between Croats, 
Slovenes (who argued for greater autonomy) and Serbs.
The Yugoslav Wars between 1991 and 2001 can be split into three groups. 
The fi rst wars took place during the break down of the Socialist Republic of Yu-
goslavia which included: the War in Slovenia (1991), the CroaƟ an War of Inde-
pendence (1991–1995), the Bosnian War (1992–1995). Secondly were the wars 
in Albanian populated areas: the Kosovo War (1996–1999), the Southern Ser-
bia confl ict (2000–2001) and the Macedonia confl ict (2001). Beside the UN and 
NATO involvement in peace keeping operaƟ ons in that region, NATO launched 
two campaigns against Serbia (third group): the NATO bombing of Republika Srp-
ska (1995–1996) and the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999.
Ten years of confl ict in the Balkans accumulated an enormous number of small 
arms and light weapons in the region, large domesƟ c weapon producƟ on was 
mulƟ plied by the illicit traﬃ  cking of SALW to fi ghƟ ng facƟ ons. New states, most 
being quite poor, chose to concentrate on the acquisiƟ on of light weapons.24 
In addiƟ on, large numbers of weapons had been illegally transferred through 
new and weakly protected borders to neighboring countries to equip minoriƟ es 
in the paramilitary and miliƟ a forces. 
Large quanƟ Ɵ es of arms reached the Balkans from far away countries. Iran 
was the main arms supplier to the Bosnian Muslim Military forces. Outside the 
United NaƟ ons arms embargo, from only May 1994 to January, 1996 Teheran 
transported over 5,000 tons of weapons and military equipment to Bosnia with 
the United States ‘green light’ policy.25 
Because of the amount of SALW in the Balkans and border relaxaƟ on aŌ er the 
Civil Wars, Former Yugoslavian countries became the main source of small arms 
22 Ian Davis “Small arms…”, p. 50. 
23 Due to diﬀ ering views and lack of documentaƟ on, esƟ mates for the number of Serbian 
vicƟ ms in CroaƟ a range widely, from 25,000 to more than one million. The esƟ mated 
number of Serbs killed in Jasenovac ranges from 25,000 to 700,000. The most reliable 
fi gures place the number of Serbs killed by the Ustaša between 330,000 and 390,000, 
with 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs murdered in Jasenovac. From the website of the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 
24 SIPRI Yearbook 1993, pp. 150–55.
25 Cees Wiebes “Intelligence and the War in Bosnia: 1992–1995” (Lit Verlag: 2003), 
pp. 178, 196–97.
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and light weapons smuggled into and outside the European Union. As a result 
cheap light weaponry were traced to the hands of criminals in the Netherlands, 
Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic. Moreover AKs, RPG rocket launchers 
and explosives were obtained by such terrorist organizaƟ ons as the Real IRA in 
Northern Island, ETA in Spain, and Italian mafi a organizaƟ ons like Cosa Nostra, 
Sacra Corona Unita and Camorra.26 
But SALW also created huge domesƟ c problems inside the new countries. 
The amount of privately owned illicit, unregistered weapons of unknown origin 
is esƟ mated in Serbia to be almost 950,000. Such arms fuel organized crime and 
acts of armed robberies and homicides in which weapons used have increased 
greatly.27 
In CroaƟ an society the widespread availability of SALW, both legal and illegal 
arms and ammuniƟ on, has created a danger to public health, safety and secu-
rity. The illegal possession and gun traﬃ  cking by criminal organizaƟ ons, presents 
a problem for law enforcement and border control. Approximately twenty per-
cent of CroaƟ an ciƟ zens possess legal weapons, which makes CroaƟ a (with the 
addiƟ on of illegal arms) one of the most heavily armed countries in South Eastern 
Europe.28 Comparable problems can be seen in FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and in Ko-
sovo. Each government launches campaigns to tackle the illegal SALW by amnesty 
programs, law enforcement, prevenƟ ng and combaƟ ng illicit arms traﬃ  cking. 
Small arms and light weapons in South Asia – Confl icts in Afghanistan
One of the biggest illicit small arms markets remains in South Asia, in the area 
from Afghanistan through Pakistan to India. The fi rst major fl ow of illegal weap-
ons to that region took place during the years of war and military clashes be-
tween India and Pakistan. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 opened a new era in the light weapons trade in South Asia. 
In response to the Soviet invasion and occupaƟ on, millions of tons of military 
equipment were imported into the region, mainly small arms and light weapons. 
The United States began the concept of indirect military assistance to the Afghan 
rebels. By the mid-1980s American intelligence services were coordinaƟ ng a mas-
sive covert operaƟ on, transferring enormous quanƟ Ɵ es of arms and ammuniƟ on 
to Mujahedeen leaders and commanders in the fi eld. The Afghan rebels were 
also supported by China – with weaponry – and by Saudi Arabia – with fi nances. 
Because of its geographic locaƟ on and poliƟ cal links, Pakistan became the main 
transit country.29 
26 DomiƟ lla Sagramoso “The proliferaƟ on of illegal small arms and light weapons in and 
around the European Union: Instability, organized crime and terrorists groups” (Safe-
world: 2001), pp. 22, 45–46.
27 South Eastern Europe SALW Monitor 2006 (2006) p. 92.
28 bid, p. 45. 
29 InternaƟ onal AcƟ on Network on Small Arms Transfers (IANSA) “South and Central 
Asia”.
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To cover the operaƟ on CIA procured a large number of SALW and ammuni-
Ɵ on in such countries as China, Egypt, Turkey, India, Israel and Great Britain.30 The 
major turning point regarding the supply of weapons by the CIA came in 1986, 
when the decision was taken to supply the Mujahedeen with a most sophisƟ -
cated anƟ -aircraŌ  system – SƟ nger missiles. The American arms shipment had 
a fundamental impact on the war in Afghanistan but also had a profound eﬀ ect 
on subsequent security condiƟ ons in the region.31
Another era of weaponry supply followed the Taliban military operaƟ on in 
early 1994. AŌ er two years of bloody fi ghƟ ng the Taliban forced President Burhan-
nudin Rabbani and the government to escape from Kabul in September 1996. 
The Afghan president joined an opposiƟ on alliance, the United Islamic Front for 
the SalvaƟ on of Afghanistan, also known as the Northern Alliance.
During the Ɵ me of war and insurgency fi ghƟ ng, the Soviet Union (Rus-
sia) became the main actor fuelling the government of Afghanistan and, aŌ er 
its collapse, the Northern Alliance rebels with a massive quanƟ ty of arms and 
ammuniƟ on.32
It has been suggested that “the two former superpowers spent nearly 50 
Ɵ mes as much on arms in the confl ict in Afghanistan than they ever have for 
development”.33.
The last war in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001. The United States and 
the United Kingdom launched a military operaƟ on (OperaƟ on Enduring Free-
dom) in response to the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda aƩ ack. The stated purpose 
of the invasion was to capture Osama bin Laden, destroy al Qaeda, and remove 
the Taliban regime, which had provided support and safe harbor to terrorists. 
The U.S. and the UK aerial bombing campaign was followed by ground forces, 
supplied primarily by the Afghan Northern Alliance. In 2002, American, BriƟ sh 
and Canadian infantry were commiƩ ed, along with Special Forces from several 
allied naƟ ons. The iniƟ al aƩ ack removed the Taliban from power. The war has 
been less successful in achieving the goal of restricƟ ng al-Qaeda’s movement. 
Since 2006, Afghanistan has seen threats to its stability from increased Taliban-
led insurgency. 
Two military operaƟ ons in Afghanistan seek to establish control over the 
country. OperaƟ on Enduring Freedom (OEF) is a United States’ combat opera-
Ɵ on involving some coaliƟ on partners and currently operaƟ ng primarily in the 
eastern and southern parts of the country along the Pakistan border. The second 
30 M. Yousaf and M. Adkin, “The Bear Trap: Afghanistan Untold Story” (London, Leo 
Cooper: 1992), p. 84.
31 Washington policy (so called “hands oﬀ ”) was to allow Pakistan ISI to control the arm 
pipeline. So up to now the amount of weapons leaked out of the pipeline and never 
reach Afghan border (leŌ  in Pakistan) is unknown. 
32 Elizabeth Kirkham and Catherine Flew “Strengthening Embargoes and Enhancing Hu-
man Security” (Saferworld and the University of Bradford: 2003), p. 24.
33 Chris Smith “Light Weapons and Ethnics Confl ict in South Asia” (American Academy of 
Arts and Science: 1995).
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operaƟ on is the InternaƟ onal Security Assistance Force (ISAF), iniƟ ally established 
by the UN Security Council at the end of December 2001 to secure the capital 
city, Kabul and its surroundings. NATO assumed control of ISAF in 2003. Both 
operaƟ ons caused addiƟ onal fl ows (legal and illegal) of SALW into the region. 
Afghanistan has become one of the most heavily armed countries in the world. 
It is esƟ mated34 that at present, there are 10 million automaƟ c rifl es of the AK 
family (the world’s most ubiquitous assault rifl e, of which 40 to 70 million have 
been manufactured since 1947). That number is sƟ ll increasing due to sales and 
donaƟ ons of weaponry (to re-arm Afghan Security Forces). “Almost 54,000 items 
of small arms and light weapons have been reported to have been donated to 
the Afghanistan government by members states of NATO and their “Partnership 
of Peace” allies between 2002–2007, and the delivery of another nearly 48,000 
small arms and light weapons is pending”.35 
Because of internaƟ onal and internal confl icts Afghanistan became one of the 
most seriously aﬀ ected naƟ ons because of the availability of small arms.36 Due to 
that enormous access to light weapons systems and “safe havens” the gravity of 
internaƟ onal terrorism has shiŌ ed from the Middle East to Asia. “Afghanistan of 
the 1990s replaced Syria – it controlled the Bekaa Valley of the 1970s and 1980s 
as the main center for training several dozen terrorists groups.”37 With the Soviet 
Union’s withdrawal well equipped and professionally trained Mujahedeen be-
came available as warriors for other confl icts seen as Islamic holy wars (Yemen, 
Chechnya etc.). What made the case of Afghanistan even worse was that the 
Taliban forces became aligned with the Al Qaeda terrorist group, and the land be-
came the training ground and launching pad for internaƟ onal terrorist acƟ viƟ es. 
To reduce the quanƟ ty of SALW in Afghanistan, in 2003 the United NaƟ on 
together with the Afghan Government launched a disarmament program38. By 
2006 the program had ended, disarming 63,000 soldiers and 750,000 civilians. 
The successor of the UN DDR program, the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Forc-
es (started on 11 June 2005) aims to disarm some of the 1,800 armed groups 
exisƟ ng across the country. Up to 2008 the UN supervised program collected over 
30,000 small arms and light weapons.
Despite countrywide disarmament eﬀ orts by the government and the in-
ternaƟ onal community, many Afghans are sƟ ll armed with small arms. Afghani-
stan through its history has been an ungovernable land of strong tribes where 
34 A.F. Musah and N. Thompson, “Over a Barrel: Light Weapons and Human Rights in the 
Commonwealth”, 1999, p. 38.
35 Amnesty InternaƟ onal “Afghanistan – Arms ProliferaƟ on Fuels Further Abuse” (2008), 
p. 2.
36 Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki, “Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Challenge of 
Terrorism” 2002.
37 Rohan Gunaratna “Terrorism and Small Arms and Light Weapons” (New York: 2001), 
p. 4.
38 United NaƟ ons Disarmament, DemobilizaƟ on and ReintegraƟ on (DDR) Program, Af-
ghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), Amnesty InternaƟ onal “Afghanistan – 
Arms ProliferaƟ on Fuels Further Abuse” (2008), p. 5.
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tradiƟ onal law was maintained by village courts and the use of guns. AŌ er the 
Soviet invasion and the ten year long brutal confl ict, the number of SALW held 
among the populaƟ on rose. As a result, a huge number of local, powerful com-
manders with hundreds of miliƟ a members had emerged. They fought the So-
viets and are now fi ghƟ ng the anƟ -coaliƟ on insurgency. In addiƟ on, the “new 
naƟ onwide business” of opium producƟ on and the armed facƟ ons infi ltraƟ ng the 
country from Pakistan are the increasing destabilizaƟ on factors in the region.39
The main price of the decades of lasƟ ng confl icts, and the general access to 
weaponry and huge number of land mines was paid by the Afghan civil popula-
Ɵ on. The Soviet confl ict, followed by civil war had cost over million (1,000,000–
1,800,000) non-combatant deaths, and another three million were maimed or 
wounded.40 Another 2 million were displaced within the country and 5 million 
fl ed to Pakistan and Iran. The United NaƟ on’s sources have indicated a massive 
percentage of civilian casualƟ es in the present war. Over 2,118 civilians died in 
2008, 55 percent originated from insurgent aƩ acks, 39 percent were caused by 
the Afghan government and NATO coaliƟ on forces (6 remaining percent because 
of crossfi re). Over 80 percent of all those deaths were caused by small arms and 
light weapons.
Small arms and light weapons in Africa – The Democra? c Republic 
of Congo
None of the world’s conƟ nents have suﬀ ered more because of small arms and 
light weapons proliferaƟ on than Africa. Since the advent of colonialism, African 
ciƟ zens have experienced an enormous number of armed confl icts. One of the 
countries in which armed confl icts almost stopped human development and 
brought mass poverty is located in the Central African sub-region, The Demo-
craƟ c Republic of Congo (DRC).41 
“There are so many weapons here that each person makes his own law. There 
is pracƟ cally complete impunity. Anyone who holds a weapon has authority over 
anyone and can threaten anyone”42 
The confl ict over the past ten years in the DRC has been described as the 
worst humanitarian disaster since the Second World War. But in the DRC confl ict 
up to 90% of violent deaths were caused by small arms and light weapons.43
39 United NaƟ ons Oﬃ  ce for the CoordinaƟ on of Humanitarian Aﬀ airs, “AFGHANISTAN: 
Violence fuels disillusionment and threatens reconstrucƟ on – UN” (07 December 
2006).
40 “Death Tolls for the Major Wars and AtrociƟ es of the TwenƟ eth Century”, hƩ p://users.
erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Afghanistan.
41 Two other States in that region are Central Africa Republic and Chad.
42 Jean Charles – Humanitarian Oﬃ  cer in the DRC since 2001, Bukavu. Amelia Bookstein 
“The call for tough arms control, Voices from the DemocraƟ c Republic of the Congo” 
(Amnesty InternaƟ onal, IANSA and Oxfam Quebec 2006), p. 2.
43 Small Arms Survey 2005, p. 248.
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European countries exploraƟ on of Congo in the nineteenth century, naƟ onal 
movement and fi ghƟ ng for independence, fi ghƟ ng between poliƟ cal parƟ es and 
their leaders for poliƟ cal power in the newly created state, cold war era military 
support versus post-Cold War lack of support and the huge number of natural 
resources are only a few of the factors on which the DRC confl icts were based. 
On 30 July 1960 Congo achieved its independence followed by fi ve years of 
instability and confl icts between the two ruling parƟ es. In the 1965 coup, the 
chief of staﬀ  of the new Congo army, Lieutenant General Joseph-Desire Mobutu 
overthrew President Kasavubu. Having strong support from the United States 
(because of his staunch opposiƟ on to the Communists) he had ruled the country 
Ɵ ll 1997.44 The end of Mobutu’s rule escalated the DRC confl ict into “Africa’s First 
World War”.45 
By 1996 tensions from neighboring Rwanda and the genocide of the Tutsis 
had spilled over to Congo (at that Ɵ me called Zaire). The Tutsis formed a miliƟ a 
joined by various opposiƟ on groups (led by Laurent-Desire Kabila) and supported 
by Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Burundi and Eritrea and they toppled Mobutu in 
May 1997. Kabila declared himself the state President and reverted the name of 
the country to the DemocraƟ c Republic of Congo.
In 1998 a new confl ict, with the aim of overwhelming Laurent Kabila was 
launched (the so-called Second Congo War). The neighboring countries of Ugan-
da, Burundi and Rwanda supported the rebels while President Kabila obtained 
assistance from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In 1999 many of the warring 
parƟ es signed the Lusaka Accord Agreement which called for a ceasefi re on all 
sides and an end to the supply of weapons. AŌ er the agreement in February 
2000 the United NaƟ ons peacekeeping mission (MONUC46) was established, but 
the war conƟ nued. 
While armed groups conƟ nued to operate in the country, some warring par-
Ɵ es resumed peace talks which resulted in the Pretoria Peace Agreement of De-
cember 2002.47 The document declared the end to hosƟ liƟ es among the main 
parƟ es and set up a power–sharing government in June 2003. 
The formal end to war and the start of the transiƟ onal government led by 
Joseph Kabila did not bring the confl ict to an end. Even the withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Congo, the presence of UN peacekeepers and the UN arms embargo 
could not stop miliƟ a rebel groups operaƟ ng in many provinces of the country.48
44 “The U.S. prolonged the rule of Zairian dictator Mobutu… by providing more than 
$300 million in weapons and $100 million in military training.” W Hartung and B Moix, 
“Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to the Congo War”.
45 Norimitsu Onishi, “Remembering How Africa’s First World War Begun”.
46 Mission de l’OrganisaƟ on des NaƟ ons Unies en République DémocraƟ que du Congo.
47 Formal name: The Global and Inclusive Agreement on the TransiƟ on in the DemocraƟ c 
Republic of the Congo (GIAT).
48 As example – According to Amnesty InternaƟ onal (2005) – in May 2004 two rebel 
groups laid siege and then occupied the city of Bukavu, killed more than a hundred of 
people, and raped women and girls as young as three years old. 
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The wars in the DRC have cost millions of lives. The human cost of the small 
arms and light weapon trade and traﬃ  cking is enormous. Just between January 
2003 and April 2004 almost 400,000 people were killed in the eastern DCR and 
more than 85% of those living near one of the front lines have been aﬀ ected by 
violence.49 But the highest cost in human lives is the indirect impact of the SALW 
presence. Arms acquisiƟ on and disposal have become a common phenomenon 
in daily lives. Guerrilla groups equipped with SALW have broken the government 
safety and social net. A health service, food supply and fi nancial support for fami-
lies in most of the country’s regions simply do not exist. More than 3.8 million 
people had died as a result of wars up to 2004. The vast majority of deaths were 
caused by the destrucƟ on of the country’s health infrastructure and food sup-
ply. More than 31,000 civilians conƟ nued to die every month as a result of the 
confl icts.50 51
FiŌ y to sixty percent of the weapons used in DCR are AK-47s, manufactured in 
Russia, China, Egypt, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia. But guns from U.S., Germany, 
France and many other European countries are in common use as well.52
Despite the UN resoluƟ ons which imposed an embargo on weapons entering 
the DRC many countries and arms traﬃ  ckers have violated it. With 350–400 se-
cret airfi elds (UN MONUC reports) and an eastern border which includes a huge 
number of lakes smuggling seems easy.
The main vicƟ ms of the Congo wars are women and children (the highest 
numbers of deaths). Because of that the confl ict has been named a “war against 
women”. The UN has charged the various rebel groups, which used rape, canni-
balism and other atrociƟ es as “the arms of war”.53 
Children (boys and girls) were abducted or coerced to join military groups. 
The simplicity of armament (SALW) made it possible to train and to use them in 
combat. It is esƟ mated that over the past decade, about 30,000 to 35,000 chil-
dren have been recruited for military service.54
3. Fighting the illicit trade and trafficking of SALW, 
an international and domestic struggle
There are several ways in which the trade of light weapons and small arms can be 
controlled and their proliferaƟ on reduced. The fi rst of these aims to strengthen 
exisƟ ng laws and establish new internaƟ onal and domesƟ c legislaƟ ons which 
49 Amelia Bookstein “The call for tough arms control, Voices from the DemocraƟ c Repub-
lic of the Congo” (Amnesty InternaƟ onal, IANSA and Oxfam Quebec 2006), p. 2.
50 Thomas Turner “The Congo wars: confl ict, myth and reality” (2007), p. 2.
51 Other sources brings even higher numbers “War, disease and malnutriƟ on are killing 
45,000 Congolese every month… and 5.4 million vicƟ ms in nearly a decade” Reuter 22 
January 2008.
52 Amelia Bookstein “The call…”, p. 11–12.
53 Thomas Turner “The Congo…”, p. 3.
54 Amelia Bookstein “The call…”, p. 7.
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could control and in many cases, stop or deter the trade and supply of weapons, 
their spare parts and ammuniƟ on. The second approach focuses on the causes of 
weapons’ proliferaƟ on and their demands.55 
Today’s wars, which are overwhelmingly intra-state combats, are fought pri-
marily with small arms rather than heavy convenƟ onal weapons. That is why 
SALW have received increased prominence on the internaƟ onal policy agenda in 
recent years. Up to the year 1990 there were no internaƟ onal regulaƟ ons dealing 
with small arms, only some naƟ onal measures and non-governmental organiza-
Ɵ ons’ eﬀ orts to address that issue. The United NaƟ ons became involved in the 
mid – 1990’s. The Panel of Governmental Experts was established (1996–1997) 
to develop the UN agenda on SALW. As a result of its work the UN Panel recom-
mended further UN acƟ on on small arms and suggested an internaƟ onal confer-
ence to cover the issue. The Panel was followed by UN Group of Governmental 
Experts (1999) which prepared the path for the UN SALW conference.
At the same Ɵ me the InternaƟ onal AcƟ on Network on Small Arms (IANSA) 
was established to unite 500 NGO groups from more than 100 countries’ acƟ ons 
on the subject of SALW.56 As a result of those eﬀ orts in July 2001 in New York the 
UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its As-
pects was held. No treaty on SALW was signed but the Conference consolidated 
global SALW acƟ ons and set an agenda for further naƟ onal, regional and global 
SALW iniƟ aƟ ves. One of the most important outcomes of this Conference was 
the adopƟ on of the UN Program of AcƟ on (PoA).57 
Since that Ɵ me the PoA has provided a framework for state acƟ on on SALW. 
To report on the implementaƟ on of the PoA, states agreed to meet biennially 
(the Biennial MeeƟ ng of States – BMS). Up Ɵ ll now three such meeƟ ngs have 
been held (First, Second and Third BMS to Consider the ImplementaƟ on of the 
PoA – July 2003, 2005 and 2008).58 The PoA has ten pillars of acƟ on for states to 
pursue in developing small arms policies and developing steps to combat the 
proliferaƟ on and misuse of SALW. These are: 
• Establishment of naƟ onal points of contact and naƟ onal coordinaƟ on 
agencies; 
• LegislaƟ on, regulaƟ ons and administraƟ ve procedures; 
• CriminalizaƟ on of illicit acƟ vity; 
• Stockpile management and security; 
• Weapons collecƟ on and disposal; 
• Export, import, and transfer controls and regulaƟ ons; 
• Brokering; 
• Marking, record-keeping, and tracing; 
• Disarmament, demobilizaƟ on and reintegraƟ on of ex-combatants; 
55 Christopher Louise “The Social Impact…”, p. 21, 22.
56 In 2009 IANSA is a network of 800 civil society organizaƟ ons working in 120 countries 
to stop the proliferaƟ on and misuse of SALW, hƩ p://www.iansa.org/about.htm.
57 United NaƟ ons Document A/CONF.192/15 (New York 2001).
58 UN PoA ImplementaƟ on Support System: PoA-ISS – hƩ p://www.poa-iss.org.
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• Assistance and internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on in tackling diﬀ erent aspects and 
consequences of the illicit SALW trade in all its aspects. 
The UN Department for Disarmament Aﬀ airs (UNDDA) collects the informa-
Ɵ on provided by states to PoA. NGOs and other civil society organizaƟ ons such as 
academic research insƟ tutes have the task of analyzing the states’ implementa-
Ɵ on of the PoA. To fulfi ll that obligaƟ on in 2003 the BiƟ ng the Bullet Project (BTB) 
was established59 and together with IANSA the fi rst comprehensive and detailed 
examinaƟ on of processing towards implementaƟ on of PoA was published – the 
so called “Red Book”.
In addiƟ on to PoA two other global small arms’ instruments were established. 
The fi rst is the UN Firearms Protocol, and the second is the Best PracƟ ce Guide-
lines and the IniƟ al Elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The purpose of the Firearms Protocol is to “promote, facilitate and strengthen 
cooperaƟ on among States Partners in order to prevent, combat and eradicate 
the illicit manufacturing and traﬃ  cking in fi rearms, their parts and components 
and ammuniƟ on”.60 The Protocol provides for a series of control measures and 
normaƟ ve provisions covering the aspect of the small arms issue. 
The Wassenaar Arrangement was established “in order to contribute to re-
gional and internaƟ onal security and stability, by promoƟ ng transparency and 
greater responsibility in transfers of convenƟ onal arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies, thus prevenƟ ng destabilizing accumulaƟ ons”.61 The decision to 
transfer any item menƟ oned in the Arrangement is the single responsibility of 
each parƟ cipaƟ ng state. And it is the states’ responsibility, through their naƟ onal 
policies, to act in accordance with the Arrangement principles.
Besides all those protocols and agreements no single treaty was signed to 
clearly defi ne state obligaƟ ons and internaƟ onal requirements and standards of 
SALW transfer. To cover that gap a number of iniƟ aƟ ves were launched. One of 
them is UK Transfer Control IniƟ aƟ ve (TCI) which “sought to secure internaƟ onal 
agreement to control standards on SALW transfers at the UN PoA Review Confer-
ence in 2006”.62 The main TCI eﬀ ort is focused on gathering informaƟ on about 
states’ SALW transfer control capabiliƟ es in order to strengthen them. The sec-
ond of the global iniƟ aƟ ves is the ConsultaƟ ve Group Process (CGP). CGP has 
involved over 30 governments from Europe, Africa, Asia and Americas, as well 
as internaƟ onal experts from diﬀ erent NGOs and UN Agencies. In 2004, the CGP 
published a “chair’s report” to build common understanding on transfer control 
guidelines, but what was most important was to restrict SALW transfer to Non-
State Actors.63 The third of the current iniƟ aƟ ves is the eﬀ ort to establish an In-
59 Three major organizaƟ ons had established BiƟ ng the Bullet IniƟ aƟ ve – Interna-
Ɵ onal Alert, Saferworld and the University of Bradford – hƩ p://www.iansa.org/un/
review2006.
60 UNGA 55/255 Protocol against… (2001) ArƟ cle 2, p. 3.
61 hƩ p://www.wassenaar.org/introducƟ on/index.html.
62 Kimberley Thachuk “TransnaƟ onal Threads Smuggling and Traﬃ  cking in Arms, Drugs 
and Human Life” (Greenwood Publishing Group: 2007), p. 70. 
63 Kimberley Thachuk “TransnaƟ onal…”, p. 70. 
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ternaƟ onal Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). That proposal was put forward by a group 
of NGOs. The ATT idea is to build an internaƟ onal agreement to control the arms 
trade in connecƟ on with humanitarian law, principles of human rights and peace-
ful internaƟ onal relaƟ ons. The growing numbers of countries (23 countries in 
2005) have expressed their support for the ATT principles. Together with over 
600 civil society organizaƟ ons worldwide. 
The establishment of SALW transfer control system has been much more suc-
cessful at the regional and sub-regional levels. In Europe the OrganizaƟ on for Se-
curity and CooperaƟ on in Europe (OSCE) published Document on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (2000) which has provided informaƟ on exchange on such things 
as SALW imports, exports, destrucƟ on, surpluses, seizures, and stockpile man-
agement and security procedures. That document was followed by development 
(through the Forum of Security Co-operaƟ on) of Best PracƟ ce Guides on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons.64 The European Union adopted the EU Code of Conduct 
on Arms Export (1998) as a poliƟ cal agreement between Member States with the 
aim of seƫ  ng high common standards for the management of convenƟ onal arms 
transfers.65
In the Western Hemisphere the OrganizaƟ on of American States (OAS) took 
a signifi cant step toward reducing the proliferaƟ on of SALW by adopƟ ng (1997) 
the Inter-American ConvenƟ on Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Traﬃ  cking in 
Firearms, AmmuniƟ on, Explosives and other Related Materials. The aim of the 
Firearms ConvenƟ on was to prevent arms from entering the black market, by 
establishing basic controls over the manufacture, import, transit and export of 
fi rearms in each member state.66 To control the smuggling of weapons and ex-
plosives, and to examine the links between arms smuggling and drug traﬃ  cking 
in the Americas, Model RegulaƟ ons were drawn up and approved by the OAS 
General Assembly in 1998.67
One of the most encouraging regional progresses on SALW transfer control 
has been made recently in Africa. In October 1998, 16 African naƟ ons voluntarily 
signed the Three Year Memorandum (extended in 2001) to coordinate a regional 
approach for SALW proliferaƟ on reducƟ on. Economic Community of West Africa 
States Memorandum (ECOWAS Memorandum) was a vital instrument for micro-
disarmament and became a model for other sub–regions.68 In 2001 the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) adopted a Protocol on Control of Fire-
arms, AmmuniƟ on and other related materials. To control the fl ow of weapons in 
64 The OrganizaƟ on for Security and Co-operaƟ on in Europe “Handbook of the Best Prac-
Ɵ ces on Small Arms and Light Weapons” (Vienna, Austria 2003). 
65 European Commission “Small Arms and Light Weapons. The response of the European 
Union” (Belgium: 2001), p. 10, 11.
66 MaƩ hew Schroeder “Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms ConvenƟ on” (FAS: 
2004), p. 19, hƩ p://www.fas.org.
67 Mats R. Berdal and Monica Serrano “TransnaƟ onal organized crime and internaƟ onal 
security: business as usual?” (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 2002), p. 100, 101.
68 hƩ p://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/ecowas.htm.
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the region, prevent and combat illicit manufacturing, regulate and harmonize the 
import, export and transit of SALW.69 Another iniƟ aƟ ve is The Nairobi Protocol for 
the PrevenƟ on, Control and ReducƟ on of Small Arms Light Weapons in the Great 
Lake Region and the Horn of Africa.70 The Protocol was signed in 2004 by eleven 
countries from that region.
All internaƟ onal and regional regulaƟ ons which cover the proliferaƟ on of 
SALW depend on sovereign states’ laws. Only strong, strict and transparent na-
Ɵ onal legislaƟ ons and administraƟ ve procedures (which are relevant to interna-
Ɵ onal direcƟ ves) can exercise eﬀ ecƟ ve control over small arms and light weap-
ons. Beside that a liƩ le progress in small weapons control has been monitored. 
It is clear that the most severely aﬀ ected SALW proliferaƟ on counƟ es, are usually 
the least able to take substanƟ al steps towards resolving the problem. On the 
other side, many governments are reluctant to follow the internaƟ onal obliga-
Ɵ ons (sign or raƟ fy certain agreements) due to consequent restricƟ ons in SALW 
export or import, which in many cases is the hidden tool of its foreign policy or 
can help to achieve its naƟ onal interests. That is why global and regional acƟ ons 
on many small arms issues sƟ ll remain weak. 
What seems to be needed is the establishment of a regime which could cover 
the internaƟ onal transfer of small arms and light weapons, similar to the exist-
ing regimes covering nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It should have 
naƟ onal, regional and global control measures – “acƟ ng like a series of dams and 
fi lters”71 – to stop illegal sales and drasƟ cally reduce legal transfers. But the fi rst 
and most urgent step is the adopƟ on of internaƟ onal norms against the transfer 
of SALW to areas of tension and confl ict.72 Intergovernmental and public trans-
parency in the internaƟ onal transfer of small arms nowadays is very weak and 
“lags behind transparency levels for other convenƟ onal weapons”.73
The second approach, by which the trade of light weapons and small arms 
can be controlled and its proliferaƟ on reduced is to restrain the demand for such 
weaponry. Chris Smith named this approach the “big soluƟ on”.74 The level of 
fi rearms demand is almost equal to the level of social violence, which is deter-
mined by degrees of social stability, the strength of democraƟ c insƟ tuƟ ons and 
the level of human development. The “big soluƟ on” requires the major world 
powers to look at the internaƟ onal system not only through their naƟ onal inter-
est and the tradiƟ onal concept of foreign policy but as a “human security collec-
Ɵ ve concern”.75 It also requires the development of a comprehensive strategy 
69 hƩ p://www.sadc.int/index/browse.
70 hƩ p://www.safeafrica.org/DocumentsCentre/Books/NairobiProtocol.
71 Jeﬀ ery Boutwell, Michael T. Klare “Light weapons and civil confl ict: controlling the 
tools of violence” (Rowman & LiƩ lefi eld: 1999), p. 221.
72 Ibid, p. 222.
73 Paul Holtom “Transparency in Transfer o Small Arms and Light Weapons. Report to the 
United NaƟ on Register of ConvenƟ onal Arms, 2003–2006” (SIPRI: 2008) Summary.
74 Christopher Louise “The Social Impact of Light Weapons Availability and ProliferaƟ on” 
(United NaƟ ons Research InsƟ tute for Social Development: 1995), p. 18.
75 Ibid, p. 19.
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to prevent confl icts, and by that the demand for small arms and light weapons. 
Unfortunately, it demands poliƟ cal will at the highest level to be eﬀ ecƟ ve, which 
makes “big soluƟ on” seem a liƩ le naive and unrealisƟ c.
There are sƟ ll some pracƟ cal causes of acƟ on which can be considered as 
a part of SALW proliferaƟ on reducƟ on. The disarmament of ex-combatants and/
or the collecƟ on of illicit weapons in communiƟ es’ control over weapons’ spare 
parts and ammuniƟ on producƟ on and shipment could drasƟ cally eliminate fi re-
arms from markets. For many countries it is the starƟ ng point for SALW control. 
Such programs as United NaƟ ons Disarmament, DemobilizaƟ on, and Reintegra-
Ɵ on (DDR) and United NaƟ ons Development Program (UNDP), have collected an 
enormous quanƟ ty of fi rearms and have created condiƟ ons for building stable 
states in many parts of the world. Another iniƟ aƟ ve is the “buy-back” program. 
It suggests that SALW should be bought from their owners by oﬀ ering prices for 
guns just above the black market rate, and full amnesty should be oﬀ ered for 
those who return their weapons. The experience of Angola, Chad, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua and Panama suggests that the program can only 
be successful within the context of a broader seƩ lement. People have to feel 
secure, otherwise they will either hold on to weapons or use the money to buy 
new and beƩ er guns.76
The eﬀ ecƟ veness of SALW is dependent on ammuniƟ on and spare parts 
supply. Many countries produce ammuniƟ on and weapons’ spare parts under 
license. The iniƟ aƟ ve to tackle such procedures and cover the whole spectrum of 
ammuniƟ on and spare parts’ delivery can vacuum up a huge number of exisƟ ng 
SALW.
Reducing legal and fi ghƟ ng illegal small arms and light weapons producƟ on, 
trade and transfer is a long term endeavor. But steps must be made at local, 
naƟ onal, regional and global levels to address certain aspects of the fi re arms 
issue. 
Conclusion
Small arms and light weapons are the world’s authenƟ c “weapon of mass de-
strucƟ on”. SALW have a wide range of eﬀ ects on human lives and suﬀ ering. Every 
day they cause over 1,300 deaths and it is esƟ mated that at least 500,000 people 
are killed by SALW every year. For every person killed by guns, three more were 
injured, with a very small chance of survival. 
Widespread proliferaƟ on has oŌ en led to acceptance of weapons as a normal 
part of life and violent confl ict as an everyday occurrence. SALW polarize commu-
nal groups and cause the erosion of respect for human rights with the breaking 
down of tradiƟ onal values. 
The spread of SALW damages the prospects for development, as human and 
social capital is destroyed and investors take their money elsewhere. Armed 
76 Ibid, p. 19.
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violence in LaƟ n America in the 1990s caused a decrease of their countries GDP 
of over 12 per cent.
But small arms and light weapons’ producƟ on and trade is a global business. 
The number of legal manufactories reached a total of over 600 in early 2000 and 
is spread among at least 95 countries. Annual global average SALW producƟ on 
is almost 6.3 million guns and it is esƟ mated that over 650 million fi rearms are 
spread all over the world today. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the small 
arms trade runs through legal transacƟ ons. Nevertheless even SALW with a le-
gal origin are oŌ en found in the hands of criminals, terrorists, insurgent groups, 
sancƟ oned governments and other prohibited recipients. Legal trade procedures 
are respected by at least 60 of the 95 small arms producing countries. All the rest 
do not provide any public informaƟ on on their small arms export.
Brokers and other intermediaries are criƟ cal of the legal and illegal trade in 
SALW. In many the causes are to mulƟ ply their personal profi ts, as inadequacies 
in naƟ onal regulaƟ ons are exploited, and stale oﬃ  cials are corrupted. Arms’ bro-
kers are able to work with very liƩ le state supervision. They fuel the illicit arms 
trade to sustain confl icts, oŌ en creaƟ ng relaƟ onships with traders smuggling such 
goods as diamonds, minerals and Ɵ mber. From all fi rearms’ exporƟ ng countries, 
only the United States requires oﬃ  cial authorizaƟ on for all brokering. 
It is evident that the illicit trade in small arms, more than any other aspect of 
the global arms’ trade, aggravates civil confl icts, organized crime, terrorists’ acƟ v-
iƟ es and violence itself. The problem includes both the black market – where the 
law is simply violated and, technically, the legal grey market, where states sup-
port covert transfers. The grey market is much bigger than the black one, and is 
usually serving sancƟ oned governments and non-state actors. Weapons running 
through the grey market oŌ en fuel black illicit trade which is more concentrated 
to support organized crime, terrorist organizaƟ ons and individual demands. 
In order to act against all negaƟ ve aspects of small arms and light weapons 
proliferaƟ on immediate steps should be taken. 
Firstly, a common internaƟ onal system for the marking and tracing of fi rearms, 
which requires every country to adopt the same standards, must be developed. 
Secondly, internaƟ onal and regional arms embargoes must be enforced and 
closely monitored. The creaƟ on of a United NaƟ on Arms Embargo Monitoring 
Unit could provide the infrastructure to control embargos, and which in close 
cooperaƟ on with other internaƟ onal security organizaƟ ons (like Interpol and Eu-
ropol and others), could fi ght the illicit arms trade or suggest consequences for 
law violaƟ on.
Next, an internaƟ onal legal procedure on the pracƟ ces of arms brokers is nec-
essary. With such regulaƟ ons, brokers would not be able to move weapons from 
confl ict to confl ict and avoid prosecuƟ on in one country by doing business in 
another.
Also, naƟ onal end-use monitoring (EUM) for arms exporƟ ng states has to be 
strengthened. An end-use check must be conducted regularly and must cover the 
enƟ re transfer process as well as future weaponry usage. 
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All major world small arms stockpiles must be registered, adequately secured 
and managed with properly equipped and trained stockpiles security forces. 
States must eliminate illicit arms producƟ on within their borders, eliminaƟ ng 
large number of fi rearms from the black market.
States must reconsider their private weapon owner regulaƟ ons (in order to 
limit privately owned guns) and improve collecƟ on of illegally owned fi rearms by 
amnesty or pay-back programs.
In war zones, countries could make aƩ empts to gather illegal weapons which 
are used by a number of miliƟ a groups, by integraƟ ng them into the naƟ onal 
army or legal state security forces. 
In post confl ict countries, internaƟ onal and naƟ onal disarmament, demobi-
lizaƟ on and reintegraƟ on programs are essenƟ al to stop SALW proliferaƟ on into 
another confl ict zone and to ensure and strengthen the fragile peace progress.
The proliferaƟ on of small arms and light weapons is a problem too severe 
to be ignored any longer. Fire arms traﬃ  cking in the 21st century is nothing if 
not a global operaƟ on and trans-naƟ onal phenomenon. It fuels civil wars and 
confl icts, contributes to crime acƟ viƟ es and feeds terrorists all over the world. 
Stemming the fl ow of these weapons is extremely diﬃ  cult, but because of this, 
and because of their impact on world security, extreme internaƟ onal, regional 
and domesƟ c eﬀ orts to manage this problem are needed.
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Janusz Kręcikij
Polish National Security 
and the New NATO Strategic 
Concept – Progress or 
Stagnation?
Formally adopted in November 2010, a new NATO Strategic Concept was a long-
awaited document. The previous one, daƟ ng from 1999 was seriously criƟ cized 
by both the Allies and many experts (though of course there were also the votes 
negaƟ ng the need to develop and implement a new concept1). There was noth-
ing strange in that. Over the past 11 years many aspects of security have been 
changed and re-evaluated. At the same Ɵ me, the lack of updated NATO doctrinal 
percepƟ on of new threats, and the vision of the opposiƟ on to them did not in-
crease the credibility of NATO and the feeling of security of Alliance signatories. 
Thus, many member states, including Poland, eagerly awaited a new Strategic 
Concept. AŌ er the formal announcement of its adopƟ on, the topic fairly quickly 
ceased to be an area of interest of the Polish media, which moreover did not 
pay much aƩ enƟ on to it, apart from some oﬃ  cial comments of NATO and Polish 
representaƟ ves. InteresƟ ngly, outside the realm of experts, knowledge of Polish 
society on the new concept content was and sƟ ll is very limited. Meanwhile one 
should remember that Polish oﬃ  cials went to the NATO Summit in Lisbon with 
specifi c expectaƟ ons, which they expressed in numerous public appearances. 
1 Like for example David S. Yost, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. 
See NATO Review, Autumn 2005 r.
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Since the essence of this material is an aƩ empt to resolve the issue presented 
in the Ɵ tle, refl ecƟ on and research results are arranged in a manner designed to 
answer four specifi c problems, formulated as the following quesƟ ons:
1. What in essence is the NATO Strategic Concept?
2. What the main contents are included in the new concept, adopted in Lisbon 
on November 20th, 2010?
3. What naƟ onal interests Poland wished to secure in the new concept and was 
it successful?
4. Does the adopƟ on of the new concept signifi cantly change the percepƟ on of 
Polish naƟ onal security?
What in essence is a NATO Strategic Concept?
Historically, the fi rst, very brief record of a NATO Strategic Concept dates back 
to December 1949. It was taken directly from the paragraphs of the Washington 
Treaty, and emphasized the key operaƟ ng principles of the defense agreement, 
later refi ned in subsequent phases of the development of NATO. The document 
stressed issues such as the defensive nature of the Alliance, the importance of 
armed confl ict prevenƟ on, cooperaƟ on between allies, the deterrent role of nu-
clear weapons and the rule of solidarity in the face of armed aggression.2
The fi rst real and full Strategic Concept the so-called Strategy of massive re-
sponse – was developed by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Adopted 
by the U.S. Department of Defense, it was oﬃ  cially accepted by NATO in 1957. 
It assumed massive retaliaƟ on by NATO countries, including the use of nuclear 
weapon in response to any serious military aƩ ack of the Warsaw Pact. Regard-
less of the outlined assumpƟ ons it was a defensive strategy in essence, whose 
primary goal was to keep the peace, by making a nuclear war impossible to win 
and too destrucƟ ve to undertake.3 Its basic weak point was, however, lack of the 
necessary fl exibility, because in the case of any act of aggression NATO could 
only do nothing, or to decide to respond against the Soviet Union with nuclear 
weapons. In addiƟ on, literal adherence to such a strategy meant that the Allies 
were not able to deal with limited challenges oŌ en presented by the policy of the 
Eastern Bloc countries.
Another concept – known as Strategy of fl exible response – was developed 
in 1961 and adopted oﬃ  cially by NATO in 1967. It accepted the use of strategic 
nuclear weapon only as a last resort, emphasizing the availability of adequate 
convenƟ onal means which could control the escalaƟ on of the crisis. The aim was 
to increase the reliability of deterrence, as well as to strengthen the posiƟ on 
of the United States as a security guarantor of Western democracies. The fl ex-
ible response concept implied three phases of confl ict development – the direct 
defense, deliberate escalaƟ on and the massive nuclear response. Accordingly, 
2 Robert Kupiecki, “NATO 1949–2002 – zarys problematyki”, w: Polska w NATO, ed. 
R. Kupiecki, M. Sielatycki, CODN, Warszawa 2002, pp. 9–36.
3 John W. Jenson, “Nuclear Strategy – diﬀ erences in Soviet and American thinking”, Air 
University Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, March-April 1979.
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it adopted a need to have three measures of using strategic nuclear weapon 
(the so-called strategic triad) – interconƟ nental ballisƟ c missiles, submarines 
equipped with nuclear warheads and strategic bombers. Each of these measures 
was to be able to carry out an aƩ ack independently, even if the other two had 
been destroyed by the anƟ cipated enemy strike.
The events connected with the fall of the communist system, democraƟ zaƟ on 
of Central and Eastern Europe and the qualitaƟ vely new internaƟ onal security 
challenges the world faced at the end of the twenƟ eth century, again forced the 
Alliance to change strategy. The competent poliƟ cal agreement on this subject 
was adopted in 1991 in Rome, during a meeƟ ng of Heads of State and Govern-
ment of NATO, and then converted into the new Strategic Concept during the 
Washington Summit in 1999. This concept perceived new threats and security 
challenges, without quesƟ oning the fundamental tasks and objecƟ ves of the Alli-
ance. Despite the reducƟ on in military spending, it reaﬃ  rmed the need of main-
tain suﬃ  cient military forces, both convenƟ onal and nuclear, capable to deter 
potenƟ al aggression and to ensure the security of the member states4.
It could be certainty say that NATO’s Strategic Concept in general is more than 
just a military strategy. NATO is a poliƟ cal-military alliance, so the document dis-
cussed cannot cover only the military aspects, but should be an expression of 
a comprehensive approach to this crucial problem, which is the security of NATO 
members. For the purpose of further consideraƟ on the author assumes that this 
Strategic Concept (strategy) had to and has to defi ne goals and objecƟ ves of the 
Alliance and set a strategic perspecƟ ve and approach to security in the foresee-
able future.
It is diﬃ  cult, however, to discuss NATO’s Strategic Concept, or assess it from 
a scienƟ fi c point of view, without previously known and applied aƩ empts to de-
scribe or defi ne a strategy as a “strategy” (keeping in mind of course the ap-
proach of dealing with the problem through security maƩ ers).
From this scienƟ fi c point of view, the strategy can include:
• a complete plan, which determines what decisions will be taken in any given 
situaƟ on5,
• the process of long-term determining organizaƟ on goals and the adopƟ on of 
policies, as well as the allocaƟ on of resources necessary to accomplish these 
objecƟ ves,6
• a parent and integrated plan describing the associated benefi ts in relaƟ on to 
the expectaƟ ons and challenges of the environment,7
4 Robert Kupiecki, NATO u progu XXI wieku, Wydawnictwo Akson, Warszawa 2000, 
pp. 13–32.
5 J. Neuman, O. Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton 
University Press, New York 1944, p. 79.
6 A.D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure, Cambridge 1962, cyt. za: W.M. Grudzewski, I.K. 
Hejduk, Projektowanie systemów zarządzania, PWE, Warszawa 2001, p. 69.
7 W.F. Glueck, Business Policy and Strategic Management, McGraw-Hill, New York 
1980.
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• the term “strategy” refers to the formulaƟ on of the main missions, goals and 
organizaƟ onal objecƟ ves, policies and programs to achieve them, the meth-
ods required to implement strategies to achieve organizaƟ onal goals,8
• a broad program of seƫ  ng and achieving the organizaƟ on goals; organizaƟ on 
(in Ɵ me) of response to environment infl uence.9
The results of the literature analysis (economics and theory of organizaƟ on 
and management) allow us to conclude that a reasonable strategy focuses on 
certain factors, from which essenƟ al are:10
1. Range of strategy – the band of markets in which the organizaƟ on will com-
pete.
2. DistribuƟ on of the resources – the way in which an organizaƟ on divides its 
resources between diﬀ erent applicaƟ ons.
3. DisƟ ncƟ ve Competence – what the organizaƟ on is doing parƟ cularly well.
4. Synergy – how the various business areas are complementary or supporƟ ve.
The results of such targeted research also oﬀ er the arƟ culaƟ ng of some fi xed 
strategy elements, among which can be idenƟ fi ed:11
1. Domain of acƟ on (which is directly related to the defi niƟ on of the mission).
2. Strategic advantage (strong point – aƩ racƟ veness).
3. ObjecƟ ves to be achieved.
4. FuncƟ onal acƟ on programs.
These brief consideraƟ ons fi nally allow us to guide the main features of the 
strategy, which typically include:12
1. Time horizon.
2. The focus of eﬀ ort on the designated task to achieve the following objec-
Ɵ ves.
3. The system of consistent decisions.
4. Ubiquity – the impact in diﬀ erent areas simultaneously (broad spectrum of 
acƟ viƟ es and types of targets).
5. The strategy is assessed by the use of specifi c indicators.
6. Taking into account the potenƟ al risks.
So, it must be seen the strategy itself was and is an object of scienƟ fi c inquiry, 
and under the term strategy there are relaƟ vely accurately ploƩ ed rules. It is 
important for further consideraƟ ons that such a claim is true also with regard to 
security strategy, and yet a NATO Strategic Concept is nothing but a kind of NATO 
security strategy – having already checked the assumpƟ on that it cannot be in 
any way restricted to the purely military aspects.
8 G.A. Steiner, J. Miner, E. Gray, Management policy and strategy, Macmillan, New York 
1986, p. 5.
9 A.F. Stoner, E. R. Freeman, D. R. Gilbert jr., Kierowanie, PWE, Warszawa 1997.
10 R.W. Griﬃ  n, Podstawy zarządzania organizacjami, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 
Warszawa 1996, p. 245.
11 A. Koźmiński, W. Piotrkowski (red.), Zarządzanie. Teoria i praktyka, PWN, Warszawa 
2000, p. 128.
12 A. Antczak, Projektowanie strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, Wydawnictwo 
Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Euroregionalnej, Józefów 2010, p. 21.
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So we know that security strategy is defi ned in order to defend against threats 
on the one hand, and create the best condiƟ ons for the development and ben-
efi ts for the country (a region, an organizaƟ on – depends on what is to be dis-
cussed). The most important from a structural point of view are: the objecƟ ve of 
the strategy (end state result) and Ɵ me horizon.
Finally, using the achievements of theory (in security science) a few essenƟ al 
elements of “a collecƟ on of facts and assumpƟ ons” called the strategy should 
also be seen, namely:
1. The overall program of state plans and intenƟ ons defi ning and implementa-
Ɵ on.
2. The real acƟ viƟ es of the state as the reacƟ ons to the infl uence of the environ-
ment.
3. The role of the state defi niƟ on and its place among the internaƟ onal com-
munity.
4. The mission of the state defi niƟ on (disƟ nguishing element in the internaƟ on-
al scene, to prejudice the state exclusivity and uniqueness).
5. The formulaƟ ng of the tasks to be done to achieve the objecƟ ves.13
Of course, it can be said that all the maƩ ers menƟ oned above concern the 
state, while in the present case we are dealing with a clear mulƟ naƟ onal struc-
ture. However, we should agree with the assumpƟ on that these fi ndings remain 
true also with regard to NATO as an organizaƟ on –a truly mulƟ naƟ onal one – 
having its leaders and guided by (at least in concept) the common good of the 
member states. So it is not an error to transfer this kind of state property into one 
of the alliance.
Thus, if the Alliance Strategic Concept is, as menƟ oned, essenƟ ally the NATO 
security strategy, from a scienƟ fi c point of view it it should be for NATO the de-
scribed method to achieve the fi nal objecƟ ve at the relaƟ vely shortest possible 
Ɵ me. Furthermore, this means achieving the following specifi c, detailed goals 
including internal and external posiƟ ve and negaƟ ve sƟ mulators and desƟ mula-
tors and planning specifi c acƟ ons to achieve each specifi c goal.
What main contents are included in the new concept, adopted in Lisbon 
on November 20th, 2010?
The new Concept is a relaƟ vely short document, numbering 11 pages of original 
text. Mindful of the importance of this document – the strategy of the biggest 
poliƟ cal-military alliance in the world, its order, not enƟ rely clear, may look a liƩ le 
bit strange. Concept contents are grouped as follows:
• Preface,
• Core Tasks and Principles,
• The Security Environment,
• Defense and Deterrence,
• Security through Crisis Management,
• PromoƟ ng InternaƟ onal Security through CooperaƟ on,
13 Ibidem, p. 26.
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• Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-ProliferaƟ on,
• Open Door,
• Partnerships,
• Reform and TransformaƟ on,
• An Alliance for the 21st Century.
In the preface it is stressed that NATO conƟ nues to play a unique and essen-
Ɵ al role in ensuring common defense and security, and that the new Strategic 
Concept sets the direcƟ on for the next phase of NATO’s evoluƟ on in a changing 
world, in the face of new threats, with new capabiliƟ es and new partners.
The commitment of mutual defense against aƩ ack was confi rmed, as well as 
the requirement to prevent crises, to control confl icts and stabilize post-confl ict 
situaƟ ons, including closer cooperaƟ on with the United NaƟ ons and the Euro-
pean Union. NATO was obliged to promote the creaƟ on of condiƟ ons for a world 
without nuclear weapons, while nevertheless clearly indicaƟ ng that as long as 
nuclear weapon exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The document also 
highlighted the commitment to maintain an “open door” for NATO to all Euro-
pean democracies that meet the standards of membership. In addiƟ on, the Alli-
ance is commiƩ ed to ongoing reform towards a more eﬀ ecƟ ve, eﬃ  cient and fl ex-
ible poliƟ cal-military body. Finally, it stressed that the essenƟ al mission of NATO 
remains the same, namely that the Alliance is a community of freedom, peace, 
security and common values.14
Core tasks and principles emphasize that the fundamental and lasƟ ng objec-
Ɵ ve of NATO is to ensure freedom and security of all members by the use of both 
poliƟ cal and military means. NATO member states create a unique community of 
values , with principles of individual freedom, democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law. It emphasizes that the transatlanƟ c relaƟ onship is strong and impor-
tant to preserve Euro-AtlanƟ c peace and security, and NATO members’ security 
on both sides of the AtlanƟ c is indivisible. It was stressed that the Alliance must 
and will eﬀ ecƟ vely conƟ nue to pursue its three main tasks, namely:
• collecƟ ve defense under ArƟ cle 5 of the Washington Treaty,
• crisis management, using the right combinaƟ on of poliƟ cal and military tools 
to assist developing countries in tackling crises,
• cooperaƟ ve security by acƟ vely engaging in eﬀ orts to strengthen internaƟ on-
al security.
It also noted that for the eﬀ ecƟ ve and eﬃ  cient implementaƟ on of the NATO 
mission, the Allies will engage in a conƟ nuous process of Alliance reforms, mod-
ernizaƟ on and transformaƟ on.15
In terms of the security environment in the document stated that the Euro-
AtlanƟ c area is quiet and the threat of convenƟ onal aƩ ack against NATO territory 
is low. At the same Ɵ me it emphasized the specifi city and signifi cance of selected 
threats, stressing that:
14 AcƟ ve Engagement, Modern Defence – Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security 
of The Members of the North AtlanƟ c Treaty OrganisaƟ on adopted by Heads of State 
and Government in Lisbon, Lisbon 2010, p. 1.
15 Ibidem, pp. 2–3.
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• convenƟ onal threats sƟ ll cannot be ignored,
• proliferaƟ on of nuclear weapon and other weapon of mass destrucƟ on and 
their means of delivery conƟ nues to threaten incalculable consequences for 
global stability,
• terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the ciƟ zens of NATO coun-
tries and more broadly for internaƟ onal stability and security,
• instability or confl ict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten the security 
of the Alliance,
• cyber-aƩ acks are becoming more frequent, beƩ er organized and more ex-
pensive, taking into account the damage they infl icton government adminis-
traƟ ons, the economy, transport and other criƟ cal infrastructure,
• all countries are increasingly dependent on transit routes, which require in-
ternaƟ onal eﬀ orts to ensure their resistance to aƩ ack or disrupƟ on.16
Characterizing defense and deterrence, it emphasized that the Alliance bears 
the greatest responsibility for protecƟ ng and defending the territory and popula-
Ɵ on against aƩ acks, as stated in ArƟ cle 5 of Washington Treaty. However there is 
no country the Alliance treats as an enemy. At the same Ɵ me it stressed that no 
one should doubt NATO’s resolve in if the safety of its members was endangered. 
It recalled the importance of nuclear forces in deterrence and the fact that as 
long as there are nuclear weapon, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
The concept has also declared a number of projects to be implemented to 
ensure NATO’s ability to deter and defend against any security threats:
• maintain the right combinaƟ on of nuclear and convenƟ onal forces,
• maintain the ability to simultaneously conduct large scale joint operaƟ ons 
and a number of smaller operaƟ ons of collecƟ ve defense and crisis manage-
ment, including operaƟ ons in distant strategic areas,
• developing and maintaining strong, mobile convenƟ onal forces,
• the necessary training, exercises, conƟ ngency planning and informaƟ on ex-
change,
• parƟ cipaƟ on of allies in collecƟ ve defense planning,
• developing the capaciƟ es to defend against ballisƟ c missiles aƩ ack (including 
the desire to cooperate with Russia and other Euro-AtlanƟ c partners in the 
fi eld of missile defense),
• developing the capaciƟ es to defend against the threat of weapon of mass 
destrucƟ on: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear,
• developing the capaciƟ es to prevent, detect and defend against cyber-at-
tacks,
• defense against internaƟ onal terrorism,
• contribute to energy security,
• maintain the necessary level of defense spending.17
In terms of security through crisis management it stated that the crises and 
confl icts outside the NATO may pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance 
territory and populaƟ ons, so NATO will be involved where possible and necessary 
16 Ibidem, pp. 3–4.
17 Ibidem, pp. 4–6.
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to prevent crises, to control them, to stabilize post-confl ict situaƟ ons and support 
the processes of reconstrucƟ on. Based on experience from Afghanistan and the 
Balkans, it was found that a comprehensive poliƟ cal, civil and military approach 
is necessary for eﬀ ecƟ ve crisis management. The paper stressed that NATO has 
unique capabiliƟ es in the fi eld of mastering the confl icts, and operaƟ ons under 
the aegis of NATO show that the Alliance can make a signifi cant contribuƟ on to 
internaƟ onal eﬀ orts in tackling confl icts. Under the new approach to ensure the 
eﬀ ecƟ veness of crisis management, the Alliance will:
• enhance the sharing of intelligence data within NATO,
• develop doctrine and military capabiliƟ es of expediƟ onary operaƟ ons,
• create civilian crisis management capabiliƟ es in order to interact more ef-
fecƟ vely with civilian partners, drawing on the experience of operaƟ ons con-
ducted under the aegis of NATO,
• strengthen integrated civilian-military planning over the whole spectrum of 
crisis management,
• develop capacity for training and building of local forces in crisis zones,
• train civilian experts from member states, to be ready to quickly take part in 
diﬀ erent missions,
• expand and intensify poliƟ cal consultaƟ ons among the allies and partners.18
In the area of Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-ProliferaƟ on, it was as-
sumed that NATO will seek to ensure its security while maintaining the lowest nu-
merical level of the armed forces. The Alliance conƟ nues to contribute to projects 
associated with the strengthening of arms control and promoƟ ng disarmament, 
both in terms of convenƟ onal weapons and weapons of mass destrucƟ on, having 
regard in parƟ cular to:
• objecƟ ves of the Nuclear Non-ProliferaƟ on Treaty,
• further reducƟ on of nuclear weapons staƟ oned in Europe and the impor-
tance of these weapons in NATO strategy,
• desire to gain Russian agreement to increase transparency about its nuclear 
weapon in Europe and move the weapon away from the territory of NATO 
countries,
• convenƟ onal arms control and keeping them at the lowest possible level,
• fi ght against proliferaƟ on.19
As part of its “open door” it was stated that NATO enlargement has contrib-
uted substanƟ ally to the safety of the member states. The prospect of further 
enlargement of the organizaƟ on and the spirit of collecƟ ve security have led to 
greater stability in Europe, and NATO membership remains fully viable for all Eu-
ropean democracies which share the values  of the Alliance.20
Much aƩ enƟ on is devoted to the concept of broadly understood partnership, 
noƟ ng that the promoƟ on of Euro-AtlanƟ c security provides a broad network of 
partnerships with countries and organizaƟ ons around the world. It is assumed 
18 Ibidem, pp. 6–7.
19 Ibidem, pp. 7–8.
20 Ibidem, p. 8.
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that dialogue and collaboraƟ on with partners can make a concrete contribu-
Ɵ on to the strengthening of internaƟ onal security and relaƟ ons will be based 
on the principle of reciprocity, mutual benefi t and mutual respect. Therefore it 
assumed:
• development of poliƟ cal dialogue and pracƟ cal cooperaƟ on with all countries, 
and such organizaƟ ons around the world who are interested in maintaining 
a peaceful internaƟ onal relaƟ ons,
• consultaƟ on with each partner country the issues of security,
• an important role of Alliance partners in shaping the strategies and decisions 
concerning the acƟ viƟ es conducted under the aegis of NATO,
• development of the already exisƟ ng partnership.
It clearly highlighted the cooperaƟ on between NATO and the United NaƟ ons 
by:
• improving exchange of informaƟ on between the heads of both organiza-
Ɵ ons,
• more regular poliƟ cal consultaƟ ons,
• improvement of pracƟ cal cooperaƟ on on crisis management the two struc-
tures are involved in.
According to the Alliance’s strategic assumpƟ ons an acƟ ve and eﬀ ecƟ ve Euro-
pean Union contributes to the safety of the whole Euro-AtlanƟ c area, hence the 
statement that the EU is a unique and important partner for NATO. It declared 
that NATO and the EU can and should play a complementary and mutually rein-
forcing role in promoƟ ng internaƟ onal peace and security. Thus, its declared aim 
is to:
• strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU,
• improve pracƟ cal cooperaƟ on in crisis management operaƟ ons,
• expand poliƟ cal consultaƟ ons on all issues of common interest, in order to 
reach common conclusions, evaluaƟ on and intenƟ ons,
• cooperate fully in capacity building eﬀ orts to minimize duplicaƟ on of eﬀ ort 
and reduce costs.
A signifi cant role was also aƩ ributed to NATO-Russia cooperaƟ on, stressing 
that NATO poses no threat to this country. The document emphasized the pursuit 
of a genuine strategic partnership, based on the NATO-Russia Founding Act and 
the Rome DeclaraƟ on, by:
• deepening of poliƟ cal consultaƟ ons and pracƟ cal cooperaƟ on with Russia,
• using the potenƟ al of the exisƟ ng NATO-Russia Council.
Among other subjects and areas of cooperaƟ on it idenƟ fi ed Euro-AtlanƟ c 
Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, further development of Mediter-
ranean Dialogue, the importance of peace and stability in the Gulf region, as well 
as strengthening cooperaƟ on within the Istanbul CooperaƟ on IniƟ aƟ ve. The ex-
pected direcƟ on of NATO’s acƟ viƟ es include:
• intensifying consultaƟ on and pracƟ cal military cooperaƟ on within the Euro-
AtlanƟ c Partnership Council,
• conƟ nuing the partnership with Ukraine and Georgia in the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission,
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• facilitaƟ ng the Euro-AtlanƟ c integraƟ on of Western Balkans,
• deepening cooperaƟ on with the current members of the Mediterranean Dia-
logue,
• developing a deeper partnership on security with partners from the Gulf.21
RelaƟ vely liƩ le space in the concept in comparison to other areas devoted to 
reform and transformaƟ on (of the Alliance). It was opƟ misƟ cally pointed out that 
NATO is the only Security Alliance in the history, which holds the military forces 
able to act together in any environment, that can conduct military operaƟ ons at 
any locaƟ on, using the integrated command and control structure, and which has 
at its disposal such capacity, which few allies could aﬀ ord individually.
In order to provide all the resources necessary for performance and security 
of the Alliance, prioriƟ es were:
• improving the deployability of their forces and to the conduct of operaƟ ons,
• ensuring maximum consistency of defense planning,
• developing and using their abiliƟ es in a systemaƟ c way,
• preservaƟ on and strengthening of joint capabiliƟ es, standards, structures and 
funding, as part of integraƟ ng the Alliance,
• engaging in a conƟ nuous process of reforms to improve exisƟ ng structures, 
improve methods of operaƟ on and maximize their eﬀ ecƟ veness.22
The summary (an Alliance for the 21st Century) is an indicaƟ on of NATO’s 
determinaƟ on regarding the renewal of the Alliance and to maintain its eﬀ ecƟ ve-
ness as the most eﬀ ecƟ ve poliƟ cal and military alliance on the globe.
“…Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common 
values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and be-
cause our common essenƟ al and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom 
and security of its members. These values and objecƟ ves are universal and per-
petual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength 
and resolve…”23.
Having the necessary knowledge about strategy in general and the new NATO 
Strategic Concept in details, it is worth asking whether the above Concept actu-
ally covers specifi c elements of the strategy in terms of security science. Thus:
• Did it present a program for defi ning and implemenƟ ng plans and objecƟ ves? 
it can be concluded that in principle it did not, because what has been formu-
lated has been so in a very general way.
• Is it possible to idenƟ fy the system of reacƟ on to the environment? This is 
extremely diﬃ  cult, almost impossible.
• Did it clarify the role and place among the internaƟ onal community? Yes, 
even though in a very general way.
• Was the mission defi ned (the element that determines its uniqueness in the 
internaƟ onal arena)? Yes, but even here the level of generalizaƟ on is very 
large.
21 Ibidem, pp. 8–10.
22 Ibidem, p. 11.
23 Ibidem, par. 38, p. 11.
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• Were the tasks to be done to achieve the objecƟ ves formulated? –The task 
was indeed formulated but the objecƟ ves were not specifi ed (sic!).
Based on the results of this analysis it can be stated that the document does 
not meet the guidelines or requirements of the strategy in terms of science. In 
addiƟ on, the science of security indicates that in a document of this magnitude 
(the poliƟ cal-strategic level) the following should at least be arƟ culated:
• environmental (threats) assessment,
• interests and purposes,
• forces and resources engaged,
• tasks for subordinates,
• basic methods and procedures.24
In the assessed Concept it is extremely diﬃ  cult to say that it was based on an 
up-to date and full analysis of the security environment. It is true that it idenƟ -
fi es the main threats to security in the poliƟ cal and military spheres. At the same 
Ɵ me, however, it completely omiƩ ed the social sphere. The Strategy also avoids 
the hazard idenƟ fi caƟ on included the classifi caƟ on of enƟ Ɵ es (sources of risk). 
It is also extremely diﬃ  cult to see the real interests of the Alliance or its purpos-
es. The menƟ oned purposes, if indeed appear, are not a separate, accentuated 
whole, and are only menƟ oned “accidentally” to examine other problem areas. 
The tasks have been formulated in some details, but without links to forces and 
resources engaged for their implementaƟ on. A defect is also the lack of any Ɵ me 
frame for their implementaƟ on, which means that they are largely (according to 
the author – excessively) “universal”, as the task “to do” within the Alliance.
Results of research allow the conclusion that the content of the new NATO 
Strategic Concept is much more akin to some kind of poliƟ cal declaraƟ on, not 
a strategic document of such importance. It contains relaƟ vely few specifi cs and 
there are no tasks for member states, giving them no clearly defi ned obligaƟ ons. 
The lack of describing NATO interests and the projecƟ on of NATO purposes, and 
essenƟ ally the same set of tasks (like in a previous Concept) leads to the conclu-
sion of a lack of consensus among NATO countries on the true direcƟ on of NATO 
transformaƟ on.
It is possible to say that in comparison to the NATO Strategic Concept from 
1999 there has been no real signifi cant change in the tasks which NATO pursues 
and fi nally even a perceived overvaluaƟ on of the center of gravity. But if we 
“must” indicate the new values, we can stress in principle only:
• a noƟ ceable emphasis on arms control and non-proliferaƟ on,
• relaƟ ons with Russia, 
• proposal to construct a missile defense system (but without any real clarifi ca-
Ɵ on), and a centralized of NATO cyber security,
• seeing the need for a civilian capability to respond to crises,
• enhanced intelligence cooperaƟ on (i.e., the sharing of informaƟ on from 
intelligence among NATO members),
24 B. Balcerowicz, “Strategia obronna Unii Europejskiej a strategie narodowe państw 
członkowskich”, [w:] E. Haliżak, Polityka zagraniczna i wewnętrzna państwa w procesie 
integracji europejskiej, Ofi cyna Wydawnicza Branta, Bydgoszcz–Warszawa 2004, p. 54.
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• full sancƟ on for prevenƟ ve operaƟ ons, which is nothing more than logical 
and necessary acƟ viƟ es that were perceived earlier, and some of them were 
carried out earlier.
What na? onal interests did Poland wish to secure in a new concept and 
was it successful?
• The results of analysis of Polish representaƟ ves’ public appearances before 
the summit in Lisbon has previously allowed the expectaƟ ons of our country 
towards a new Strategic Concept of NATO to be clarifi ed. Those expectaƟ ons 
arƟ culated by the President, Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs concerned, apart from some minor aspects25, the two main problem ar-
eas:
• providing “automaƟ c” operaƟ ons based on ArƟ cle 5 of the Washington Treaty 
and clearly emphasizing the defense (military) importance of the Alliance,
• preparaƟ on of NATO conƟ ngency plans, providing specifi c Alliance forces in 
the event of aggression against Poland.
Following the adopƟ on of a new Concept, the decision-makers of our country 
have confi rmed that these expectaƟ ons were fully achieved in the two issues 
highlighted above (as well as others not considered here). Therefore, it seems ex-
pedient to examine whether in fact the document adopted in Lisbon makes real 
qualitaƟ ve changes in the parƟ cularly interesƟ ng problem areas of our country. 
In other words, as has been stated publically is ArƟ cle 5 of the Washington Treaty 
more automaƟ c in comparison with the record of 1949?
The concept analysis results show that the reference to ArƟ cle 5. appears 
three Ɵ mes. For the fi rst Ɵ me in paragraph 4.a:26
“…CollecƟ ve defence. NATO members will always assist each other against 
aƩ ack, in accordance with ArƟ cle 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment 
remains fi rm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of ag-
gression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fun-
damental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole…”.
Once again, in paragraph 16:27
“…The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our ter-
ritory and our populaƟ ons against aƩ ack, as set out in ArƟ cle 5 of the Washington 
Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, 
no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were 
to be threatened…”.
Finally, in paragraph 19, sub-paragraph 3:28
25 For example, the need to maintain a balance between the geographical dimensions 
of the Alliance in the era of global engagement. The author deliberately makes no 
menƟ on of issues such as missile defense and NATO’s defense against cyber-terrorism, 
because they are allied and general issues of concern not only to Polish security.
26 AcƟ ve Engagement, Modern Defence…, p. 2.
27 Ibidem, p. 4.
28 Ibidem, p. 5.
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“…develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable convenƟ onal forces 
to carry out both our ArƟ cle 5 responsibiliƟ es and the Alliance’s expediƟ onary 
operaƟ ons, including with the NATO Response Force…”.
The results of the quoted passages empower to bring the thesis that the con-
cept only recalls that ArƟ cle 5 of Washington Treaty, is one of the foundaƟ ons of 
the Alliance in its military aspect. However, it is worth noƟ ng that this arƟ cle has 
never been canceled or altered. There has not as yet appeared any oﬃ  cial NATO 
document suggesƟ ng that it has been revoked or suspended. Its content since 
1949 is sƟ ll the same and the new NATO Strategic Concept changes nothing in 
this fi eld:29
“…The ParƟ es agree that an armed aƩ ack against one or more of them in Eu-
rope or North America shall be considered an aƩ ack against them all and conse-
quently they agree that, if such an armed aƩ ack occurs, each of them, in exercise 
of the right of individual or collecƟ ve self-defencerecognised by ArƟ cle 51 of the 
Charter of the United NaƟ ons, will assist the Party or ParƟ es so aƩ acked by tak-
ing forthwith, individually and in concert with the other ParƟ es, such acƟ on as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North AtlanƟ c area. Any such armed aƩ ack and all measures taken 
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain internaƟ onal peace and security…”.
In this situaƟ on it is extremely diﬃ  cult, if not impossible, to defend the claim 
that in the 2010 Concept there appeared a new commitment from the Alliance to 
Poland at the area of the merits and understanding of ArƟ cle 5, or its operaƟ on 
has become more automaƟ c. This arƟ cle, in that and not another version, was 
and remained an important part of the Washington Treaty and the new Concept 
did not, in this respect, add anything new to pre-exisƟ ng arrangements.
Another achievement declared by Polish authoriƟ es is a statement that for 
the fi rst Ɵ me (during nine years of our NATO membership) NATO conƟ ngency plan 
to defend Poland have been prepared. 
The New Concept menƟ ons conƟ ngency planning in paragraph 19, sub-para-
graph 4:30
“…carry out the necessary training, exercises, conƟ ngency planning and infor-
maƟ on exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of convenƟ onal 
and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and 
reinforcement for all Allies…”
Due to the nature of military planning, it is not possible to explore exactly new 
operaƟ onal plans and it is necessary to believe that they exist, in accordance with 
the assurances of the Alliance. But remember that these plans in no way are the 
consequence of a new concept. They are the result of the logical and successful 
eﬀ orts of the Polish authoriƟ es over many years to incorporate our country by 
NATO operaƟ onal planning, to preplan precisely how and with which forces NATO 
29 Washinghton Treaty, Washinghton 1949.
30 AcƟ ve Engagement, Modern Defence…, p. 5.
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would react if Poland becomes the object of aggression. In turn, including the re-
cord about menƟ oned planning in secƟ on 19 of Concept is hardly a revoluƟ onary 
change, because the conƟ ngency planning is from years one of two broad cat-
egories of operaƟ onal planning in NATO (conƟ ngency and crisis response plan-
ning31), and the record exists for all Allies, not especially for our country. It can 
therefore be said that the creaƟ on of new plans is strongly posiƟ ve for the Poland 
and its security, however, it is absolutely not a result of the Concept adopted in 
Lisbon, as some of Polish authoriƟ es would like it to be.
It is also worth remembering a seemingly minor detail of terminology. Ac-
cording to NATO military terminology, a category of plans associated with de-
fense against aggression on NATO countries are known as Standing Defense Plans 
– SDPs.32 This term does not appear either in the body of the new Concept or in 
the announcement that NATO’s defense planning for Poland was accomplished. 
The author hopes that this is the result of disorder or confusion of terminology, 
because each SDP is a COP, but not every COP is SDP and up to now we know only 
about COP for Poland what can essenƟ ally change the character of things.
To sum up, from the perspecƟ ve of Poland’s security interests, regardless of 
declaraƟ ons and oﬃ  cials statements, the new Strategic Concept does not make 
any changes for the funcƟ oning of the famous ArƟ cle 5. It is true of course that 
military plans to support our country in case of an aggression are important, but 
they cannot be considered to be a result of the adopƟ on of a new document.
Does the adop? on of a new concept signifi cantly change the percep? on 
of Polish na? onal security?
If the change would directly result from the adopƟ on of the new document, we 
should answered absolutely negaƟ vely. The argument of this thesis is presented 
in part concerning the nature and content of the new Concept. Similarly, it is dif-
fi cult to talk about a major change, if our point of reference is Polish expectaƟ ons 
of the new document, and the results of these expectaƟ ons – of course, if the 
analysis is based on facts, not on the oﬃ  cial statements and assumpƟ ons. Thus, 
referring to the topic: is there progress or stagnaƟ on in the area of Polish naƟ onal 
security?
Even taking into account all the previously menƟ oned concerns, it is diﬃ  cult 
to talk about stagnaƟ on, which in modern Ɵ mes, especially in the area of security 
means in fact a regress. The Alliance, including Poland, can see new threats and 
understands the need to oppose them. The importance of military strength is 
happily understood, as well convenƟ onal and nuclear weapons. There is a noƟ ce-
able concern about energeƟ c security, the risks arising from new technologies 
(cyber-terrorism), relaƟ ons with Russia and other partners and the need for an 
31 NATO operaƟ onal planning consists of two planning categories: Advance Planning 
and Crisis Response Planning. The fi rst one results are conƟ ngency plans (COPs) and 
Standing Defence Plans (SDPs). J. Kręcikij, Wybrane aspekty procesu planowania dzia-
łań NATO, Warszawa, Akademia Obrony Narodowej 2000, p. 10.
32 Ibidem, pp. 10–11.
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integrated missile defense. It is emphasized, fi nally, that ArƟ cle 5 of the Washing-
ton Treaty sƟ ll exists. But do all these records of the new document indeed create 
a completely new value, which opens a qualitaƟ vely new stage of transformaƟ on 
of the Alliance? It is diﬃ  cult, based on scienƟ fi c facts, defend this thesis. Thus, 
if the “new” NATO, aŌ er the summit in Lisbon has not obviously created such 
a new value, it is frankly impossible to say that the adopƟ on of a new NATO Stra-
tegic Concept has led to revoluƟ onary, or even seriously signifi cant progress in 
Polish naƟ onal security. 
To conclude, regarding the above, the fi nal answer to the quesƟ on as to who 
was right: Lionel Ponsard, Vice-President of Academic Research Department of 
the NATO Defense College in Rome, an ardent advocate of the early adopƟ on of 
a new concept, or the already menƟ oned David S. Yost, professor at Naval Post-
graduate School Monterey, and a resolute opponent of the same, sƟ ll seems to 
be worth a fair and thorough discussion.
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Erhard Cziomer
International Security 
Challenges and Difficulties 
at the Threshold 
of the Second Decade 
of the 21st Century 
from the Perspective 
of Germany
Introduction
The aim of this arƟ cle is to present a synthesis of new challenges for internaƟ onal 
security at the threshold of the second decade of the 21st century, from the per-
specƟ ve of a leading European country – Germany. The aƩ empt was made mainly 
to signalize Germany’s standpoint on focal internaƟ onal security problems, rather 
than analyze their scope in detail. The essence of the issue is that since Germa-
ny’s reunifi caƟ on in 1990, the country has been undergoing a permanent process 
of adjusƟ ng its interests, aims and security principles to the changes taking place 
on the internaƟ onal arena, which has signifi cantly changed at the threshold of 
the fi rst and second decades of the 21st century. The related broadly-understood 
safety-related issues are thus, in the interior aspect, an element which is nec-
essary to guarantee autonomy of development, which signifi cantly impacts on 
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Germany’s posiƟ on on the transnaƟ onal arena in accordance with the country’s 
economic potenƟ al, as well as its benefi cial role and internaƟ onal posiƟ on.
Due to the predefi ned scope and purpose of the arƟ cle, the author shall focus 
mainly on a presentaƟ on of the determinants, interests, objecƟ ves and chosen 
problems of the development of Germany’s strategy and tacƟ cs concerning focal 
issues linked with internaƟ onal security at the threshold of the second decade 
of the 21st century. The analysis will be based on available source materials1 and 
broad literature on the subject.2 The author’s research is based both on the latest 
publicaƟ ons and his own wriƟ ngs on the topic.3
1. General indicators of economic and social security 
in Germany
Germany’s external security is determined by such objecƟ ve determinants as: 
the status of a medium-sized country, with deep roots in the European Union 
(EU) and the North AtlanƟ c Treaty OrganizaƟ on (NATO), with extensive global, 
principally economic, interests. To illustrate the above thesis I shall limit my-
self to an outline of Germany’s focal economic and social determinants, which 
largely impact on its internaƟ onal role and posiƟ on. These form the foundaƟ ons 
1 Cf. Broad documentaƟ on of Germany’s current security policy: SƟ chworte zur Sich-
erheitspoliƟ k [in:] hƩ p://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Nachrichten/
Journale/SƟ chwortezurSicherheitspolitk/sƟ chw as well as government websites: 
Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt) – hƩ p://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/
DE/Bundesregierung/bundesregierung.html as well as various government resorts 
concerned with the problem – Federal Oﬃ  ce of Foreign Aﬀ airs (AustwaerƟ ges Amt) – 
hƩ p://www.auswaerƟ ges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/Uebersicht_node.html, Federal Minis-
try of Defense (Bundesministerium fuer Verteidigung) hƩ p://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/
bmvg and Federal Ministry of Internal Aﬀ airs (Bundesministerium des Innern) – hƩ p://
www.google.pl/search?client=fi refox-a&rls=org.mozilla%3Apl%3Aoﬃ  cial&channel=
s&hl=pl&source=hp&
2 See: in recent German literature: S. Boeckenfoerde (Hg.), Deutsche SicherheitspoliƟ k. 
Herausforderungen, Akteure und Prozesse, Opladen 2010, Für eine neue Ausrichtung 
deutscher SicherheitspoliƟ k. Hersg. von der Friedrich-Ebert-SƟ nŌ ung, [in:] InternaƟ o-
nale PoliƟ kanalyse – www. fes.de, and SƟ Ō ung WissenschaŌ  und PoliƟ k, InsƟ tut für 
InternaƟ onale PoliƟ k und Sicherheit (FoundaƟ on of Science and PoliƟ cs – InsƟ tute of 
InternaƟ onal PoliƟ cs and Security) Berlin, [in:] www. swp.berlin.org, including an over-
view of research topics concerning the subject 2011/12 – OrienƟ erungsrahmen fur die 
Forschung 2011/12, [in:] hƩ p://www.swp-berlin.org/fi leadmin/contents/products/
sonsƟ ges/OR_2011_12 SƟ Ō ungsrat_fi nal.pdf, and in Polish literature – K. Malinow-
ski, Przemiany niemieckiej polityki bezpieczeństwa 1990–2005, Poznań 2009, R. Zięba 
Red., Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, Warszawa 2008, K. Żukrow-
ska, Red. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Warszawa 2011.
3 See: the latest publicaƟ on with broad quoted bibliography: E. Cziomer, Polityka zagra-
niczna Niemiec w dobie nowych wyzwań globalizacji, bezpieczeństwa międzynarodo-
wego oraz integracji europejskiej po 2005 roku, Warszawa–Kraków 2010.
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of the country’s stability as well as its internal and external security. Thanks to 
the country’s high economic potenƟ al, at the end of the fi rst decade of the 21st 
century, a united Germany is considered a leader among developed western 
countries. The following selected economic and social factors have impacted on 
this potenƟ al:
• The value of Germany’s gross domesƟ c product (GDP) is 3,316.143 billion 
USD, and the country ranks as third on the global scale, following the USA 
(13,807.550 billion USD) and Japan (4,280.361 billion USD), ranking slightly 
ahead of the People’s Republic of China (3,205.507 billion USD), with simulta-
neous economic growth oscillaƟ ng from 0.8 % in 2005, to 3.0 % in 2006, 2.5% 
in 2007 and 1.3% in 2008, and its forecasted decline during the global eco-
nomic recession to –6.0% in 2009. An economic recovery is predicted start-
ing in 2010, which should lessen the GDP’s decline to –0.5%. Germany’s GDP 
was shaped in 2008 mainly by: services (69%), industry (30%) and agriculture 
(1%). Germany also ranks among leading developed countries, with a GDP of 
40,415 USD per resident (2008). 
• During the abovemenƟ oned period Germany held second place in the gen-
eral global trade balance, following the US. UnƟ l the year 2008 it held the 
leading posiƟ on in global expert, lost in mid-2009 to the People’s Republic 
of China. In 2008 Germany exported goods valued at 992.7 billion EUR, and 
imported goods valued at 814.5 billion EUR. This was an increase in export 
of 2.8%, and import of 5.8%, compared with the year 2007. This resulted in 
a balance of foreign trade of 178.2 billion EUR (2008), compared with 195.3 
billion EUR in 2007. Germany’s general balance of payments in 2008 – with 
added value of balance of foreign trade – was 178.2 billion EUR, payments 
and foreign capital at a level of +39.7 billion EUR, and, aŌ er subtracƟ ng the 
value of current benefi ts (–30.2 billion EUR) and foreign trade services, gave 
a result, due to a decrease of export, of 162.2 billion EUR. In 2007 Germany’s 
acƟ ve balance of payments was 180.8 billion EUR. The nature of Germany’s 
regional import and export Ɵ es are illustrated in detail in Table 1 and Table 2. 
We must underline that the requirements of acceleraƟ ng globalizaƟ on have 
caused Germany to clearly broaden its internaƟ onal trade of goods with Chi-
na, India and Brazil on the threshold of the fi rst and second decades of the 
21st century; these three countries, along with Russia, comprise the BRIC as-
sociaƟ on. This is important as excessive concentraƟ on of German trade with 
European countries, especially the EU, Poland included, leads to a series of 
dependencies and challenges, especially during the Ɵ mes of the global re-
cession. Transferring trade outside of Europe, however, increases numerous 
threats to its safety, especially linked with piracy and other forms of interna-
Ɵ onal organized crime.
• A systemaƟ c increase of the value of Germany’s direct foreign investments 
had taken place, from 541.861 billion USD (in 2000) to 997.459 (2005) and 
1,235.989 (2007), with lower parƟ cipaƟ on of cumulated foreign investments 
in Germany (629.711 billion USD in 2007).
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• Germany maintained signifi cant balance of payments surplus abroad. This 
was due to general assets valued at (in millions of EUR): 5,004,342, includ-
ing those belonging to companies and private individuals: 1,151,014; as well 
as liabiliƟ es to the sum of 4,359,722, including those of companies and pri-
vate individuals: 1,570,076, which jointly gave a posiƟ ve balance of +644,620, 
(+780,828 for companies and private individuals). 
• Average salaries per hour of labor in Germany were among the highest in the 
world in 2007 (30.1 USD); wages were higher only in Norway (39.6 USD) and 
Switzerland (32.9 USD).
• German ciƟ zens also ranked at top posiƟ ons on the scale of persons whose 
capital exceeded 1 billion USD. In 2007 Germany was third: 833 persons, aŌ er 
America (3019) and Japan (1517), and outclassed Great Britain (491), France 
and the People’s Republic of China (413). The global fi nancial crisis that took 
place in 2008 aﬀ ected the above staƟ sƟ cs quite signifi cantly, and the number 
of millionaires dropped. In Germany this drop was relaƟ vely small (to 810 
persons), when compared with the US (2460) and Japan (1366). The world’s 
wealthiest persons lost an average of 1/5 of their capital on the stock market 
and in banks, mainly American banks (without factoring in losses on the real 
estate market). 
• Comprehensive environmental protecƟ on acƟ ons play a central role in Ger-
many, as well as the ecological modernizaƟ on of various branches of the 
economy and of social life. Due to this Germany is a leader among developed 
countries and its internaƟ onal acƟ viƟ es in this fi eld are not without impact.
• The level and quality of life in Germany is among the highest in the world 
due to a low infl aƟ on rate (2.8% in 2008) and high earnings combined with 
a shortened workday (to an average of 36 hours a week). Evidence of this can 
be found in the fact that Germans parƟ cipate in internaƟ onal tourism more 
than any other naƟ on; 83.0 billion USD, an average of 1009 USD per resident. 
Germany has outclassed America in this fi eld – Americans spend a total of 
81.1 billion USD on internaƟ onal travel and only 269 USD per resident. 
Among the more serious shortages and challenges faced by Germany’s social 
and economic development at the end of the fi rst decade of the 21st century 
are: 
• Germany is having problems with boosƟ ng its own compeƟ Ɵ ve advantage in 
the western economy. Out of 54 highly developed countries, Germany has 
ranked low in the years 2008–2009. According to the Growth CompeƟ Ɵ ve-
ness Index – 9th place, aŌ er the US, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Singapore 
and Finland. 
• Germany is dependent on the supply of numerous resources, especially en-
ergy resources, which makes the country sensiƟ ve to all price variaƟ ons on 
the global markets. 
• Germany has maintained a high rate of structural unemployment, which has 
not undergone signifi cant changes in the period we are discussing – 10.7% 
in 2005; 9.8% in 2006; 8.4% in 2007 and 7.3% in 2008. There was a decrease 
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only from 4.8 million unemployed in 2005 to 3.2 million in 2008. The average 
unemployment rate among new EU members was higher (13.1% in 2008). 
• Despite high unemployment in Germany, during the late 1990s the country 
noted a defi cit of approximately 70,000 high-class specialists, mainly in the 
fi eld of informaƟ on technology (according to esƟ mates this defi cit may in-
crease by a couple of hundred thousand within the next ten years). 
• Germany’s budget expenditures on social benefi ts are among the highest in 
the world. In the year 2008, out of a federal budget of 283.2 billion EUR, the 
government spent 45.7% on social benefi ts and counteracƟ ng unemploy-
ment, and 15.1% (1.5 billion EUR) on the FederaƟ on’s defi cit. Further expen-
ditures included: naƟ onal defense (8.7%), construcƟ on and municipal devel-
opment (9.0%), educaƟ on and research (3.2%).4
As a side note to the above economic and social determinants we must 
underline that despite many diﬃ  culƟ es and complex internal development is-
sues, Germany has overcome the negaƟ ve consequences of the fi nancial crisis 
of 2007–2009 relaƟ vely quickly and with relaƟ ve ease, in comparison with the 
economies of many other highly developed western countries, including the 
USA.5 All in all we can state that at the threshold of the second decade of the 
21st century Germany, as a medium-sized European country, has not only played 
a leading role in the EU, but also as a global power in trade is strictly bound up 
with the global economy and trade. Maintaining this leading posiƟ on guarantees, 
on the one hand, good life quality for its residence, but, on the other, requires 
that the country maintains a high level of internaƟ onal security and stability. It is 
also linked with the necessity for Germany to take on greater responsibility for 
safety on the European and global levels. 
2. Germany’s role in transatlantic cooperation
Taking into account the enƟ rety of Germany’s security concerns as part of 
transatlanƟ c cooperaƟ on, especially with NATO, we can – at the end of the fi rst 
decade of the 21st century – pinpoint the following main direcƟ ons of interest 
and prioriƟ es: 
a) Improvement of NATO’s stabilizaƟ on missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo; 
b) Determining NATO’s relaƟ onship with other large internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons, 
especially the UN and the EU; 
c) Maintaining friendly and close relaƟ ons with the USA;
d) SupporƟ ng NATO-Russia cooperaƟ on along with all poliƟ cal and strategic im-
plicaƟ ons resulƟ ng thereof.6
4 More on the subject: Cziomer, Polityka zagraniczna Niemiec w dobie nowych wyzwań 
globalizacji, op. cit., pg. 30 and following. 
5 More on the subject: E.Cziomer, Wyzwania światowego kryzysu fi nansowo-gospo-
darczego dla polityki Niemiec, (in:) Między kryzysem a współpracą gospodarczą, red. 
M. Lasoń, Ofi cyna Wydawnicza KAAFM, Kraków 2010, pgs. 51–68.
6 More on the subject: Cziomer, Polityka zagraniczna Niemiec w dobie nowych wy-
zwań.., op. cit., 172 and following, passim.
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As far as prioriƟ es b and c are concerned, with the CDU/CSU/FDP government 
in power since the autumn of 2009, no serious changes have been implemented 
in this fi eld, and Germany’s security policy is largely a conƟ nuaƟ on of the policy 
in force in the period between 2005 and 2009, when the Grand CoaliƟ on (CDU/
CSU/SPD) was in power. This also pertained to cooperaƟ on with Russia, seen as 
a “strategic partnership”.7 The Bundeswehr maintained its parƟ cipaƟ on in NATO 
military operaƟ ons, of which the most important (towards the end of 2009), in-
cluded: 
• ParƟ cipaƟ on in the ISAF operaƟ on in Afghanistan, where – along with 43 
countries – 3,500 German soldiers and oﬃ  cers were located,
• The KFOR stabilizaƟ on mission in Kosovo, where among 32 countries and 
12,300 soldiers, Germany held command of the Pizren region (since the year 
1999), sending the largest conƟ ngent of troops, counƟ ng 2,100 soldiers,
• ParƟ cipaƟ on in the patrolling of the Mediterranean Sea (the AcƟ ve Endeavor 
operaƟ on), employing a frigate or underwater vessel,
• Training approximately 175 soldiers outside of Iraq (the NTM-I Iraq mission, 
starƟ ng in 2004),
• The Bremen frigate, with a staﬀ  of approx. 240 (Rheinland-Pfalz) parƟ cipated 
in the Ocean Shield operaƟ on to counteract piracy in East Africa unƟ l the 
end of the year 2010 (primarily unƟ l 2008, later prolonged unƟ l the end of 
2010). 
Since the beginning of 2008, the situaƟ on of Germany’s ISAF military con-
Ɵ ngent in Kunduz grew increasingly complicated. A hitherto relaƟ vely peaceful 
province in the north of Afghanistan was more and more oŌ en the target of 
Taliban aƩ acks, which required greater involvement of German units in direct 
armed operaƟ ons. These units had thus less Ɵ me to build roads, schools or other 
faciliƟ es for the Afghani civilians. The German conƟ ngent was addiƟ onally heav-
ily criƟ cized by ISAF allies from southern Afghanistan, as the units denied them 
assistance and aid on many occasions during armed operaƟ ons against the Tali-
ban, which have been underway for quite some Ɵ me. German poliƟ cians and 
commanders strived to emphasize the civilian-military nature of ISAF operaƟ ons 
in Kunduz and defend the greater eﬀ ecƟ veness of their own strategy for the sta-
bilizaƟ on of Afghanistan. An event that had impact of further developments was 
the immobilizaƟ on by the Taliban of an ISAF convoy with two fuel cisterns near 
Kunduz. These were used as a source of fuel by Afghani civilians in the area. Ger-
man Colonel Georg Klein, without a necessary and in-depth military evaluaƟ on of 
the situaƟ on, interpreted it as a direct threat to German units staƟ oned nearby. 
He called in American bombers for addiƟ onal support and bombed the cisterns. 
The bombing led to 142 casualƟ es, mainly Afghani civilians, including many wom-
en and children. In addiƟ on military commanders and the Ministry of Defense’s 
7 Cf. ibidem, Międzynarodowe implikacje partnerstwa strategicznego Niemcy–Rosja 
w XXI wieku, (in:) Zrozumieć współczesność. Księga Pamiątkowa w 75 rocznicę urodzin 
prof. Hieronima Kubiaka, pod red. G. Babińskiego i M. Kapiszewskiej, Ofi cyna Wydaw-
nicza AFM, Kraków 2009, pgs. 240–249. 
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oﬃ  cials did not thoroughly inform the Minister of Defense, then Franz Josef Jung 
from the CDU, about the course of events. Jung maintained for several weeks that 
the vicƟ ms of the bombing were almost solely members of the Taliban, dismissed 
an iniƟ al assessment of ISAF’s commanders and ignored the protests of the fami-
lies of the vicƟ ms and oﬃ  cials in Afghanistan, calling it a fl awed assessment of 
the Bundeswehr’s commanders. His successor, von GuƩ enberg, iniƟ ally believed 
the above version of events promoted by Jung, but soon distanced himself from 
it – aŌ er receiving informaƟ on from other sources. He further precipitated the 
demission of the Chief of the General Staﬀ  and Deputy Minister of Defense, who 
misinformed their superior, Minister Jung, and did not provide reliable informa-
Ɵ on about the event to the new minister. The Bundestag created a special inves-
Ɵ gaƟ on commiƩ ee to explain the event in detail. Their work indicated a series 
of defects in the operaƟ ons of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, but the state’s 
aƩ orney disconƟ nued the criminal proceedings. The federal government had to 
spend over 3 million EUR on compensaƟ on for the Afghani vicƟ ms, killed during 
the cistern bombing. 
The above – necessarily brief – descripƟ on of the event had certain conse-
quences for Germany’s security policy. Hitherto most German poliƟ cians and me-
dia suggested that the Bundeswehr ISAF mission was limited only to stabilizaƟ on 
operaƟ ons. Publicity surrounding the event that had taken place on the 4th of 
September 2009 near Kunduz proved the opposite to be true; that stabilizaƟ on 
operaƟ ons had developed into a civil war with the use of force and weapons. In 
addiƟ on, these weapons are not used only to fi ght the Taliban, but more and 
more oŌ en the vicƟ ms are civilians, who are formally protected by the provi-
sions of the Hague ConvenƟ on from 1907 on the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land. The events addiƟ onally increased civilian resistance against the ISAF units 
in Afghanistan. German public opinion also did not support the maƩ er. The fed-
eral government had to take responsibility for human lives and material dam-
ages, and was obligated to compensate the families of the Afghani vicƟ ms. It 
became increasingly harder for the Bundestag to gain support for an extension 
of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan; the fi nal decision had to be made by Febru-
ary of 2010. The maƩ er was also a sensiƟ ve one for Chancellor Merkel, who had 
– in November of 2009 – paid a visit to Washington, where she not only spoke 
with President Obama but also gave a speech before both houses of Congress. 
In 2009/2010 Merkel supported Obama’s eﬀ orts to increase ISAF units in order 
to avoid the diﬃ  culƟ es forecasted by the media, including even the hypotheƟ cal 
failure of the USA and ISAF units in Afghanistan. Obama had expected, in this 
situaƟ on, a greater amount of commitment from Germany in Afghanistan. This 
commitment had not pertained to a larger ISAF military conƟ ngent – which was 
then criƟ cally viewed in German – but to greater fi nancial and material help in 
rebuilding Afghanistan. 
The US had consequently peƟ Ɵ oned its allies for more staﬀ  and fi nancial sup-
port for NATO stabilizaƟ on missions. Despite the fi nancial crisis, greater engage-
ment in Afghanistan was to be the fi rst test of Germany’s credibility. To aƩ ain 
this towards the end of 2009 Obama proposed to increase the US conƟ ngent in 
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Afghanistan by 30,000 soldiers, expecƟ ng similar declaraƟ ons from the remain-
ing allies, Germany included. The US was not eager to bear responsibility for 
global safety by itself. In other words, in contrast to his predecessor, George Bush 
Jr., Obama’s new staﬀ  preferred to create not a “coaliƟ on of willing” (as in, e.g. 
Iraq 2003), but a “coaliƟ on of capable”8 (as in, e.g. currently in Afghanistan), to 
undertake stabilizaƟ on missions in the form of military operaƟ ons, linked with 
a systemaƟ c increase of costs and other material support on the part of each ally. 
This was also linked with the allies being prepared to bear greater responsibility, 
along with the US, for individual decisions. Despite the German public opinion’s 
negaƟ ve approach to greater commitment in Afghanistan, the CDU/CSU/FDP 
government, led by the Chancellor, was forced – due to the abovemenƟ oned 
incident that took place on the 4th of September 2010 – to launch a wide-scale in-
formaƟ ve campaign regarding the ISAF stabilizaƟ on mission in Afghanistan. This 
was important in order to, on the one hand, maintain and develop further good 
relaƟ ons with the Obama AdministraƟ on, and, on the other, strengthen Germa-
ny’s posiƟ on in NATO. The armed nature of the stabilizaƟ on mission was no lon-
ger held secret, as Minister of Defense von GuƩ enberg termed it “an operaƟ on 
similar to war operaƟ ons”, while Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs Westerwelle called 
the Bundeswehr’s operaƟ ons in Afghanistan simply “armed confl ict”. At the be-
ginning of 2009 an experienced diplomat, Bernd Muetzelburg, was chosen as 
a special representaƟ ve of the federal government in maƩ ers concerning Afghan-
istan and Pakistan, whose task was, inter alia, to maintain close contacts with his 
American equivalent, Ambassador Richard Hobrook, as well as with NATO, and to 
coordinate Germany’s preparaƟ on for a conference concerning Afghanistan. The 
conference, at the request of the French, German and BriƟ sh governments, was 
planned for the 28th of January 2010 in London.
During a conference of NATO’s ministers of foreign aﬀ airs held in Brussels on 
the 4th of December 2009, the German Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, Westerwelle, 
confi rmed Germany’s intensive acƟ ons for the stabilizaƟ on of the situaƟ on in Af-
ghanistan, postulaƟ ng to talk more about the strategy concerning Afghanistan’s 
future during the planned conference, and not only about increasing the number 
of military conƟ ngents by the allies. The Afghani government, especially President 
Karzai, should take greater responsibility for their own country. He also declared 
greater German commitment and assistance, especially in the development and 
modernizaƟ on of the police force [see: Westerwelle bei NATO – Treﬀ en in Brues-
sel, 4 Dezember 2009]. Due to the police force’s diﬃ  cult fi nancial situaƟ on, the 
CDU/CSU/FDP government gave an addiƟ onal 13 million EUR for the UN’s LOTEA 
Fund (Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan) towards the end of 2009. Its an-
nual volume, since 2002, is approximately 200 million. The largest donaƟ ons are 
made by the US, Japan and the European Commission. Germany’s input in 2009 
was 50.3 million EUR in total. Germany’s strategy concerning Afghanistan was 
elaborated by a group of experts – military and diplomats – from the Chancel-
lery, foreign aﬀ air and defense departments. The strategy was called Transferring 
8 The terms are my own – E.C. 
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Responsibility (Uebergabe in Verantwortung). Following remarks from all inter-
ested departments and following the federal government’s approval (on the 
25th of January 2010), a comprehensive document was elaborated, meant to be 
a interdepartmental legal basis for prolonging the Bundeswehr’s mandate unƟ l 
2010, and Germany’s standpoint during the conference in London was enƟ tled 
Afghanistan. On the Road to “Transferring Responsibility”. The main elements 
and theses of the above documents were restated by Chancellor Merkel on the 
27th of January 2010, where she declared, inter alia, that the federal government’s 
strategy regarding Afghanistan is – for the Afghanis to take on greater responsibil-
ity for their country, for Germany to provide greater development aid and to train 
Afghani police and military as well as to strengthen the German ISAF conƟ ngent. 
During the Afghanistan conference on the 29th of January in London the federal 
government was represented by Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs Westerwelle, who 
declared that an addiƟ onal military conƟ ngent of 500 soldiers would be sent to 
Afghanistan. This took place in February of 2010, aŌ er the Bundestag’s approval, 
given the same month. AddiƟ onally, Germany declared that it would allot an ad-
diƟ onal 50 million EUR in total for parliamentary elecƟ ons in Afghanistan. The 
realisƟ c period that the Bundeswehr’s units would begin leaving Afghanistan was 
set for the threshold of 2014/2015.
In general we can state, based on the above outline of Germany’s strategy 
regarding Afghanistan, that Chancellor Merkel’s speech in Bundestag the day 
before the London conference and her meeƟ ng with H. Karzai, the president of 
Afghanistan, who was on that day paying a short visit to Berlin, as well as the vari-
ous statements made by Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs G. Westerwelle and Minister 
of Defense T. zu GuƩ enberg that the CDU/CSU/FDP government’s role and stand-
point had a signifi cant impact on the elaboraƟ on of the fi nal document and the 
results of the London conference. This is confi rmed by a special communicaƟ on 
issued by the federal government on the 29th of January 2010, which emphasizes, 
inter alia, the following chief achievements of the conference: 
• The Afghani government’s obligaƟ on to establish full safety in the country by 
2014, enabling ISAF armies to withdraw from Afghanistan.
• Germany had decided to send an addiƟ onal military conƟ ngent to north Af-
ghanistan, counƟ ng 500 soldiers, leaving an addiƟ onal 350 soldiers, trained 
for special missions, in “strategic” reserve. 
• Germany would also increase the number of instructors to train the Afghani 
police, from 123 to 200 persons.
• Establishing a point of emphasis: striving to quicken the training of Afghani 
military and police forces, in which Germany will be greatly engaged.
• Germany is also ready to quicken the reconstrucƟ on of road infrastructure 
and the construcƟ on of new schools; to obtain this objecƟ ve Germany shall 
double its annual support to the sum of 430 million EUR.
• Germany strongly supports the concept of “naƟ onal unifi caƟ on”, which will 
enable discussions with moderate members of the Taliban, especially young 
members who want to sever their Ɵ es with terrorism and return to their own 
homes.
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• Germany fully supports calling the so-called Peace Jurga which will oversee 
the Afghani naƟ onal unifi caƟ on process and support it with the sum of 10 
million a year during the years 2010–2014.9
In 2010 Germany preliminarily assumed a new program to replace the gen-
eral defense obligaƟ on with a professional army. The maƩ er has sparked a series 
of controversies, but the CDU/CSU/FDP government wants not only to decrease 
number of the Bundeswehr’s soldiers to approximately 185,000, but also to 
bridge the gap in military modernizaƟ on, in relaƟ on to the level of the BriƟ sh or 
French armies. 
Germany, along with France, as the cohosts of the NATO summit in Kehl-Stras-
burg held at the beginning of 2009, made a signifi cant input to the preparaƟ on 
of NATO’s new strategic concept, subsequent to consultaƟ ons during the Lisbon 
Summit, held on the 19th–20th of November 2010. German specialists cannot 
agree on the signifi cance of the above concept for NATO’s future. The Konrad 
Adenauer FoundaƟ on’s experts, associated with the CDU, gave a posiƟ ve assess-
ment of NATO’s new strategic concept, viewing the discussion regarding the fi nal 
version of ArƟ cle 5 as a raƟ onal compromise between countries who favor allied 
operaƟ ons in the defense of their own territory and tendencies to assign greater 
meaning to stabilizaƟ on and prevenƟ on operaƟ ons outside of NATO’s territory. 
Simultaneously there were opinions that there is a need to elaborate a concept 
for the construcƟ on of a common missile defense system for all of NATO and to 
intensify NATO-Russia cooperaƟ on.10 LeŌ -wing experts, on the other hand, se-
verely criƟ cized the aggressive and provocaƟ ve nature of NATO’s new strategic 
concept, which in essence does not stand for internaƟ onal stabilizaƟ on, but is 
rather a list of guidelines for further “improvement of future wars”.11
3. The interest and aims of Germany’s security policy 
in the context of new international challenges 
and threats on the threshold of the second decade 
of the 21st century
Due to its geo-poliƟ cal locaƟ on in the heart of Europe, the country’s economic 
potenƟ al and the abovemenƟ oned interests and global Ɵ es associated with this 
potenƟ al, Germany did not experience – aŌ er the reunifi caƟ on in 1990 – a direct 
military threat. In its current, though parƟ ally outdated, security strategy, elabo-
rated in 2006, non-military threats to external safety are awarded more signifi -
9 Ibidem, pgs. 180–186.
10 Cf. P.Keller, Die Selbstvergewisserung der NATO: Das neue Strategische Konzept, [in:] 
Analysen und Argumente der Konrad Adenauer SƟ Ō ung, Berlin 2010.
11 See: C.Schreer, Das neue Strategische Konzept der NATO: Das Kursbuch zur Perfek-
Ɵ onierung zukünŌ iger Kriege, [in:] isw- InsƟ tut für sozial-ökologische WirtschaŌ sfor-
schung e. V. – hƩ p://isw-muenchen.de/download/nato-cls-201011.pdf.
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cance.12 These threats have been specifi ed in detail in the latest poliƟ cal-military 
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Defense on the 27th of May 2011, which will 
remain in force unƟ l a new security strategy is enacted for the enƟ re Federal 
Republic. 
The second subchapter of this document has been fully devoted to an ex-
ploraƟ on of the external security threats and risks to Germany – the strategic 
security environment (Das strategische Sicherheitsumfeld). The essence and fo-
cal elements of the threats and risks for Germany formulated therein can be pre-
sented as follows: 
• Germany’s strategic security environment has undergone further changes fol-
lowing the consequences of globalizaƟ on which had led to a change in the 
balance of forces between groups of countries and the development of new 
regional great powers, 
• Threats to security arise today mainly due to fallen or spliƫ  ng countries or 
groups of countries,
• This situaƟ on has led to an intensifi caƟ on of internaƟ onal terrorism as well 
as the development of dictatorial regimes as well as other networks of orga-
nized internaƟ onal crime, 
• AddiƟ onal threats are the outcome of ecological and climate-related catas-
trophes and intensifi caƟ on of internaƟ onal migraƟ on,
• Huge challenges are posed by diﬃ  culƟ es in obtaining and insuﬃ  ciencies of 
natural goods and raw materials, as well as the rapid spread of infecƟ ous dis-
eases, epidemics, etc.,
• Serious threats are also posed by the destrucƟ on of IT infrastructure and re-
lated techniques, inter alia due to so-called cyber-aƩ acks and a series of other 
aƩ acks.13
The above guidelines also addiƟ onally indicate the intensifi caƟ on of an ac-
cumulaƟ on of the abovemenƟ oned threats, which oŌ en take place far from Ger-
many’s borders, but impact on the safety of trade routes and the supply of raw 
materials (e.g. sea piracy oﬀ  the shores of Somalia and the Indian Ocean), as 
well as the relaƟ vely potenƟ al threat of weapons of mass destrucƟ on used by 
terrorists and other groups of organized crime (e.g. in Pakistan). These threats 
create the necessity to modify the interests and objecƟ ves of Germany’s external 
security policy. The abovemenƟ oned guidelines formulate Germany’s interests 
related with security policy in this context as follows: 
• CounteracƟ ng crises and striving to counteract internaƟ onal confl icts which 
impact on the safety of Germany and its allies,
• Improving transatlanƟ c security and cooperaƟ on,
• Oﬀ ering support to human rights and principles of democracy in internaƟ onal 
relaƟ ons, striving simultaneously to gradually limit the developmental dispro-
porƟ ons between the poor and wealthy regions of the world, 
12 Cf. Weißbuch. zur SicherheitspoliƟ k Deutschlands und zur ZukunŌ  der Bundeswehr. 
Hrsg. vom Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, Berlin 2006.
13 See: VerteidigungspoliliƟ sche Richtlinien vom 17. Mai 2011 [in:] hƩ p://www.bmvg.
de/portal/a/bmvg, pgs. 1–3.
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• Ensuring free trade and access to seas and oceans as well as natural raw ma-
terials. 
The following objecƟ ves and tasks of German security policy are derived from 
the interests listed above:
• Ensuring safety and protecƟ on for the country’s own ciƟ zens,
• ProtecƟ on of Germany’s territorial integrity and the territorial integrity of its 
allies, 
• ConƟ nuing the baƩ le against internaƟ onal terrorism, 
• Further development of development assistance and providing humanitarian 
aid, 
• AccepƟ ng greater internaƟ onal responsibility, 
• Support for abiding by the norms of the internaƟ onal legal system,
• The need for strict cooperaƟ on between Germany as part of NATO, the EU 
and the UN, including parƟ cipaƟ on in peace and stabilizaƟ on missions and 
rescue and evacuaƟ on missions, which have to, however, be within the norms 
set by German and internaƟ onal law.14
This requires Germany to be more engaged in internaƟ onal security and sta-
bilizaƟ on, not only within the frames of general poliƟ cal declaraƟ ons, but also in 
specifi c allied operaƟ ons. Towards the end of the fi rst decade of the 21st century, 
the German Chancellery took a leading role in the coordinaƟ on of external securi-
ty policies. PoliƟ cians comprising the main ruling party – the ChrisƟ an DemocraƟ c 
Party – addiƟ onally administered focal security departments, the Department of 
Defense and Department of Interior Aﬀ airs, while the coaliƟ on (SPD; 2005–2009 
and FDP; aŌ er 2009), administered only the Department of the Exterior. 
The abovemenƟ oned interests and objecƟ ves of Germany’s security policy 
unequivocally indicate that, as a great power in Europe with global interests, the 
country must – at the threshold of the second decade of the 21st century – face 
various new internaƟ onal challenges and threats. This requires the country to en-
gage seriously in solving these problems, in coordinaƟ on with allies. The main dif-
fi culty, however, is that in 2010/2011 the ruling liberal-conservaƟ ve party lead by 
A. Merkel lost its majority in the German Bundesrat, and was thus forced to seek 
alliance with the opposiƟ on in certain maƩ ers concerning security policy, among 
which – especially among the Alliance ‘90/The Greens – pacifi sƟ c tendencies 
materialized. It was thus harder to gain required support for the Bundeswehr’s 
NATO stabilizaƟ on missions in the Bundestag. For the Bundeswehr to be sent to 
operate an outside mission, a series of important requirements and legal-poliƟ cal 
criteria have to be fulfi lled, of which the most important are: 
• Does the mission have a legal and internaƟ onal mandate? 
• As part of which missions is the mandate to be executed?
• Does the mandate take under consideraƟ on German values, principles and 
interests?
• To what extent does the mandate harmonize with the general poliƟ cal con-
cept and its various instruments?
14 Ibidem, pgs. 4–6.
International Security Challenges and Difficulties at the Threshold of the Second Decade... 131
• What are the chances of solving the confl ict as part of the mandate, or create 
circumstances for disconƟ nuing the use of force?15
In the context of lessening parliamentary support for the liberal-conservaƟ ve 
party and intensifi caƟ on of a series of interior poliƟ cal controversies since the 
beginning of 2011, Germans must take a stand concerning new internaƟ onal and 
naƟ onal security threats and challenges, of which the following are of focal im-
portance:
• Adequate response to the civil war in Libya in the context of democraƟ c trans-
formaƟ ons taking place in the Arab world and NATO’s role,
• AcceleraƟ ng the Bundeswehr reform and counteracƟ ng new internal and ex-
ternal threats to Germany. 
The framework of this arƟ cle allows the author to only indicate the most im-
portant elements of the above issues and their individual scope. 
Since the country’s reunifi caƟ on in 1990, Germany has been endeavoring to 
secure permanent membership in the United NaƟ on’s Security Council (UNSC), 
aspiring to augment its responsibility for internaƟ onal security. Required diplo-
maƟ c iniƟ aƟ ves have brought no success, but the Federal Republic’s role on the 
UN forum has been an acƟ ve one – although the country prefers peace support 
operaƟ ons. 
At the beginning of 2011 Germany became a nonpermanent member of the 
UNSC for a period of two years, to face the problem of taking proper acƟ ons with 
regard to democraƟ c changes taking place in Arab countries in North Africa. The 
eﬀ ects of these acƟ ons were, inter alia, the overthrow of the dictatorships in 
Egypt and Tunisia and a civil war in Libya.16 The CDU/CSU/FDP government gen-
erally supported the transformaƟ ons taking place in the Arab world, but at the 
beginning of 2011 it refrained from voƟ ng for the UNSC’s resoluƟ on concerning 
NATO’s authority to control the fl ights of M. Gaddafi  against Libyan rebels, along 
with Russia, the People’s Republic of China and Brazil. Germany’s stance obvi-
ously was in opposiƟ on to that of its western allies – the USA, France and Great 
Britain – who, as permanent UNSC members, supported resoluƟ on no. 1973 and 
were acƟ vely engaged in the aforemenƟ oned operaƟ on in Libya.17 Without going 
into details of such a decision, we should look for the answer to the following 
quesƟ on: why did the CDU/CSU/FDP government, and Chancellor Merkel, decide 
to take this step and face criƟ cism from the media, including German media, as 
well as from its allies? It was possible to formally vote at the UNSC for the reso-
luƟ on, and refrain from parƟ cipaƟ ng in the armed operaƟ ons against Gaddafi ’s 
regime, as many NATO member countries had done, including Poland.
We can try outlining Germany’s objecƟ ves and reasoning concerning NATO’s 
intervenƟ on against Gaddafi ’s regime in Libya in the following manner:
15 Cf. Für eine neue Ausrichtung deutscher SicherheitspoliƟ k, op. cit. p.7 Sicherheitspoli-
Ɵ k.
16 Cf. More on Germany’s standpoint – Aufstand in Arabien, [in:] InternaƟ onale PoliƟ k 
Nr 2 Maerz/ April, Berlin 2011, pgs.10–45.
17 See: Nach der UN-ResoluƟ on, [in:] FAZ.NET from the 18th of March 2011. 
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• It was a funcƟ on of the country’s internal policies resulƟ ng from pacifi sƟ c 
tendencies in Germany, and to an even greater extent dictated by the upcom-
ing naƟ onal elecƟ ons in Baden-WürƩ emberg and Rhineland-PalaƟ nate on 
the 27th of March 2011, where the ChrisƟ an DemocraƟ c Party and the Liberal 
Party were on the defensive. The step – just like the moratorium on work on 
selected nuclear reactors as an outcome of the catastrophe in Fukushima – 
did not bring posiƟ ve results. The elecƟ ons were won by the Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens and the SDP, further complicaƟ ng the rule of the CDU/CSU/FDP on 
the federal level. 
• Germany decided to completely withdraw its ships and planes from the Med-
iterranean area due to fi nancial reasons and poliƟ cal calculaƟ ons. The coun-
try deemed that the NATO operaƟ on, enforced mainly by France and Great 
Britain, will be very expensive and will not gain broad internaƟ onal approval 
in the long run, especially from the Arab world and in Africa. 
• Germany did, however, become engaged in solving humanitarian issues as 
well as in helping to reorient developmental policies and increasing aid for 
Arab countries in North Africa and the Near East with greater fi nancial assis-
tance. In April and in May the country once again played an important role on 
the EU’s various forums.18
• Without doubt Germany exposed itself to severe criƟ cism from France and 
Great Britain due to its stance concerning NATO’s intervenƟ on in Libya. The 
criƟ cism from the Obama administraƟ on in the US was, however, moderate 
– especially since Germany had amplifi ed its allied operaƟ ons in Afghanistan 
against the Taliban. Obama oﬃ  cially invited Chancellor Merkel to Washing-
ton and bestowed upon her the PresidenƟ al Medal of Freedom, the high-
est civilian award in the United States. At the same Ɵ me German-French and 
German-English tension was lessened. This was necessary as in May and June 
of 2011 the maƩ er of further aid for Greece went into the fi nal phase, which 
could not have been agreed upon without cooperaƟ on with Germany.19
As a side note we can state that analyses have appeared concerning an as-
sessment of Libya’s internal situaƟ on and NATO’s armed intervenƟ ons. The fi rst 
was carried out by an expert of a renowned research center in Berlin – the Ger-
man InsƟ tute for InternaƟ onal and Security Aﬀ airs – which analyzes the armed 
confl ict in Libya through the prism of the civil war, which, even aŌ er Gaddafi , his 
family and confi dants were removed from power, did not lead to swiŌ  peace and 
stabilizaƟ on. The scenarios included in the analysis suggest a breakup and divi-
sion of Libya, or long-term aƩ empts to maintain the country as a unifi ed naƟ on.20 
The second analysis was wriƩ en by a specialist of the Bundeswehr University in 
18 Cf. Der Halbierte beim Rueckkehr, [in:] FAZ.NET from the 20th of June 2011 and RFN: 
plan intensyfi kacji relacji gospodarczych z krajami Maghrebu, [in:] Ośrodek Studiów 
Wschodnich from 2011-02-16 – ww.osw.waw.pl.
19 See: Wie viel zusaetzliches Geld braucht Giechenland, [in:] FAZ.NET from the 10th of 
June 2011.
20 Cf. W.Lacher, Libyen nach Kqaddafi . Staatszerfal oder Staatsbildung?
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Hamburg, and very criƟ cally assesses the intervenƟ on’s poliƟ cal preparaƟ ons as 
well as the course of NATO’s military operaƟ ons, indicaƟ ng lack of consequently 
executed poliƟ cal and military strategy, where France and Great Britain employed 
the United States’ lack of greater interest and imposed its overly ambiƟ ous aspi-
raƟ ons and operaƟ on plans, of which there is no end, and which can cause a se-
ries of internaƟ onal complicaƟ ons.21 The new Minister of Defense, Thomas de 
Maziere, also clearly opposes sending German soldiers to Libya, yet expects that 
if NATO operaƟ ons in Libya will, as will probably be the case, become drawn out 
in Ɵ me, Germany will have to provide not only humanitarian aid, but also support 
its allies with air-aƩ ack operaƟ ons.22
As already menƟ oned above, one of the main defi ciencies of Germany’s se-
curity policy is the discussion involving the reform of the Bundeswehr – under-
way since the country’s reunifi caƟ on in 1990 – which has not brought saƟ sfying 
results. In 2010 Chancellor Merkel’s liberal-conservaƟ ve government decided, 
succeeding iniƟ al aƩ empts to shorten the period of the draŌ , to end the draŌ  
on the 1st of July 2011 and in turn create a professional army. Plans are to re-
duce the Bundeswehr from approx. 300,000 to approx. 185,000 soldiers, includ-
ing 170,000 professional soldiers and 5–15,000 military volunteers. A specially 
trained peace mission and stabilizaƟ on mission unit for operaƟ ons outside of 
Germany is to count 10,000 soldiers (previously 7,000). The defense department 
also plans to signifi cantly increase the number of military staﬀ  and the number 
of departments comprising the Ministry of Defense, as well as to close many per-
manent military accommodaƟ ons, which has given rise to a series of protests and 
controversies in various federal states and among the leaders of the Bundeswehr, 
which is an important employer and creates many workplaces – also for civilians 
– throughout the enƟ re Federal Republic of Germany.23 
The most important challenges linked with the realizaƟ on of the Bundeswehr 
reform iniƟ alized in 2010, which should be carried out by the year 2014, in-
clude: 
• Carrying out the reform by 2014 by reaching the target employment level (for 
example – by the end of 2011 approx. 25,000 professional soldiers were to be 
employed, while only 5,000 applied),
• Financial problems; 32 billion euros are to be annually spent on the enƟ re 
Bundeswehr reform, while at the same Ɵ me the CDU/CSU/FDP government 
plans to save 8 billion euros, which does not seem to be realisƟ c,
• The Bundeswehr is to carry out an ambiƟ ous modernizaƟ on program con-
cerning equipment and weapons, as well as cooperate with NATO allies in 
Europe,
21 Cf. A. PradeƩ o, IntervenƟ on in Libyen zwischen Regimewechesl und umanitaeren Ans-
pruch, [in:] InternaƟ onale PoliƟ k Nr 3 Juli/August, Berlin 2011 pgs. 53–59.
22 See: Deutsche Soldaten in Libyen? [in:] FAZ.NET from the 14th of June 2011.
23 See: VerteidigungspoliliƟ sche Richtlinien vom 17. Mai 2011, op. cit, p, 10 and follow-
ing.
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• The necessity to prepare for stabilizaƟ on and peace mission, to parƟ ally de-
crease disproporƟ ons in relaƟ on to the French and BriƟ sh armies.24
The Bundeswehr reform is to modernize the army in order to forge it into 
a signifi cant poliƟ cal and military force in Europe. 
The threat of so-called cyber-aƩ acks has become serious challenge for inte-
rior security. In 2010 approx. 200 cyber-aƩ acks were carried out within the ter-
ritory of Germany. These were relaƟ vely dangerous aƩ acks of unknown criminal 
groups and hackers carried out on important government buildings, the aim of 
which was the theŌ  of confi denƟ al naƟ onal informaƟ on, or the destrucƟ on of 
computers and other important devices. For this reason the Ministry of Interior 
Aﬀ airs created at the threshold of 2010/2010 a NaƟ onal Cyberdefense Center 
(Cyber-Abwehr-Zentrum) in Berlin. It is currently in the phase of intense develop-
ment, and is at present occupied with collecƟ ng materials and exchanging ex-
perience with allied countries. Apart from counteracƟ ng internaƟ onal terrorism, 
with which Germany had been concerned with for many years, the center is an 
important element in the country’s endeavor to counteract modern threats to 
internal security, with many signifi cant internaƟ onal implicaƟ ons.25
Conclusions
The above analysis of Germany’s standpoint on the challenges of internaƟ onal 
security at the threshold of the second decade of the 21st century oﬀ ers the fol-
lowing conclusions: 
1) For historical reasons and due to the country’s interior policies, Germany pre-
fers to maintain its internaƟ onal role as a civil power (Zivilmacht). 
2) Western allies, with the US as the forerunner, expect Germany to become 
more engages in solving the poliƟ cal and military problems faced by modern 
socieƟ es.
3) Germany abstained from voƟ ng on March of 2011 in the UN Security Council 
vote on intervenƟ on in Libya against Gaddafi ’s regime. This indicates serious 
dilemmas and challenges for Germany’s security policy. The above standpoint 
is moƟ vated both by interior policy factors as well as fi nancial factors and 
a criƟ cal assessment of NATO’s operaƟ ons in Libya hitherto – their planning 
and progression. 
4) At the threshold of the fi rst and second decades of the 21st century Germany 
commenced work on a new strategy regarding their security policy, in which 
focal elements include counteracƟ ng new interior challenges and threats, as 
well as a military (Bundeswehr) reform. 
24 Cf.: P. Keller, Die strategische Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr, [in:] Analysen und Ar-
gumente Nr. 92, Berlin 2011 – www.kas.de and S. Ch. Brune/ M. Dickow/ H. Linnenl-
kamp/ Ch. Moelling, Die kuenŌ ige Bundeswehr und der Europaeische ImperaƟ v, [in:] 
SWP-Aktuell Nr 15, Berlin 2011 pgs. 3–8.
25 Cf. P. Keller, NichƩ radiƟ onelle Herausforderungen für deutsche Sicherheit PoliƟ k, Hrsg. 
Konrad Adenaer SƟ Ō ung, Berlin 16 Juni 2011 [in:] www.kas.de/wf/de33.23050.
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5) A recent government decision (CDU/CSU/FDP) from mid-March of 2011 con-
cerning the liquidaƟ on of all German nuclear power plants unƟ l the year 2022 
due to the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan has a series of implicaƟ ons for 
the nature of future energy safety and environmental protecƟ on in Europe 
and on the global scale. 
Appendixes
Table No. 1. Regional layout and value of Germany’s import in the years 2005–
2008 (in millions of EUR)
Countries/ years 2005 2006 2007 2008
UE-27 countries, including:
Belgium
France
Italy
Holland
Great Britain
371 136
28 849
 52 700
 36 348 
 51 823
 39 069 
423 731
33 388 
 62 102
 41 470
 60 750
 40 832
449 691
36 259
 62 873
44 694
61 951
41 966
478 050
39 775
66 710
45 962
72 083
44 261
EFTA countries (1)  38 432  45 631 48 384 54 330
NAFTA countries ( 2)
Including the US
 46 617
41 798
 56 212
49 197
 53 284
45 993
54 102
46 060
ASEAN countries (3)  16 348  18 418  19 179  19 217
BRIC countries (4)
Including China (5)
45172 
40 845
 91 286
49 958
98 539
56 417
109 911
59 378
Other countries, 
including
Japan
All African countries apart from NAFTA 
countries and Brazil
 83 103
21 772
13 761,3 
91 994,1
 98 715
24 016
16 734,3
104 153,7
100 810
24 381
16
100 768,9
103 010
23 087 
19 700,3 
101 951,8
Import in total  786 266  893 042 965 236 994 870
Legend: 1–5 
Legend for Table No. 1 regarding economic grouping: 1) EFTA = Island, Lichtenstein, Nor-
way and Switzerland; 2) NAFTA = Canada, USA, Mexico; 3) ASEAN = Brunei, Indonesia, 
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (formerly Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Tha-
iland, Vietnam; 4) BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China; 5) China = without data for Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. 
Source: StaƟ sƟ scher Jahrbuch 2009 für die BRD, Wiesbaden 2009, s. 478.
Erhard Cziomer136
Table No. 2. Regional spread and value of export without excess balance 
for Germany in the years 2005–2008 (in millions of EUR)
Countries/ years 2005 2006 2007 2008
UE-27 countries, including:
Belgium
France
Italy
Holland
Great Britain
505 716
43 613
79 039
53 855 
49 033
60 394
564 864
725
85 006
59 348
56 531
64 726 
623 837
50 689
91 665 
64 499
62 948
69 760
632 953
51 635
96 859
64 003
65 644
88 788
EFTA countries (1)  36 300  42 635  45 138 47 567
NAFTA countries (2)
Including the US
80 706 
69 299
90 859
77 991 
86 248
73 327
84 856
71 467
ASEAN countries (3)  12 657  14 563  15 495  15 569
BRIC Countries (4)
Including China (5)
48 190
21 235
63 614
27 478
7 247
29 902
 83 252
34 096
Other countries, including Japan 
and African countries
All of North and South America, 
apart from NAFTA countries and Brazil
 102 697
13 338
14 806,9
91 994,1
 117 008
13 886
16 617,2
104 153,7
122 270
13 022
17 572,2
100 768,9
130 944
12 806 
19 700,3
101 951
Import in total  628 087 733 994 796 887 818 621
Legend for Table No. 2 regarding economic grouping: 1) EFTA = Island, Lichtenstein, Nor-
way and Switzerland; 2) NAFTA = Canada, USA, Mexico; 3) ASEAN = Brunei, Indonesia, 
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (formerly Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Tha-
iland, Vietnam; 4) BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China; 5) China = without data for Hong 
Kong and Taiwan.
Source: StaƟ sƟ scher Jahrbuch 2009 für die BRD, Wiesbaden 2009, p. 478.
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Experience and Conclusions 
Regarding the Functioning 
of the Special Forces 
Within the Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Poland
The establishment of the Special Forces within the struc-
ture of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland
In response to the geo-poliƟ cal transiƟ ons occurring worldwide, and as a result 
of the terrorist aƩ ack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, a NATO 
summit was organized in Prague in November 2002. This was when the Polish 
party declared its willingness to recognize the Special Forces as “their naƟ onal 
specialty” in the Military Alliance. On 15 May 2006, in connecƟ on with this decla-
raƟ on, Poland, the United States, the Netherlands and Norway presented a doc-
ument enƟ tled: “The NATO Special OperaƟ ons Forces TransformaƟ on IniƟ aƟ ve 
(NSTI)” to the North AtlanƟ c Council. Poland, as one of four NATO countries, was 
in favor of increasing the potenƟ al of the Special OperaƟ ons Forces1, recognizing 
1 The study uses the name “the Special OperaƟ ons Forces” (SOF) to refer to the NATO 
Special Forces, whereas the Polish special military units are referred to as the Special 
Forces, in accordance with naƟ onal military nomenclature. 
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the need to establish the kind of Treaty insƟ tuƟ ons that would be capable of 
coordinaƟ ng the development and exploitaƟ on of the Special OperaƟ ons Forces 
on a strategic level.
The reference iniƟ aƟ ve was approved by NATO and, in accordance with the 
document presented, the implementaƟ on arrangements were made during the 
2006 NATO Summit in Riga. As a result, the NATO Special Opera? ons Coordina-
? on Center (NSOCC) was established within the Allied Command for OperaƟ ons 
(ACO) in Mons, Belgium. In response to the iniƟ aƟ ve, the Special Opera? ons 
Command (SOC) was set up at the end of 2005 within the NATO command struc-
tures and the General Staﬀ  of the Polish Armed Forces. It was entrusted with 
laying down the necessary formal, legal and organizaƟ onal condiƟ ons to create 
a new type of Special Armed Forces – the Special Forces and the Special Forces 
Command.
While defi ning the principal development direcƟ ons of the Armed Forces 
within the Defense Program for 2007–20122, in view of the future threats and 
challenges to be faced by the Armed Forces, it was recommended that a new 
type of military forces, referred to as the Special Forces, be established, together 
with the Special Forces Command. These recommendaƟ ons were approved by 
the Minister of NaƟ onal Defense in his decision of 25 October 2006 regarding the 
formaƟ on of the Special Forces Command as of 1 January 2007.
The new type of military forces consisted of all Polish special military units, 
previously operaƟ ng within various structures and under diﬀ erent commands. 
GROM, the Mobile Opera? onal Reac? on Group, was directly subordinated to 
the Minister of NaƟ onal Defense. The 1st Special Regiment (currently referred to 
as the COMMANDOS Military Unit) was one of the units supervised by the Army 
Command, whereas the Frogmen Special Groups (currently referred to as the 
FORMOZA Military Unit) were included in the Reconnaissance Ships Group of the 
3rd Naval Fleet, subordinated to Naval Command.
It should also be noted that although the formaƟ on of the Special Forces 
Command consƟ tuted a huge change in the Polish Armed Forces, the fact that 
it was assigned the role of the Armed Forces Type Command, in line with the 
exisƟ ng Army, Air Force and Naval Commands, should be viewed as the most 
revoluƟ onary. Equally innovaƟ ve provisions involved the command mode and 
the military forces delegaƟ on to various operaƟ ons. Only the Chief Commander 
of the Special Forces performs the role of both the Force Provider and the Force 
User in the course of the operaƟ ons conducted3.
2 In accordance with § 8 Point 2 of the RegulaƟ on of the Council of Ministers dated 15 
June 2004 on the CondiƟ ons and Mode of Planning and Financing the Tasks Imple-
mented as Part of the State Defensive Work by Government AdministraƟ on Bodies 
and by Local-Government Bodies, defence programmes were to be draŌ ed for six-
year periods. In 2007, under the RegulaƟ on by the Council of Ministers of 3 Octo-
ber 2007, these programme cycles were adjusted to the mode applied by NATO as 
middle-term programming in ten-year cycles.
3 The Act on the General ObligaƟ on to Defend the Republic of Poland of 24 May 2007, 
ArƟ cle 3, Point 3 and ArƟ cle 13a, Point 2.
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In the period 2007–2012, the Special Forces underwent a number of organi-
zaƟ onal and dislocaƟ on-related changes, aimed at determining the proper func-
Ɵ onal structure that would allow the eﬀ ecƟ ve carrying out of their duƟ es. The 
current structure and posiƟ on of the Special Forces Command is presented in 
Figure 1.
OperaƟ ons Command
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
NAVAL COMMAND
Special operaƟ ons 
squadron
SPECIAL FORCES 
COMMAND
COMMANDOS Military Unit
NIL Military Unit
FORMOZA Military Unit GROM  Military Unit 
AGAT Military Unit
ARMY COMMAND AIR FORCE COMMAND
Figure 1. The structure of the Special Forces and their posiƟ on within the com-
mand system of the Polish Armed Forces
Source: author’s presentaƟ on. 
The Special Forces duties arising from their role in the 
Polish Armed Forces 
The duƟ es entrusted to the Special Forces arise from the strategic and poliƟ cal 
condiƟ ons relaƟ ng to the naƟ onal security of Poland, and also from their role 
within the State security system. The Na? onal Security Strategy of the Republic 
of Poland, announced in 2007, strengthened the posiƟ on of the Special Forces 
within the command system of the Polish Armed Forces. It further defi ned the 
duƟ es to be assumed by the Special Forces4. These mainly included prevenƟ ng 
asymmetrical threats and undertaking cooperaƟ on with other enƟ Ɵ es operaƟ ng 
within the State security system. It was also considered essenƟ al to foster the 
development of these forces with the view to their most eﬃ  cient uƟ lizaƟ on.
The Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, consƟ tuƟ ng the sector-
specifi c strategy of the Polish NaƟ onal Security Strategy, was another strategic 
document defi ning the duƟ es delegated to the Special Forces. It emphasized the 
role and posiƟ on of the Special Forces even more expressly. The most impor-
tant statements include defi ning the operaƟ onal space, both domesƟ cally and 
abroad, in Ɵ mes of peace, crisis and war, in order to achieve strategic and opera-
Ɵ onal objecƟ ves5.
4 The NaƟ onal Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2007, p. 25.
5 The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2009, p. 22.
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Experience related to the functioning of the Special 
Forces within the Polish Armed Forces
Due to their role within the State security system and the duƟ es performed, the 
Special Forces, despite their short history as a military unit, have gathered rich 
experience related to their funcƟ oning in Ɵ mes of peace, and, especially, to their 
parƟ cipaƟ on in combat operaƟ ons. A list of conclusions and experiences related 
to the funcƟ oning of the Special Forces Command, including the units directly 
subordinated to the Command of the Polish Armed Forces in 2007–2012, is pre-
sented below.
1. The establishing of the Special Forces Command complied with the poliƟ cal 
decisions made by Poland at two NATO summits. It was a milestone in earn-
ing the status of a reliable and serious special operaƟ ons partner within the 
North AtlanƟ c Treaty OrganizaƟ on. 
2. The formaƟ on of the Special Forces has strengthened naƟ onal defense. They 
will consƟ tute a supplementary power within the Polish Armed Forces in the 
event of convenƟ onal crises, consƟ tuƟ ng the principal tool of responding to 
contemporary threats defi ned, e.g., in the naƟ onal Joint Doctrine D/01(C) of 
20096.
Contemporary threats to the State and citizens’ security are 
mostly of a non-military nature, and they are posed by the 
States or non-State organisations which have hostile intentions 
towards other States or organisations, as well as the suﬃ  cient 
means to realise their threats.
Figure 2. Threats to naƟ onal security
Source: The Joint Doctrine D/01 (C), p. 34. 
3. The Special Forces consƟ tute an immediate reacƟ on agent in special circum-
stances, such as the kidnapping of Polish ciƟ zens outside the country, the pos-
ing of a threat to diplomaƟ c posts, or the need to evacuate Polish ciƟ zens 
from insecure territories. They also perform a prominent role in the allied/
coaliƟ onal operaƟ ons conducted in the case of asymmetrical confl icts. Their 
signifi cance is expressly refl ected in the ISAF mission, during which the Spe-
cial Forces, accounƟ ng for less than 8% of the enƟ re conƟ ngent of the Pol-
ish Armed Forces, have achieved up to 60% of the enƟ re operaƟ onal result 
(e.g. catching key leaders of terrorist organizaƟ ons or liquidaƟ ng ammuniƟ on 
dumps). They currently act as the only naƟ onal enƟ ty saƟ sfying the needs 
related to image reconnaissance by the Polish military conƟ ngent.
6 Further details available in the Joint Doctrine D/01(C), Warsaw 2009, Point 1044, 
p. 34 and subsequent pages, and in the latest Allied Joint Doctrine – AJP 01(D) of 
2010, p. 2.
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4. The establishing of the Special Forces contributed to the State defense sys-
tem with the principal element of supporƟ ng the forces subordinated to the 
Minister of the Interior in reacƟ ng to the internal security threats of terrorist 
types. This was fully proven during the preparaƟ on and conducƟ ng of the 
security-related operaƟ ons in the course of the largest mass event held in 
Poland, i.e. the European Football Championship EURO 2012. The selected 
squads of the Special Forces (referred to as Task Forces – TF)7, together with 
a complex communicaƟ ons system, smoothly integrated with the forces and 
resources assigned for this purpose by the Minister of the Interior.
5. ConstrucƟ ng a consistent command, support and protecƟ on system, dedi-
cated to special operaƟ ons. The Special Forces consist of three combat units 
(the GROM, COMMANDOS and FORMOZA Military Units), a combat support 
unit (the AGAT Military Unit), and an IT support and logisƟ cs protecƟ on unit 
(the NIL Military Unit). The Special Forces operaƟ ons are further secured by 
a special Air Force unit (the 7th Special Opera? ons Squadron), subordinated 
to the Chief Commander of the Air Force. What merits special recogniƟ on is 
the ability to conduct operaƟ onal analyses and to benefi t from the experi-
ence gathered during various training courses and missions abroad, which 
have allowed the adjusƟ ng of the organizaƟ onal structures to the require-
ments of contemporary baƩ lefi elds and to emerging threats.
6. The Special Forces are capable of the independent conducƟ ng of special op-
eraƟ ons in all types of environment (land, air and sea), which makes them 
the only joint8 type of Polish Armed Forces. The Special Forces can conduct 
operaƟ ons separately or as support for other armed units.
7. The construcƟ on of a complex communicaƟ ons system for the Special Forces 
by appoinƟ ng full-Ɵ me communicaƟ ons teams/oﬃ  cers, and by delegaƟ ng 
them to the key insƟ tuƟ ons/commands within the command system of the 
Armed Forces, allows the coordinaƟ ng of the planning and conducƟ ng of spe-
cial operaƟ ons.
8. Pursuing the process of aƩ aining the status of a Special OperaƟ ons Forces 
Framework NaƟ on (SOFFN) by the Special Forces Command, planned to be 
completed by the end of 2013, will make the NATO countries perceive Poland 
as the Eastern European leader that reforms its Armed Forces in line with 
contemporary threats. Several Ɵ mes the leading NATO fi gures, poliƟ cians and 
representaƟ ves of the US Armed Forces have considered Poland an example 
to follow for other countries reforming their Armed Forces. As a result of the 
wide involvement of the American party, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(Moil) was signed by the United States Special OperaƟ ons Command (US SO-
COM) and the Polish Special Forces Command. The Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, such as Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, CroaƟ a, Hun-
gary and Germany, also joined the managerial process eﬀ ected by Poland. It 
should be especially noted that aƩ aining SOFFN status by Poland is the most 
7 The Task Force was defi ned in the Doctrine DD/3.5 Special OperaƟ ons, Krakow 2011, 
p. 30.
8 AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Defi niƟ ons, 2007, p. 213.
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straighƞ orward, fastest and cheapest way to take over the command of NATO 
military operaƟ ons (in 2014).
9. The role of the Chief Commander of the Special Forces, defi ned as both the 
Force Provider and the Force User, leads the Special Forces Command to act 
both as the Armed Forces Type Command and as the Armed Forces Opera-
Ɵ onal Command as regards the command in operaƟ ons/special military units. 
For this reason, both the structure and the duƟ es entrusted to the Special 
Forces Command diﬀ er from other commands of the military forces. Never-
theless, it should be stressed that, due to such legislaƟ ve provisions, the Chief 
Commander of the Special Forces can have an impact on the preparaƟ on and 
training of operaƟ onal forces – acƟ ng as the Force Provider. He/she may also 
promptly and eﬃ  ciently react to the changing operaƟ onal situaƟ on, and ad-
just the type and amount of delegated forces (including mainly Task Forces, 
Assault Forces, support and protecƟ on units) – fulfi lling the role of the Force 
User.
10. Given the specifi c needs of the Special Forces – cuƫ  ng-edge technological 
soluƟ ons, short producƟ on series and the introducƟ on of modifi caƟ ons al-
ready aŌ er starƟ ng the acquisiƟ on process – it is essenƟ al to allow them to 
purchase military equipment themselves. This entails the possibility of the 
using of budget resources by the Chief Commander of the Special Forces.
11. It is common knowledge that the training process of the Special Forces opera-
tors (Task Force soldiers) is long and very expensive. An average training course 
takes around three years unƟ l the soldiers aƩ ain their operaƟ onal readiness. 
Experience further indicates that the training process of an operaƟ onal of-
fi cer of the Special Forces Command also lasts around two/three years. This 
results from the specifi city and the wide array of duƟ es performed by the 
Special Forces, and from the necessity to eﬀ ecƟ vely funcƟ on in an interna-
Ɵ onal domain (English being the principal working tool). The methodological 
and systemaƟ c Special Forces training is conducted in the NATO schools and 
training centers (e.g. in NSHQ Chievres), and also, with a view to increasing 
training eﬃ  ciency in the country through mobile training teams delegated 
from the SOCEUR, SOCOM and the Oberammergau NATO School. The main 
emphasis is put on planning and commanding allied special operaƟ ons, on 
conducƟ ng reconnaissance operaƟ ons and on using advanced equipment 
and technologies (secret communicaƟ ons, digital recogniƟ on techniques and 
biometrics). The ouƞ low process of the Special Forces Command staﬀ  was 
especially impacted on by the command dislocaƟ on changes in 2007–2009, 
as part of the staﬀ  did not decide to once again change their garrisons.
12. The assumed development direcƟ ons of the Special Forces in 2009–2018, 
and their follow-up as part of “The Special Forces Development Program for 
2013–2022,” allow the increasing of the number of combat units in the Spe-
cial Forces, making them independent, and expanding their combat potenƟ al 
and their eﬃ  ciency to cooperate with convenƟ onal forces, in order for them 
to be employed on the contemporary baƩ lefi eld, in Ɵ mes of peace, crisis and 
war. 
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Summary
The decision on establishing the Special Forces Command within the Polish 
Armed Forces was not a sudden decision, taken on impulse or in reacƟ on to an 
important event. Following this decision, all naƟ onal enƟ Ɵ es, operaƟ ng both on 
the poliƟ cal level, responsible for developing strategies, and on the military-stra-
tegic level, responsible for determining the development direcƟ ons of the Special 
Forces, acted jointly, being aware of the essence, role and duƟ es of the Special 
Forces in the State security system.
It is also worth emphasizing that the formaƟ on of the Special Forces Com-
mand was based on the philosophy of the gradual achievement of the target, 
which assumed the reconstrucƟ ng of the organizaƟ onal structures and establish-
ing a module-task structure in a few or even several years’ Ɵ me.
It is assumed that the implementaƟ on of the organizaƟ on and the modern-
izaƟ on-related objecƟ ves and undertakings in 2009–2018 will make it possible to 
increase the number of combat units of the Special Forces, and to considerably 
expand their operaƟ onal potenƟ al and their eﬀ ecƟ ve uƟ lizaƟ on on the contem-
porary baƩ lefi eld. The manpower of the Special Forces within the Polish Armed 
Forces will oscillate around three percent of the enƟ re manpower of the Polish 
Armed Forces9.
In addiƟ on, it seems extremely signifi cant in the face of the current fi nancial 
crisis that the fi nancial outlays on the Special Forces are massively lower than the 
outlays on more “convenƟ onal” types of Armed Forces, accounƟ ng for less than 
two percent of the budget of the Polish Armed Forces.
9 The global standards defi ne the manpower of the Special OperaƟ ons Forces in rela-
Ɵ on to convenƟ onal forces (the Army, the Air Force and the Navy) as two to fi ve 
percent.

Sławomir Mazur
International Aspects 
of Counteracting Terrorism
What is terrorism? Just like in the case of the term internet, most people have 
only a vague understanding of what terrorism involves; they do not know a pre-
cise, to-the-point and comprehensive defi niƟ on of the term. Currently, there are 
over 200 defi niƟ ons.1 Such a large number of explanaƟ ons of the phenomenon 
indicate its complex nature and variability in essence and over Ɵ me. According 
to Z. Cesarz and E. Stadtmiiler, this “is of course the outcome of poliƟ cal and 
ideological issues. These issues are also the reason for the various interpreta-
Ɵ ons of the phenomenon by individual countries and groups of countries. What 
some assess as terrorism is deemed by others as a jusƟ fi ed method of fi ghƟ ng for 
naƟ onal independence, defense of idenƟ ty or religious senƟ ments”.2 The media 
are in part to blame for this ambiguity. We need only to pick up a newspaper 
to fi nd out that, even as part of the same program or arƟ cle, various acts such 
as detonaƟ ng a building, the murder of a head of state, a massacre of civilians 
carried out by a military unit, adding poison to food products on the shelves of 
a supermarket or conscious contaminaƟ on of over-the-counter medicine are all 
deemed to be acts of terrorism. This has led to chaoƟ cally terming a series of acts 
of violence as “terrorism”. Almost every parƟ cularly detestable act of violence, 
seen as an act against society, is oŌ en labeled as “terrorism”.3
1 A. Ciupiński, M. Zając (red.), Wybrane problemy walki z terroryzmem międzynarodo-
wym, AON, Warszawa 2003, p. 9.
2 Z. Cesarz, E. Stadtmüller, Problemy polityczne współczesnego świata, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1996, p. 351.
3 B. Hoﬀ man, Oblicza terroryzmu, wyd. Grupa Wydawnicza Bertelsmann Media, War-
szawa 2001, p. 11.
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The term terrorism was fi rst used during the 3rd Conference for the Unifi ca-
Ɵ on of Criminal Law held in Brussels in 1930, where a text concerning terrorism 
composed of fi ve arƟ cles was accepted.4
The New Encyclopedia Britannica defi nes terrorism as the “systemaƟ c use of 
terror or unpredictable violence against governments, publics, or individuals to 
aƩ ain a poliƟ cal objecƟ ve”.5
According to the United States Department of Defense, terrorism is the “pre-
meditated use of violence or threat of violence to insƟ ll fear and coerce govern-
ments or socieƟ es moƟ vated by religious, poliƟ cal, or other ideological beliefs”.6
The United NaƟ on’s Encyclopedia7 terms terrorism as the use of violence in 
internaƟ onal relaƟ ons for poliƟ cal or economic objecƟ ves, including the use of 
forced intervenƟ on carried out by special units of the police force, military units 
or terrorist organizaƟ ons. 
The New PWN Encyclopedia defi nes terrorism as various, ideologically mo-
Ɵ vated, planned and organized acƟ viƟ es undertaken by individuals or groups, 
which disrupt legal order, carried out to coerce government oﬃ  cials and so-
cieƟ es to act in a certain way, which oŌ en disrupt the rights of third parƟ es; 
these acƟ viƟ es are carried out with full severity with the use of various means 
(psychological pressure, physical violence, the use of weapons or explosives), in 
condiƟ ons of resolutely established publicity, and purposefully deepened social 
fear. 
Terror, on the other hand, is use of strength and violence of “stronger” gov-
ernment bodies against “weaker” ciƟ zens; in contrast to terrorism, which in-
volves use of strength and violence undertaken by the “weaker” ciƟ zens against 
“stronger” government bodies.8
According to Indecki, an act of terror is the behavior of individuals or groups 
of individuals that takes the form of violence (or threat of violence). An act of 
terror diﬀ ers from terrorism as terrorism is based on a strategy and tacƟ cs linked 
with predefi ned objecƟ ves, where acts of violence are seen as the only eﬀ ecƟ ve 
way and means of aƩ aining the objecƟ ve. Terrorism thus involves a unique strat-
egy and tacƟ cs in which acts of violence – while most important – are nonethe-
less linked with other acƟ ons (e.g. propaganda of slogans). An act of terror – is 
a manner of operaƟ ng with the use of specifi c and dangerous means. 
There is a signifi cant diﬀ erence between the terms terror, terrorism and acts 
of terror, regarding more than quanƟ ty, as terrorism is not a simple “mulƟ plic-
ity” of acts of terror. An act of terror can, but does not have to, be a “link of 
4 M. Zając, Międzynarodowa współpraca Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w walce z terrory-
zmem, rozprawa doktorska, AON, Warszawa 2004, p. 21.
5 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ediƟ on, volume 11, p. 650.
6 J. Pawłowski (red.), Terroryzm we współczesnym świecie, wyd. Biblioteczka Wojska 
i wychowania, Warszawa 2001, p.11.
7 Z. Domarańczyk, Terroryzm, wyd. MAW, Warszawa 1979, p. 47.
8 Nowa Encyklopedia PWN, wyd. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Tom 6, p. 370.
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terrorism”, although in both cases the objecƟ ve is to elicit fright, danger or fear in 
another person, group of persons or an enƟ re society.9
Criminal terror is the use of physical violence or an aƩ empt of its use and 
eliciƟ ng a state of fear in order to elicit a specifi c behavior in a group of persons 
or groups of persons, undertaken for profi t or strictly criminal moƟ ves. The use 
of physical force, violence or intenƟ on of their use takes the form of a violent at-
tack on a person’s rights or property, or even the rights or property of an enƟ re 
social group. 
The Europe ConvenƟ on on the PrevenƟ on of Terrorism established the term 
criminal terrorism, which can be defi ned as acts which are criminal in nature, car-
ried for nonpoliƟ cal reasons, being the subject of internal law.10
The defi niƟ on of the term quoted below is an approach proposed by Czesław 
Drycza: “Terrorism is a historically shaped (in forms of acƟ vity) phenomenon with 
poliƟ cal-ideological-religious foundaƟ ons, comprising a group of lawless acƟ ons, 
planned and carried out by individual persons or organized groups, which target 
authoriƟ es (naƟ onal, social, and lately military), for poliƟ cal, economic or other 
reasons, characterized by ruthlessness, cruelty, great publicity and which enƟ ce 
social fear and anxiety”.11
It is without doubt that terrorism is of a criminal nature, a method to aƩ ain 
predefi ned objecƟ ves, the outcome of: a concept, preparaƟ on and an aƩ ack. It 
involves the threat of violence or a causal act undertaken to destabilize life, as 
well as to undermine social order and harmony, an aƩ ack carried out on individu-
als or groups.12
We should keep in mind one obvious maƩ er, but not perceived by everyone: 
that terrorism as a form of baƩ le is a method for which various executers reach: 
representaƟ ves of criminal circles, extremists moƟ vated by various social prob-
lems (ecological or pro-life/pro-choice acƟ vists), parƟ cipants of ethnic confl icts 
or tradiƟ onal poliƟ cal skirmishes, as well as those who rise against authority.13
The above views presented by various authors on the essence of terror and 
terrorism do not oﬀ er an unequivocal defi niƟ on, and cannot oﬀ er one – as there 
are various criteria according to which deeds are defi ned as terror or terrorism; 
this is the outcome of various legal sources or historical condiƟ ons. Yet an analy-
sis of these views allows us to specify a few shared elements. The element linking 
terror and terrorism is the form of acƟ on – violence or the threat of violence. 
Violence is the manner through which terror is made a reality, created. This type 
9 K. Indecki, Prawo karne wobec terroryzmu i aktu terrorystycznego, wyd. Wydawnic-
two Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 1998, p. 18.
10 P. Rakowski, „Przeciw Terroryzmowi”, Prawo i Życie nr 11/99, p. 55.
11 C. Drycz, Terroryzm początku XXI wieku jako zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa międzynaro-
dowego i narodowego, Wydawnictwo MW, Gdynia 2005, p. 14.
12 Por: M. Sraga, „Choroby XXI wieku – bioterroryzm” [in:] Edukacja dla Bezpieczeństwa, 
Biblioteczka Edukacji Obronnej t. III, red. S. Mazur, wyd. AWF, Katowice 2006, p. 157.
13 K. Wolak, Od blokad ulicznych do Word Trade Center – Psychologiczne aspekty działań 
terrorystycznych, wyd. Wydawnictwo Secretum, Toruń 2002, ps. 41.
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of violence is an element of terrorism, and furthermore characterizes the specifi c 
objecƟ ve of the acƟ vity and its object (vicƟ m).14
Despite many aƩ empts to defi ne the phenomenon of terrorism and the di-
versity of methodological approaches, there is no universally accepted defi ni-
Ɵ on with a global range. The standpoint of the UN, NATO and EU are also uncer-
tain.15
The decision to call a person or organizaƟ on terrorist is a subjecƟ ve decision, 
and largely depends on whether we sympathize with a given person (group) or 
cause, or if we are against it. 
Terrorists intenƟ onally use military terminology. They consciously portray 
themselves as warriors (for freedom), or even soldiers, who – if caught – have 
the right to be treated as war prisoners, and not like common criminals in normal 
courts. Terrorist believe that due to their small numbers, limited fi repower and 
scarce supplies – when compared with the large defense and safety apparatus 
used by naƟ ons – they have no choice but to act in secrecy, and step out from 
the shadows to carry out drasƟ c (oŌ en bloody or destrucƟ ve) acts of violence 
and then protect themselves by fl eeing, in order to draw aƩ enƟ on to themselves 
and their cause, to publicize the maƩ er. In their opinion a bomb in a trash can is 
simply the equivalent of an air raid for the poverty stricken, the only way in which 
a terrorist can challenge a country which had much more power, and draw its 
aƩ enƟ on.16
Apart from diﬃ  culƟ es in defi ning the phenomenon itself, the typology of ter-
rorist organizaƟ on also gives rise to many controversies. The most common clas-
sifi caƟ on is to cluster groups according to their ideological aﬃ  liaƟ ons: this is why 
there is talk about right-wing and leŌ -wing terrorism (oŌ en called the far-leŌ ), 
oŌ en publicized as “black” and “red” terrorism.17 If we follow this line of thought 
we can diﬀ erenƟ ate Marxist, anarchist, Maoist, Trotskyist, naƟ onalist and fascist 
organizaƟ ons. This typology does not exhaust all tendencies; further diﬀ erenƟ a-
Ɵ ons are added to those above, based on the objecƟ ons individual groups fi ght 
for, e.g. separaƟ st movements, internaƟ onalist or revoluƟ onary. At Ɵ mes typol-
ogy is based on geographical locaƟ on where groups are acƟ ve: this is why there 
is talk about LaƟ n American terrorism, Western European terrorism or terrorism 
of the Near East. Religion might be yet another criterion: the IRA is idenƟ fi ed as 
a Catholic group, the Jihad – Islamic.18
14 A. Mroczek, „Co różni terror i terroryzm”, Gazeta Samorządu i Administracji Nr 10/2004, 
p. 60.
15 M. Zając, Międzynarodowa współpraca Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w walce z terrory-
zmem, Rozprawa doktorska, AON, Warszawa 2004, p. 39.
16 Ibidem, p. 28.
17 M. Sraga, Zagrożenia terroryzmu jako bariera w rozwoju turystyki międzynarodowej 
[in:] Turystyka w Polsce w warunkach integracji europejskiej i globalizacji rynku świa-
towego, red. I. Jędrzejczak i W. Mynarskiego, wyd. AWF, Katowice 2003, p. 67. 
18 A. Głodowski (red.), Encyklopedia terroryzmu, wyd. Spar, Warszawa 1995, p. 13.
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Paul Wilkinson presents an interesƟ ng typology of terrorism in his book en-
Ɵ tled Terrorism and the Liberal State. Wilkinson lists four basic trends of contem-
porary terrorism, with diﬀ erent objecƟ ves and characterisƟ cs: 
1) SubrevoluƟ onary terrorism. 
This aims to obtain certain poliƟ cal goals (e.g. changes in poliƟ cs, law), which 
are not revoluƟ onary (systemic) changes. Acts of violence are carried out by small 
groups (at Ɵ mes even by individual endeavors) in a highly unforeseeable manner 
and are oŌ en diﬃ  cult to diﬀ erenƟ ate from psychopathological and criminal ac-
Ɵ viƟ es with the use of force.
2) RevoluƟ onary terrorism.
A revoluƟ on or tacƟ cal victories in a revoluƟ onary fi ght are the aims of revo-
luƟ onary terrorism. Acts of violence are carried out by groups with leaders and 
an ideology or program (oŌ en a poliƟ cally “immature” program), which makes 
these groups in a way similar to parƟ san groups in the light of internaƟ onal law. 
These are usually special, conspiracy-laden, paramilitary groups created within 
a revoluƟ onary movement. Apart from armed baƩ les, the groups conduct poliƟ -
cal baƩ les – creaƟ ng alternaƟ ve insƟ tuƟ onal structures. 
3) Repressive terrorism.
Undertaken to “repress rebellions or keep groups, individual ciƟ zens or forms 
of behavior seen as undesirable by the repressor in check, or to only oppress cho-
sen movements into liquidaƟ on”. This form of terrorism – according to Wilkinson 
– is “oŌ en very bloody, permeaƟ ng into mass terror. A special terror apparatus is 
formed, a secret police, which performs these tasks, although oŌ en they are car-
ried out by other government bodies (i.e. the ruling party and the army). Torture 
is its primary technique. In totalitarian and ideological regimes terror, fear and 
mutual suspicion can be omnipresent and resulƟ ng from the paranoia of those 
in command”.19
4) Epiphenomenal terrorism. 
“Characterized by a lack of clearly specifi ed objecƟ ves, it is the element of 
acts of violence conducted on a mass scale. Acts of violence are incidental, not 
thought-through and unplanned, appear in the context of very bloody baƩ le, 
where systemaƟ c terrorism may be an accompanying element”.20
Illegal terrorism (not carried out by the state), is linked with the aforemen-
? oned trends and can be classifi ed as: 
• Far-right terrorism (neo-fascist, racial, chauvinist),
• Far-leŌ  terrorism (neo-anarchist, anarchisƟ c),
• NaƟ onal independence movement terrorism (PalesƟ nian, Basque, Iranian, 
Moluccan),
• Terrorism with other ideological and poliƟ cal foundaƟ ons (e.g. ArgenƟ nian 
Monteneros, Muslin or Iranian groups, etc.).21
19 Ibidem.
20 Ibidem.
21 J. Pawłowski (red.), Terroryzm we współczesnym świecie, wyd. Biblioteczka Wojska i 
Wychowania, Warszawa 2001, p. 15.
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Program-related ambiguity, various reasons for which groups of people revert 
to violence as well as mulƟ plicity of locaƟ ons makes it impossible to present an 
unequivocal classifi caƟ on of contemporary terrorism (literature on the subject 
contains various classifi caƟ ons). This is also due to the fact that groups that use 
terrorist methods oŌ en undergo a metamorphosis during the period they are ac-
Ɵ ve, e.g. from Marxism to anarchism to common criminal acƟ vity. 
According to Bruce Hoﬀ man there are four types of terrorism: 
• Ethnic-naƟ onalist and separaƟ st. In 1945 terrorism moƟ vated by ethnical and 
naƟ onalist as well as separaƟ st aspiraƟ ons became a global phenomenon. 
Ethnic and naƟ onalist uprisings that developed aŌ er World War II had a last-
ing impact on future terrorist campaigns. It was during these post-war cam-
paigns that the advantages of publicity and the necessity to direct acts of 
violence with an audience in mind were fi rst perceived. 
The aim of separaƟ st terrorism is to cause separaƟ on, or succession, in other 
words separaƟ on from a country that terrorists rise against and the formaƟ on of 
their own country or joining a neighboring country (IRA, Basque ETA, Canadian 
FLQ, Sikh terrorism, Kurdish, Tamil).22
• Religious. Terrorism and religion share a long common history, yet in the past 
century this phenomenon was overshadowed by terrorism moƟ vated by 
ethnic-naƟ onalist, separaƟ st or ideological objecƟ ves. The onset of contem-
porary religious terrorism was at fi rst strictly linked with the Islamic revolu-
Ɵ on in Iran, yet a decade later no major religion could deem itself inoculated 
against the explosive mixture of faith, fanaƟ cism and violence. An interesƟ ng 
fact is that along with the increase of religious terrorism formaƟ ons, there 
was a clear decrease of ethnic-naƟ onalist and separaƟ st groups.23
The reasons behind the increased number of vicƟ ms of terrorist aƩ acks car-
ried out for religious reasons can be sought in the diﬀ erent system of values, 
diﬀ erent mechanisms of legiƟ mizaƟ on and validaƟ on, diﬀ erent concepts of mo-
rality and world outlooks of religious terrorist. For a religious terrorist violence 
is fi rst and foremost a sacral act, the fulfi llment of an obligaƟ on rooted in divine 
orders, a direct answer to a theological imperaƟ ve or command. Terrorism thus 
assumes a transcendental level; those who commit crimes are not limited by 
poliƟ cs, morality or pracƟ cality that might aﬀ ect the members of other groups. 
Religious terrorists are simultaneously acƟ vists engaged in baƩ le – which they 
view as the ulƟ mate war.24
• Sponsored by the state. In the second half of the 20th century certain coun-
tries began uƟ lizing terrorist organizaƟ ons for their own objecƟ ves. In certain 
cases countries even formed “marioneƩ e” terrorist groups whose task was 
to act in the name of the sponsoring country in order to assist in its interests 
22 B. Hoﬀ man, Oblicza terroryzmu, wyd. Grupa Wydawnicza Bertelsmann Media, War-
szawa 2001, p. 43 and 62.
23 Ibidem, pgs. 86–87.
24 Ibidem, pgs. 90–91.
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and represent it on a regional or local front. In other cases countries sponsor 
exisƟ ng terrorist organizaƟ on for mutual benefi ts.
Patron countries oﬀ er the organizaƟ on poliƟ cal support, fi nancial assistance 
as well as any other assistance necessary to carry out objecƟ ves. In exchange 
they uƟ lize the organizaƟ on to carry out terrorist aƩ acks in order to spread their 
ideology throughout the world. Sponsored terrorism can help a country achieve 
certain strategic objecƟ ves where convenƟ onal means would not be advisable, 
possible or eﬀ ecƟ ve. High costs of modern warfare and fear of escalated violence 
in case of defeat as well as reluctance to play an aggressor before the world make 
terrorism an eﬀ ecƟ ve, convenient and discreet tool in the baƩ le for a country’s 
interests in the internaƟ onal arena.25
Another method of disƟ nguishing various types of terrorism is a classifi caƟ on 
of trends: 
• AnarchisƟ c-far leŌ : Red Brigades (Italy), Red Army FacƟ on (Germany), AcƟ on 
Directe (France); 
• SeparaƟ st-naƟ onalist: IRA (Ulster), ETA (Spain);
• Communism extremists: Tupamaros NaƟ onal LiberaƟ on Movement (Uru-
guay), People’s RevoluƟ onary Army (ArgenƟ na), Japanese Red Army;
• NaƟ onal independence movements: Black September, Popular Front for the 
LiberaƟ on of PalesƟ ne;
• Neo-fascist: New Order (Spain);
• Far-right: Ulster Defense AssociaƟ on – UDA and Ulster Volunteer Force – 
UVF;
• Religious: Islamic fundamentalists, e.g. Hamas (Gaza Strip), the Buddhist sect 
– AumShinrikyo.26
Increasingly prevalent acts of terror have mobilized democraƟ c countries to 
take countermeasures. Countries have been changing their regulaƟ ons – within 
their local jurisdicƟ on – and forming new organizaƟ ons. Yet in the Ɵ mes of “new 
terrorism”, supranaƟ onal associaƟ ons in the network, the world was forced to 
cooperate. Terrorists can be “outrun” only via a quick exchange of informaƟ on. 
CooperaƟ on is also required in the fi elds of law and technology exchange. This 
is why government agencies have been cooperaƟ ng to create a common law for 
all countries that want to join the baƩ le against terrorism. Only by counteracƟ ng 
terrorism in a structural manner can their acƟ viƟ es be restricted. 
The elaborated model for counteracƟ ng internaƟ onal terrorism mainly sets 
the responsibility for signatory countries to accept the conducts described herein 
as criminal acƟ viƟ es in the light of naƟ onal law. 
The UN convenƟ on on prevenƟ ng and prosecuƟ ng crimes against humanity 
categorically forbids countries, groups and individuals to kill, persecute, physically 
or psychologically maltreat any individuals for naƟ onal, racial, ethnical or religious 
25 R.M. Barnas, Terroryzm – od Assasynów do Osamy bin Ladena, wyd. KIRKE, Wrocław 
2001, p. 18.
26 Ibidem, p. 18, ed. M. Bieniek, S. Mazur, System zarządzania kryzysowego Rzeczypospo-
litej Polskiej, AWF, Katowice 2009, wyd. II p. 22
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reasons.27 In addiƟ on the UN DeclaraƟ on on internaƟ onal law principles includes 
a regulaƟ on that calls on countries to refrain from “organizing, aiding or assisƟ ng 
confl icts and terrorist acƟ viƟ es within the territory of other countries”.28
InterpretaƟ on of the above documents in the context of counteracƟ ng ter-
rorism is not clear. Many poliƟ cians believe that the UN sancƟ ons all acƟ viƟ es 
undertaken in the name of naƟ onal independence as well as providing outside 
assistance in baƩ les. The case of Israel seems to confi rm this – as a member of 
the UN, Israel is guaranteed the right to territorial sovereignty and defense of 
sovereignty. Some member countries believe that they have the right to arm and 
support groups that seek to destroy Israel, since they see them as fi ghƟ ng in the 
name of naƟ onal independence. These uncertainƟ es are refl ected in the UN’s 
undecided stance on counteracƟ ng terrorism. The dissonance in the UN mem-
bers’ structure and views became apparent aŌ er the massacre that took place 
during the Olympic Games in Munich in 1971. The then Secretary-General of the 
UN, Kurt Waldheim, demanded that the UN stand in opposiƟ on to the threat of 
global terrorism. His speech created a discussion that revealed discord between 
member countries – some of which demanded condemnaƟ on of terrorism and 
counteracƟ ons, whilst others wanted to view it as a jusƟ fi ed baƩ le in special cir-
cumstances.29
Further documents passed by the UN include: 
– The Hague ConvenƟ on of 1970, which obligates signing parƟ es to extradite 
anyone who seizes an aircraŌ  (extradiƟ on to their country of origin or provide 
a trial in accordance with the jurisdicƟ on of that country),30
– The Montreal ConvenƟ on of 1971, which extends internaƟ onal law to cover 
acts of sabotage or aƩ acks on airports and aircraŌ s not in fl ight (security of 
civil aircraŌ s),31
– The Tokyo ConvenƟ on of 1963 concerning crimes and acts commiƩ ed on 
board ships (counteracƟ on of sea piracy),
– The New York ConvenƟ on of 1973 and 1979 concerning aƩ acks against the 
life, health and freedom of those under internaƟ onal protecƟ on (heads of 
state, diplomats and their families) as well as the headquarters and means of 
transportaƟ on used by these individuals,
– The ConvenƟ on on the prevenƟ on of terrorism signed in Strasbourg in 1976,
– The Agreement concerning the implementaƟ on of the European ConvenƟ on 
on prevenƟ ng terrorism signed in Dublin in 1979,
27 W. Skrzydło (red.), Almanach Wiedzy Powszechnej 1996/97,wyd. Skrzydła, Warszawa 
1996, p. 853.
28 DeclaraƟ on on Principles of InternaƟ onal Law approved by the UN General Assembly 
on the 24th of October 1970. Encyklopedia terroryzmu, op. cit., p. 661.
29 Ibidem, p. 663.
30 Por.: Z. Galicki, Terroryzm lotniczy w świetle prawa międzynarodowego, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1981, p. 123.
31 Encyklopedia terroryzmu, op. cit., p. 664. 
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– The ConvenƟ on concerning physically protecƟ ng nuclear materials from 
1980, signed by the InternaƟ onal Atomic Energy Agency.32
There are also several resoluƟ ons on the topic issued by the United NaƟ ons 
General Assembly.
InternaƟ onal law has developed a model for prevenƟ ng internaƟ onal terror-
ism based on universal repression and which assumes that countries have an 
obligaƟ on to cooperate to fully realize prevenƟ on goals. The principle however 
has many excepƟ ons, for various – including poliƟ cal reasons.
The model for prevenƟ ng internaƟ onal terrorism presupposes fi rst and fore-
most that its signatories will assess deeds covered by convenƟ ons as crimes in 
the light of their domesƟ c law. The types of acƟ viƟ es listed in convenƟ ons are 
felonies in the legislature of signatory states. Regardless whether domesƟ c crimi-
nal codes included such categories of felony as terrorism, seizing an aircraŌ  or 
taking hostages, these deeds are listed in convenƟ ons and are have the status of 
universal felonies such as: murder, grievous bodily harm, unlawful imprisonment, 
public endangerment. This is why those who commit terrorism can be punished 
based on domesƟ c law. This was the case during a terrorist aƩ ack on the Pol-
ish Embassy in Berlin in 1982 – the perpetrators were punished based on Swiss 
regulaƟ ons and the deed was assessed as: breach of the peace, unlawful impris-
onment, use of threats, extorƟ on, destrucƟ on of property, use of violence and 
threats against the government and government oﬃ  cials, use of repression as 
well as violaƟ on of stay and seƩ lement of foreigners’ regulaƟ ons.33
The above convenƟ ons obligate signatory states to behave in a predefi ned 
manner:
– “They establish the obligaƟ on for signatory countries to take all necessary 
means to establish their own laws regarding all acts listed in convenƟ ons if 
commiƩ ed on their territory, on board a ship or an aircraŌ  registered in their 
country, by a ciƟ zen of the country or a person whose place of residence is 
within the signing party’s country, and the perpetrator commiƩ ed his act to 
force the signatory state to behave in a certain way;
– Signatory states are permiƩ ed to establish their own jurisdicƟ on in all other 
cases, if the perpetrator resides within their territory;
– Signatory states are permiƩ ed to confi ne the perpetrator for the period nec-
essary to conduct a criminal proceeding concerning the deed or an extradi-
Ɵ on;
– Countries are also obligated to exchange informaƟ on in the case of acts of 
terrorism, acƟ ons undertaken to commit acts of terrorism, and to provide 
mutual legal assistance. Such informaƟ on can be provided directly to an in-
terested state or through the UN Secretary General”.34
32 Leksykon politologii, op. cit., p. 430; por: T. Aleksandrowicz, Terroryzm międzynarodo-
wy, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2008, op. cit., p. 85. 
33 T. Aleksandrowicz, Terroryzm międzynarodowy, op. cit., p. 108.
34 Ibidem, p. 109.
Sławomir Mazur154
The internaƟ onal, legal model of prevenƟ ng terrorism is based on the recog-
niƟ on of fi ve autpunireautdedere principles, or precisely: autdedereauƟ udicare.35 
RecogniƟ on of this formula is a compromise between the concept of uncondi-
Ɵ onal extradiƟ on of those who have commiƩ ed acts of terrorism and leƫ  ng the 
country where the perpetrator is found decide about his fate. 
The increased signifi cance of terrorism has brought along changes in con-
cepts concerning its prevenƟ on. IniƟ ally, the police and protecƟ on services were 
responsible for counteracƟ ng terrorism; currently it is the task of the secret po-
lice and special operaƟ ons forces. Every exisƟ ng country has to be “on its toes” 
and look aŌ er its territory, as it is impossible to foresee where and when the next 
terrorist aƩ ack will take place. In order to prevent terrorism, Special Forces and 
police various countries must exchange informaƟ on and experiences via various 
channels, such as Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence InternaƟ onal 
(TREVI), EU organizaƟ ons, the Interpol, Europol, UN, NATO, the OrganizaƟ on for 
Security and Co-operaƟ on in Europe (OSCE) or other shared sources. 
In Poland, terrorism is prevented mainly due to the eﬀ orts of the Internal 
Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego – ABW) and the police. 
In various cases, depending on the type of threat, other enƟ Ɵ es may assist in pro-
ceedings, including: the Coast Guard, the NaƟ onal Fire Service, privately owned 
security agencies as well as the Armed Forces and medical services. 
It should be underlined that Polish legislature had not possessed a formal 
defi niƟ on of an act of terror or terrorist crime unƟ l the year 2004. Of course any 
criminal acƟ viƟ es, defi ned in the UN’s convenƟ ons, were punished. Every perpe-
trator faced consequences foreseen by Polish law. 
The term terrorism or crime of terrorism funcƟ oned in the Polish legal system 
only in acts that were not included in legal codes. One of these acts was the Act 
on the Internal Security Agency and Intelligence Agency. It included the tasks of 
the Internal Security Agency. These included the idenƟ fi caƟ on and prevenƟ on as 
well as detecƟ on of terrorism. The Intelligence Agency was to idenƟ fy interna-
Ɵ onal terrorism, in accordance with regulaƟ ons. The term terrorism was defi ned 
for the fi rst Ɵ me in the Polish legal system in the Act on CounteracƟ ng the Intro-
ducƟ on to the Financial CirculaƟ on of Financial Assets OriginaƟ ng from Illegal 
or Undisclosed Sources and CounteracƟ ng Financing Terrorism.36 The regulaƟ ons 
therein indicated that an act of terrorism is a crime commiƩ ed against public 
safety as well as an assault on the head of state. In addiƟ on, an assault on the 
head of any country commiƩ ed within the territory of the Republic of Poland is 
also considered an act of terrorism. When following the above statements we 
must indicate that the defi niƟ on can only assist in outlining the enƟ rety of the 
term “crime of terrorism”.37
35 Ibidem.
36 Act on CounteracƟ ng the IntroducƟ on to the Financial CirculaƟ on of Financial Assets 
OriginaƟ ng from Illegal or Undisclosed Sources and CounteracƟ ng Financing Terrorism 
from the 16th of November 2000 (Polish Journal of Laws 2003, no. 153, item 1505 as 
amended).
37 K. Skowroński, Operacyjna kontrola rozmów telefonicznych. Ustawowa treść, a prak-
tyczne oblicze „legalnej inwigilacji” [in:] P. Chrzczonowicz, V. Kwiatkowska, K. Skow-
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A formal defi niƟ on of crime of terrorism was added to the criminal code aŌ er 
its novelizaƟ on in 2004. The changes were in a way brought on by the necessity 
to adjust Polish law to the European Union’s legal norms. In this case the adjust-
ment was to select the same soluƟ on as in the Framework Decision from the 13th 
of June 2002, which pertained to the case of counteracƟ ng terrorism.38
According to the codifi ed soluƟ ons, a crime of terrorism is an act prohibited 
by law, punishable by imprisonment for a period of at least fi ve years, and which 
was commiƩ ed with the objecƟ ve of: “gravely inƟ midaƟ ng many persons; coerc-
ing the Republic of Poland’s government organs or the organs of any other coun-
try or internaƟ onal organizaƟ on to undertake or disconƟ nue an acƟ vity; insƟ ll-
ing serious disrupƟ ons in the Republic of Poland’s government or economy, the 
government or economy of any other country or internaƟ onal organizaƟ on – as 
well as threats to commit these acts”. Signifi cantly, the crime described above 
has the status of delictum commune (common criminal oﬀ ence). The object of 
protecƟ on, however, was very broadly defi ned, i.e. it encompasses prohibited 
acts which violate various rights – including peace or freedom. We should also 
menƟ on that the subject of the act can be a vast number of persons, govern-
ment insƟ tuƟ ons (of the Republic of Poland or any other country), as well as 
internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons. The subject can also be Poland’s economy or regime 
as well as the economies and regimes of other countries and internaƟ onal orga-
nizaƟ ons.39
In the case of the crime being discussed, it is signifi cant that it can only be 
commiƩ ed with direct intent. In other words, the act can only be commiƩ ed if 
the perpetrator wants to commit the prohibited act and undertakes acƟ ons with 
an adequate mindset. The crime we are speaking of is a goal-oriented crime. 
Apart from the goal orientaƟ on, we should also menƟ on the fact that it is an 
oﬀ ence with criminal consequences; the statutory condiƟ ons of the crime have 
been termed in a very general manner: “This is due to the fact that crimes of 
terrorism actually encompass an enƟ re group of other crimes, varying from their 
usual manifestaƟ ons due to the terrorism-related objecƟ ves of the perpetrator. 
The causaƟ ve act involves fulfi lling one or more of three objecƟ ves of terrorism, 
and is a prohibited act punishable with imprisonment for a period of not less than 
fi ve years”.40
We need to keep in mind the fact that Poland, which includes the country’s 
legal regulaƟ ons, is sƟ ll establishing a system on prevenƟ ng and counteracƟ ng 
terrorism-related phenomena. We can assume that individual forces and services 
are currently funcƟ oning properly. Yet the country must create a system of mutu-
al connecƟ ons in which the fi ght against terrorism can be conducted with greater 
eﬃ  ciency. The proper coordinaƟ on is of focal importance. The direcƟ on chosen 
roński (red.), Społeczeństwo inwigilowane w państwie prawa, materiały z konferencji 
naukowej, Toruń, 25–27 marca 2003, p. 160.
38 J. Barcik, Akt terrorystyczny i jego sprawce w świetle prawa międzynarodowego i we-
wnętrznego, Warszawa 2004, p. 101.
39 Ibidem, pgs. 118–120.
40 Ibidem. 
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by Poland seems to be an adequate one, which is confi rmed by the words of EU 
mission evaluators who visited Poland in 2004. According to their opinion Poland 
has all insƟ tuƟ ons and forces necessary to prevent terrorism, as it has introduced 
the proper legal regulaƟ ons. All these organs are eﬃ  cient enough and well orga-
nized within their own structures. Yet “domesƟ c analyses show lack of coordina-
Ɵ on and cooperaƟ on on the naƟ on’s strategic level. Terrorism as a phenomenon 
is perceived and treated in Poland on an insƟ tuƟ onal level, or a ministerial level, 
but not beyond the ministerial level and not on a scale encompassing the enƟ re 
country (…). A well-constructed system of counteracƟ ng terrorism must uƟ lize all 
the resources that a country has available. In order to do this, however, the coun-
try must unequivocally establish: a. The scope of responsibiliƟ es of individual 
forces and services; b. The “leaders” of individual consƟ tuents of counteracƟ ng 
terrorism; c. Principles of cooperaƟ on and rank; d. Financing special operaƟ ons; 
e. Unifi ed representaƟ on on the internaƟ onal arena in order to coordinate train-
ing and parƟ cipaƟ on in operaƟ ons, etc.; an insƟ tuƟ on that would handle the co-
ordinaƟ on on a general level”.41
Here we should menƟ on aƩ empts to create the organs described above, 
which would coordinate the work of enƟ Ɵ es responsible for counteracƟ ng terror-
ism. The fi rst is the Center for CounteracƟ ng Organized Crime and InternaƟ onal 
Terrorism (Międzyresortowe Centrum ds. Zwalczania Przestępczości Zorganizow-
anej i Międzynarodowego Terroryzmu). This insƟ tuƟ on assists the Prime Minister 
of the Republic of Poland. It was formed when RegulaƟ on No. 54 issued by the 
Prime Minster on the 30th of April 2002 entered into force; the regulaƟ on con-
cerned creaƟ ng the enƟ ty described above.
The Center’s acƟ viƟ es are administered by the Minister of the Interior and 
AdministraƟ on, as well as the Minster of Finances, the Minster of NaƟ onal De-
fense and the Minster of Foreign Aﬀ airs. As required by Polish law, the Center has 
its own members. In accordance with regulaƟ ons these members are: the Head 
of the Internal Security Agency, the Head of the Intelligence Agency, the Head 
of the NaƟ onal Police Headquarters, the Head of the Polish Border Guard, the 
Head of the Military InformaƟ on Services, the Head of the Military Gendarmerie, 
the General Inspector of Financial InformaƟ on and the General Fiscal Control In-
spector. Generally speaking, the Center ensures cooperaƟ on between govern-
ment insƟ tuƟ ons and coordinates their acƟ viƟ es within the scope of prevenƟ ng, 
counteracƟ ng and detecƟ ng organized crime and terrorism on the internaƟ onal 
level. The Center also protects criƟ cal informaƟ on and coordinates cooperaƟ on 
between the insƟ tuƟ ons of various countries.
Another facility whose operaƟ ons encompass a broad fi eld in the fi ght against 
terrorism is the Counter-Terrorism Department (Wydział ds. Terroryzmu). The 
Department began its operaƟ ons of the 1st of June 2005. Its tasks include, inter 
alia, an analysis of terrorism as a phenomenon and tracking the phenomenon 
throughout the world (with special consideraƟ on for the situaƟ on in Poland), 
preparaƟ on and assessment of counter-terrorism projects, elaboraƟ on of new 
41 K. Kowalczyk, W. Wróblewski, Terroryzm. Globalne wyzwanie, Toruń 2006, p. 214. 
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legislaƟ ve soluƟ ons and ediƟ on of regulaƟ ons already funcƟ oning within the Pol-
ish legal system in order to improve the fi ght against terrorism and its conse-
quences. The Department began operaƟ ng in the Ministry of Interior Aﬀ airs and 
AdministraƟ on in the beginning of the year 2006, as part of the Department of 
Security and Public Order (Departament Bezpieczeństwa i Porządku Publicznego). 
We must emphasize that this Department operates both on the strategic and 
tacƟ cal levels. 
Yet another counter-terrorism insƟ tuƟ on is the Government InformaƟ on 
Centre (Wspólnota Informacyjna Rządu – WIR). It was created in 2002 and assists 
the Prime Minister. Its tasks include informaƟ on exchange, analysis as well as 
detecƟ on of potenƟ al terrorist threats. Various organs of public administraƟ on 
cooperate within the center and their mission is to increase exterior safety for 
Poland. The InformaƟ on Center is also concerned with internaƟ onal terrorism 
and organized crime. The Head of the Intelligence Agency presides over the In-
formaƟ on Center. 
We must also menƟ on the Collegium for Secret Services (Kolegium do Spraw 
Służb Specjalnych), which was formed in 2002. It operates based on the Inter-
nal Security Agency and Intelligence Agency Act. Its focal task is to assess the 
direcƟ ons and plans of secret services; assess proposed legal regulaƟ ons and 
government documents concerning the secret services and prepare assessment 
concerning the above issues. We should also menƟ on that the Team for the Rec-
ogniƟ on of PoliƟ cal Terrorism and CoordinaƟ on of OperaƟ ons (Zespół ds. Koor-
dynacji Działań Operacyjno-Rozpoznawczych w Zakresie Zwalczania Terroryzmu 
Politycznego) was formed on the basis of the Collegium.42
CounteracƟ ng terrorism, especially eﬀ ecƟ ve prevenƟ on, requires two basic 
elements. The fi rst element is the creaƟ on of a security system. This system must 
fulfi ll one basic condiƟ on – without which it cannot be eﬀ ecƟ ve. It must be her-
meƟ c enough so that the costs of breaching its security levels outweigh any ensu-
ing profi ts from an aƩ ack. However, the construcƟ on of such a system generates 
internal costs for the country. Every element of the system is an element of con-
trol, supervision, monitoring and inspecƟ on, as well as safety zones, limited ac-
cess zones, zones of special authorizaƟ on, etc. In short – every security element 
is an element that limits the personal freedom of its ciƟ zens, freedom according 
to today’s understanding of the term. We agree to go through a metal detector 
before boarding an airplane. We agree to reside in closed districts, protected by 
security agencies in order to be sure of our safety during the night. We allow the 
government to collect our personal data to decrease the risk that someone will 
use this data to commit a crime. We surrender more and more in order to feel 
safe in a world which is becoming increasingly dangerous. For these reasons ter-
rorism has also become a threat on the axiological level. How far can a country go 
in order to ensure safety and at the same Ɵ me ensure that the means uƟ lized to 
meet this end do not violate basic principles and rights of a country ruled by law? 
What competencies should we award the agencies and forces concerned with 
42 D. Szlachter, Walka z terroryzmem w UE, Toruń 2006, pgs. 210–212.
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naƟ onal security in order not to violate the limits of privacy of the country’s ciƟ -
zens? What means should we use against those who commit crimes of terrorism 
in order to prevent their operaƟ ons without violaƟ ng human rights, the right to 
a fair trial, the right of defense? When creaƟ ng a security system, a contemporary 
country searches for the greatly sensiƟ ve point of equilibrium between eﬃ  ciency 
and the rule of law. Finding this point is becoming increasingly diﬃ  cult as those 
who threaten order follow a decreasing number of rules.
The issue being discussed is not an interior issue. PracƟ cally all countries – 
members of an internaƟ onal society – must currently deal with terrorism. Due to 
its global nature, counteracƟ ng terrorism must be conducted on an internaƟ onal 
scale; thus the means uƟ lized by countries must be legiƟ mate on the level of the 
internaƟ onal legal order.
InternaƟ onal law, issues concerning legal capacity in internaƟ onal law, the 
dynamic nature of terrorism-related phenomena and the changes that this dy-
namism insƟ lls on the legal and security systems both on the domesƟ c and in-
ternaƟ onal levels increase the diﬃ  culty levels of construcƟ ng eﬀ ecƟ ve means of 
prevenƟ ng the threat of terrorism. In addiƟ on, we must always keep one fact in 
mind: it is impossible to implement a security system that would be one hundred 
percent foolproof. Every system is constructed by people and every system carries 
the risk of human error. Every system also carries the risk of being incapable of 
adjusƟ ng to changes dynamically enough, inadequate communicaƟ on and alerts 
that come too late. The only goal that can be achieved by the enƟ Ɵ es responsible 
for the safety of others is to maximize the eﬀ ecƟ veness and eﬃ  ciency of the 
means uƟ lized. This is the reason why we should think twice before protesƟ ng 
against new security methods and means: risk minimizaƟ on is the only thing we 
can count on. It would be a success if this minimizaƟ on of danger that we are 
striving to aƩ ain would guarantee an ad-hoc feeling of safety. 
Following the creaƟ on of a security system, the second, element of prevent-
ing terrorism in modern Ɵ mes is prevenƟ ng its sources. Common convicƟ ons 
concerning the sources of terrorism, drawn mainly from terrorist manifestos and 
declaraƟ ons of objecƟ ons, equate its sources with the contemporary world’s 
most signifi cant problems: hunger, poverty, social inequality and marginalizaƟ on. 
This presentaƟ on of sources is saturated with ideology: this is what the members, 
or rather the leaders, of terrorist organizaƟ ons wish to signify. Yet by invesƟ gaƟ ng 
the origins and resources of the leaders of these organizaƟ ons we can perceive 
that they do not suﬀ er from hunger or poverty. Organizing the acƟ viƟ es of terror-
ist organizaƟ ons requires vast amounts of funding and logisƟ cs. 
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Monika Ostrowska 
Cyber-Terrorism 
as the New Form of Threat 
in the Twenty-first Century
Computers and the Internet have become an indelible part of our everyday life. 
Used by individuals, as well as socieƟ es as a whole they allow the automizaƟ on 
of our acƟ viƟ es. The success of almost all fi elds of economics, parƟ cularly energy, 
transport, communicaƟ on, aspects of banking, computer networks, is closely de-
pendent on the bandwidth, the eﬃ  ciency and the reliability of these technolo-
gies. Damaging any element could cause paralysis of the enƟ re country. In the 
past an immediate aƩ ack on the infrastructure was possible in a direct way. With 
the development of communicaƟ on networks a new danger appeared, “cyber-
danger”. Today it is unnecessary to cross poliƟ cal borders in order to make a ter-
rorist aƩ ack. 
Furthermore, it is completely impossible to detect an aƩ ack using computer 
technology at the planning and preparaƟ on stage. A cyber-terrorist aƩ ack can be 
carried out in the space of minutes or seconds, and its eﬀ ects can be far more se-
rious than with the applicaƟ on of convenƟ onal weapons. Bearing in mind these 
dangers one should defi ne and judge threats resulƟ ng from the use of commu-
nicaƟ on networks and computers against some naƟ on or the government for 
poliƟ cal or ideological reasons. Paying aƩ enƟ on to news of the problem and the 
subsequent real danger is crucial. Apart from defi ning the actual noƟ on of cyber-
terrorism, this study will endeavor to ascertain what behaviour is probable in 
a poliƟ cally moƟ vated terrorist aƩ ack using computers and the Internet.1 
1 B. Hoﬀ man, Oblicza terroryzmu, Warszawa 1990, p. 27.
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Terrorism is a diﬃ  cult and ambiguous phenomenon as many diverse method-
ologies of defi ning it exist. AddiƟ onally, over a period of years its understanding 
underwent systemaƟ c changes and alteraƟ ons. The word ‘terrorism’ derives from 
the LaƟ n and it means fear, danger. There is no unambiguous descripƟ on of the 
nature of terrrorism, because currently in the world there are between 100 and 
200 defi niƟ ons of the word itself. The encyclopedia of the UN and internaƟ onal 
relaƟ ons determines the occurrence of terrorism as “applying violence for the 
achievement of the poliƟ cal or economic objecƟ ves in internaƟ onal relaƟ ons.”2 
The Federal Bureau of InvesƟ gaƟ on (FBI) regard as terrorism “unlawful use of 
force or violence towards persons or property with a view to inƟ midaƟ ng or co-
ercing the government, [the civilian populaƟ on,] or part thereof, in furtherance 
of poliƟ cal or social objecƟ ves”.3
Next the naƟ onal security thesuarus says that terrorism is “a form of violence 
consisƟ ng of the planned acƟ on of extorƟ ng or terrorizing governments or par-
Ɵ cular social groups for economic and other poliƟ cal objecƟ ves”.2 It is possible to 
noƟ ce that certain common factors appear in all defi niƟ ons of terrorism. They 
are applying violence and force, the poliƟ cal aspect of the act, evoking fear and 
threats as a key element of inƟ midaƟ on, the eﬀ ects and psychological reacƟ ons 
to the acƟ on carried out.
Terrorism has been the subject of UN debates for over a dozen years. Coun-
tries collaborated to develop 13 internaƟ onal convenƟ ons which refer to terror-
ism-related acƟ viƟ es. Member naƟ ons cooperated in the General Assembly to 
coordinate their anƟ terrorism eﬀ orts to an even greater degree. Work on new le-
gal norms is underway. Member countries also cooperated to defi ne terrorism. 
The League of NaƟ ons’ ConvenƟ on for the PrevenƟ on and Punishment of Ter-
rorism adopted in Geneva on the 16th of November 1937defi nes terrorism as: all 
criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state 
of terror in the minds of parƟ cular persons or a group or the general public.4 In 
1992 A. B. Schmidt, of the UN’s Criminal Department, suggested a defi niƟ on that 
is now used by all member naƟ ons. According to this defi niƟ on an act of terror-
ism is the peaceƟ me equivalent of a war crime.5
United NaƟ ons Security Council ResoluƟ on No. 1269 (issued in 1999) states: 
“We unequivocally condemn all acts, methods and pracƟ ces of terrorism as crim-
inal and unjusƟ fi able, regardless of their moƟ vaƟ on, in all their forms and mani-
festaƟ ons, wherever and by whomever commiƩ ed, in parƟ cular those which 
could threaten internaƟ onal peace and security”.6
Contemporary scholarship has introduced a disƟ ncƟ on between the terms 
terror and terrorism. Terror is understood as the acƟ viƟ es of a government 
2 Encyklopedia ONZ i stosunków międzynarodowych, Warszawa 1986, p. 513
3 Słownik terminów z zakresu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Warszawa 2002, p. 149.
4 J.W. Wójcik, Przeciwdziałanie fi nansowaniu terroryzmu, WoltersKluwer Polska, War-
szawa 2007, p. 31.
5 hƩ p://www.unic.un.org.pl/terroryzm, downloaded on the: 10.08.2010.
6 J.W. Wójcik, op. cit., p. 31.
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undertaken in order to remain in power. All other acƟ viƟ es, undertaken not by 
the government but by private individuals or groups of individuals, aiming to ex-
ert leverage on other individuals, the government or public opinion, as a form of 
rebellion of such individuals or groups against the social or legal order, is termed 
as terrorism. While terror is usually a way of remaining in power used by various 
tyrants or totalitarian governments, terrorism is aimed against those in power. 
Terror is thus violence employed by ruling parƟ es (government bodies) against 
the weak (the ciƟ zens), while terrorism is its opposite.7
We can thus state that terrorism is a strategy employed by poliƟ cally engaged 
individuals. It involves the use of elaborate measures against the personal and 
substanƟ al rights of others, in order to draw the public’s aƩ enƟ on to those com-
miƫ  ng acts of terrorism and their ideals. The aim of these acƟ viƟ es is to cause 
dread, so that others will feel forced to act in a way desired by terrorists.8
Yet another defi niƟ on describes terrorism as the planned, organized and 
usually ideologically substanƟ ated acƟ viƟ es of individuals or groups, the aim of 
which is to force state authoriƟ es to act in a desired way. These acƟ viƟ es are 
criminal in nature, undertaken to cause widespread and maximum fear among 
the public.9
Terrorism is defi ned in numerous ways in American and Western European 
literature. The Oxford DicƟ onary defi nes terrorism as a method of poliƟ cal hosƟ l-
ity involving selecƟ ve or comprehensive use of violence against opponents. It is 
present in the ideology and pracƟ ce of radical poliƟ cal and social movements. 
Unlike terror, the illegal use of violence by the government towards groups or 
individuals, terrorism is the weapon of the opposiƟ on, used by specialized groups 
linked with poliƟ cal parƟ es and movements. Their aim is to destabilize those in 
power and spread fear.10
Academic circles emphasize that terrorism is the ideological acƟ viƟ es of in-
dividuals and groups – variously moƟ vated – which upset the legal order. These 
acƟ viƟ es are undertaken to force authoriƟ es to act in a certain way or oﬀ er de-
sired benefi ts, infringing the rights of third parƟ es. These acƟ viƟ es are carried 
out ruthlessly with the help of various means (physical force, the use of weapons, 
explosives), in order to publicize the deeds and cause fear.11
The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st are a period of 
the sudden development of new computer technologies, computers and the In-
ternet. With the unchecked development of this medium, and the considerable 
degree to which it aﬀ ected modern society, there appeared new, so far unusual 
threats which in a signifi cant way can threaten the criƟ cal infrastructure of the 
7 Mały oksfordzki słownik historii świata w XX w., Puls, Londyn 1992, p. 592–593.
8 A. Pawłowski, Terroryzm w Europie XIX i XX wieku, WSP, Zielona Góra 1980, p. 9.
9 T. Hanausek, W sprawie pojęcia współczesnego terroryzmu, Prob. Krym., 1980, 
No. 143, p. 86.
10 Mały oksfordzki słownik historii świata, op. cit., p. 592–593.
11 S. Pikulski, Prawne środki zwalczania terroryzmu, Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski, 
Olsztyn 2000, p. 10.
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state. This progress spreads through change: technological, poliƟ cal, social and 
cultural. The progress in the global processes of the producƟ on, processing and 
the transmission of informaƟ on is one of the most important components of 
described changes. More and more states enjoy the benefi ts of this progress, 
including those which unƟ l now did not have access to the most modern devel-
opments from the fi eld of advanced technologies. This dependence on computer 
technology means that more and more states must deal with the growing threat 
of the new form of terrorism, namely cyber-terrorism.
They more and more oŌ en and more universally talk about danger of terror-
ist aƩ acks commiƩ ed with the help of computer systems and aimed at public 
health, security and the natural environment. Since there is this new phenom-
enon doubts and misunderstandings associated with defi ning cyber-terrorism 
have apppeared. Therefore in order to classify this phenomenon several defi ni-
Ɵ ons are needed. 
Cyber-terrorism “(…) these are a threat or an unlawful aƩ ack aimed at a com-
puter system or gathered data, with a view to inƟ midaƟ ng or extorƟ ng from the 
authoriƟ es of the state or its representaƟ ves concessions or expected behaviors, 
with a view to supporƟ ng defi ned objecƟ ves (e.g. poliƟ cal). For such acƟ on to 
be categorized as informaƟ on terrorism, the aƩ ack should cause heavy losses or 
such eﬀ ects which provoke a universal feeling of fear”.12
“(...) using computer networks as tools for the paralyzing or a major limitaƟ on 
of the possibility of eﬀ ecƟ ve use of naƟ onal structures (such as energeƟ cs, trans-
port, government insƟ tuƟ ons, etc.) or to inƟ midaƟ ng or forcing the government 
or the populaƟ on to act in a specifi ed way”.13
US NaƟ onal Infrastructure ProtecƟ on Centre: “(...) criminal act commiƩ ed 
with the help of computer and the IT, caused using force, damage and/or stop-
ping the supply of services for triggering fear, by creaƟ ng confusion or uncertain-
Ɵ es in the given populaƟ on, with a view to infl uencing governments or persons 
in order to use their reacƟ ons for achieving defi ned poliƟ cal, social or ideological 
objecƟ ves or the program propagated by the terrorists”.14
A defi niƟ on created by the American Federal Bureau of InvesƟ gaƟ on states 
that terrorism is the “premeditated, poliƟ cally moƟ vated aƩ ack against informa-
Ɵ on, computer systems, computer programs or data, of nonmilitary nature, un-
dertaken by supranaƟ onal or naƟ onal terrorist groups”.15
Professor M. PolliƩ  from George Washington University defi nes terrorism as 
the “covert, poliƟ cally moƟ vated aƩ ack against informaƟ on, computer systems, 
12 D. Denning, Cyber-terrorism, 2000 hƩ p://www.cs.georgetown.edu~denning/infosec/
cyberterror-GD.doc, 27.03.2004.
13 J.A. Lewis, Assessing the risk of cyber terrorism, cyber war and other cyber threats, 2002, 
Center for Strategic and InternaƟ onal Studies, hƩ p:// www.csis.org/tech/0211lewis.
pdf, 27.03.2004.
14 L. Garrison, M. Grand, Cyber-terrorism, 2001, An evolving concept, NIPC highlights, 
hƩ p://www.Nopc.gov./publicaƟ on/highlight/2001/highlight-01-06.htm, 04.04. 2004.
15 Ibidem, p. 10.
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computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant tar-
gets by sub naƟ onal groups or clandesƟ ne agents”.16
An analysis of the above defi niƟ ons allows us to idenƟ fy two main aspects. 
Defi niƟ ons created by J. Lewis and the US NaƟ onal Infrastructure ProtecƟ on 
Center focus on the fact that it is possible to use computer or informaƟ on and 
communicaƟ on systems to carry out a cyberneƟ c aƩ ack. Defi niƟ ons created by 
D. Denning, the FBI and M. PolliƩ  emphasize that computers and informaƟ on 
systems are the objecƟ ves of terrorist aƩ acks. The two diverse approaches to the 
discussed issue are the most important characterisƟ cs of the defi niƟ ons quoted. 
It is believed that for an aƩ ack to be classifi ed as an act of cyber-terrorism 
it must involve the use of an informaƟ on system or an electronic device. Cyber-
terrorism and cyber-aƩ ack are treated as interchangeable and equivalent terms. 
This leads to many misunderstandings.
D. Denning believes that a poliƟ cally moƟ vated cyber-aƩ ack, leading to the 
death of many people, casualƟ es or injuries, explosions or substanƟ al material 
losses is an example of cyber-terrorism. However an aƩ ack that only disrupts 
the economic or legal order or one that does not involve substanƟ al disrupƟ ons 
or losses cannot be classifi ed as a cyber-aƩ ack. Based on defi niƟ ons created by 
D. Denning, J. Lewis and M. PolliƩ , it can be assumed that we have not witnessed 
an act of cyber-terrorism thus far. Yet if we employ criteria of the US NaƟ onal In-
frastructure ProtecƟ on Centre, we can assume that a number of cyber-terrorism 
acts have taken place in the past. They were not, however, poliƟ cally moƟ vated, 
or moƟ vated in a way that would allow these acts to be classifi ed as acts of ter-
rorism. 
The frequency of terrorist aƩ acks in the past years has caused most experts 
to claim unanimously that these acts will create the biggest threat and challenge 
in the near future. Acts of terror can take various forms. UnƟ l they take place 
they are treated by society as poliƟ cal fi cƟ on. We can thus state that terrorism 
has reached such levels of irraƟ onality in the past years that it is hard to foresee 
which way it will evolve and what forms it will take. This is why despite the lack 
of past examples of cyber-aƩ acks we must be aware of the fact that it is a real 
threat. Below is an outline of criminal acƟ viƟ es which may be undertaken in cy-
berspace.17
Analyzing the above defi niƟ ons it is possible to assume that the use of a com-
puter system or some electronic device is necessary for classifying the aƩ ack as 
the cyber-terrorism. There is also another noƟ on oŌ en confused with cyber-ter-
rorism, namely the cyber-aƩ ack. A cyber-aƩ ack takes place, when informaƟ on, 
programs, computer systems or databases become the object of aƩ ack.18
16 M.M. PolliƩ , Cyber-terrorism – Fact or Fancy?, 2004, 10.06. 2011. hƩ p://www.
cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosechtml/polliƩ , 04.04. 2004.
17 B. Adkins, The spectrum of cyber confl ict from hacking to informaƟ on warfare: What 
is the law enforcement’s role?, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 2001, p. 2.
18 T. Szubrycht, Cyberterroryzm jako nowa forma zagrożenia terrorystycznego, Zeszyty 
Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej, No. 1/2005, p. 176.
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AƩ acks in cyberspace are popular mainly because the funcƟ oning of every 
highly or averagely developed country is more or less dependent on the correct 
and undisturbed use of cyberspace. Computers are more and more user-friendly 
and detailed knowledge is nor needed in order to use them for work, educaƟ on 
and recreaƟ on. Unfortunately, this also has its disadvantages. As technology be-
comes more and more advanced, fewer computer skills are needed to carry out 
cyber-aƩ acks.
So anyone who is suﬃ  ciently interested in technology could become a cyber-
terrorist. So what moƟ vates cyber-terrorists? Above all, the cost is low. It will be 
suﬃ  cient to have a computer, a modem and enough IT ability. Cyber-terrorists 
can act anonymously across borders of states. Regarding the cyber-aƩ ack, per-
cepƟ on of the threat is disrupted, since it is not obvious whether the threat is 
real, or virtual. Nor is it clear what are the capabiliƟ es, aƩ acking intenƟ ons and 
aim of the aƩ ack. Cyber-terrorists build coaliƟ ons, whose structure is impossible 
to idenƟ fy and where friends cannot be disƟ nguished from enemies.
Such aƩ acks are divided into: those enƟ rely made in cyberspace, physical 
aƩ acks on informaƟ on systems and combined aƩ acks, i.e. performed simulta-
neously in the real, and virtual world, the last of which is the most dangerous 
and damaging. A division into three groups of terrorist organizaƟ ons exploiƟ ng 
new techniques is associated with this classifi caƟ on. The author who specifi ed 
this division, American specialist A. Rathmell, disƟ nguishes one group which, for 
conducƟ ng tradiƟ onal acƟ vity, uses new technologies (e.g. uses the internet for 
transport, collecƟ on and removal of money, another group exploiƟ ng old tech-
niques, e.g. using physical force against informaƟ on systems and with group 
which makes aƩ acks in cyberspace in order to disrupt the correct funcƟ oning of 
informaƟ on.
For the eﬀ ecƟ ve prevenƟ on of cyber-aƩ acks potenƟ al risks must be idenƟ -
fi ed. These are defi ned by the Crisis Management Act as, funcƟ onally intercon-
nected systems, including equipment, devices, installaƟ ons, crucial services for 
state security and ciƟ zens and for assuring the smooth funcƟ oning of insƟ tuƟ ons 
of public authority and private enterprise.. CriƟ cal infrastructure includes: IT, 
power systems, producƟ on, storing and transport of natural gas and petroleum, 
banking and fi nancial systems, water supply, transport, health services and the 
conƟ nuous funcƟ oning of authoriƟ es and public services.
All aƩ acks using computer technologies have a few common features, allow-
ing their number to grow in the near future: 
• they are extremely diﬃ  cult to detect. Those commissioning an aƩ ack can hire 
contractors from abroad or conduct aƩ acks from an public internet café, 
• the anonymity of the top insƟ gators behind the aƩ ack,
• great striking power. The former head of the FBI Jim SeƩ le at one Ɵ me said 
“give me 10 hackers and in the sequence of 90 days I will bring this country 
[the USA] to its knees”,
• the extraordinary ease of conducƟ ng aƩ acks. Countries without great power 
can consƟ tute a considerable risk for advanced military and economic pow-
ers,
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• low costs of the undertaking. A short program downloaded from the Inter-
net for a few dollars will oŌ en be enough. According to online esƟ mates of 
experts, there are at present over 68,000 programs able to serve potenƟ al 
cyber-terrorists, 
Methods and tools used in carrying them out are the next element of consid-
ering the problem of cyber-terrorist aƩ acks. On account of the diversity of acƟ on 
methods and the diverse criteria of the descripƟ on of this phenomenon, there is 
no unambiguous ranking. The following rank among the most popular methods: 
• obtaining, thanks to carelessness of authorized persons, a password for ac-
cess to the network,
• using the system without special licenses or using providing soŌ ware from 
illegal sources, 
• destroying the mechanism used for the authorizaƟ on, 
• using the gaps in the set of rules steering the informaƟ on exchange between 
two or more independent devices or processes, 
• obtaining the informaƟ on necessary for correct acƟ on of the nets available 
only to the administrator and prevenƟ ng users from using their systems.
One should state that in cyberspace it will not be possible to categorize acƟ on 
according to one category only, oŌ en there are many categories which are inter-
mixed. Therefore P. Neuman and D. Parker oﬀ ered the following division which is 
based on accessible empirical data: 
• the inspecƟ on and theŌ  of the informaƟ on by the person from outside the 
system, 
• destroying the hard disk, 
• passing oneself oﬀ  as somebody else, 
• installing a malicious program, 
• breaking passwords, 
• falsifying data, 
• intenƟ onal mismanagement.
The most popular and the most oŌ en used tools are : viruses, worms and 
computer bacteria, logic bombs – a type of computer virus which can remain 
dormant for a long period aŌ er having infected a given computer, up unƟ l some 
peculiar event, e.g. of determined date, Trojan Horse – programs which perform 
addiƟ onal harmful acƟ viƟ es, without the knowledge and consent of the user e.g. 
removing fi les, data transfer to the author, formaƫ  ng the disc, chipping – put-
Ɵ ng in data computers of chips containing programs allowing for e.g. destroying 
the computer hardware, spam – electronic message sent out without consent 
of the addressee who is not expecƟ ng this message, back door – leaving gaps 
by authors of programs, mainly with a view to recƟ fying mistakes later; it can 
also be used for downloading and sending viruses, exchanges of fi les names etc., 
spoofi ng – pretending by aƩ acking one of the users of the system which has their 
own IP address, with a view to avoiding securiƟ es which administrators of intra-
nets can apply, scanning – sending a predetermined inquiry by the unauthorized 
person for scanning computers with a view to obtaining informaƟ on, hijacking 
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– intercepƟ ng the data transmission being held, between at least two systems, 
sniﬃ  ng – so-called “eavesdropping “, which consists of keeping up with the net-
work traﬃ  c and catching the important informaƟ on for aƩ acking, van Ecka re-
ceptors – emiƫ  ng electromagneƟ c signals with the help of electronic devices, 
which enables the hacker to view replicas of images shown on the screen of the 
aƩ acked computer on a separate monitor, thanks to DoS and Dos – aƩ acks block-
ing services by sending bulks of leƩ ers sent by post to an email account, or also 
making very many inquiries to Web servers, e-mail bombing, consisƟ ng of the 
sending of a huge number of electronic messages to the mail server, oŌ en with 
large fi les enclosed, as well as social engineering – applying psychological devices 
in order e.g. to get the password of a given network.
During the past dozen or so years we could clearly observe society’s increas-
ing dependence on computer technology. At the same Ɵ me cyberspace remains 
a mystery to most people. It is thus no surprise that cyber-terrorism evokes fear 
and anxiety among the public. From the psychological point of view this new 
form of IT-related terrorism involves two aspects that cause both raƟ onal and 
irraƟ onal fear.
The irraƟ onal aspect involves the fear of losing control of computer systems. 
Computers currently carry out many tasks that allow us to funcƟ on in today’s 
world; they carry out these tasks quicker and with beƩ er accuracy. This is why 
many people are afraid that computers might someday become our masters. Of 
course it is very diﬃ  cult to eliminate these fears with the help of raƟ onal argu-
ments. This fear is addiƟ onally intensifi ed by the myth that things which are hard 
to control can easily be intercepted or used in a way that violates the law. 
RaƟ onal fear linked with terrorist acƟ vity has also intensifi ed in the last few 
years. NaƟ ons threatened with such acts live in constant fear – not knowing the 
Ɵ me or objecƟ ve of future aƩ acks. The Ɵ me and place of a terrorist aƩ ack is 
determined by the terrorists. Fear of this form of terrorism is constantly height-
ened by the media; in their search for sensaƟ ons the media proclaim even absurd 
events as examples of cyber-terrorism. Of course society is aware of the level of 
potenƟ al danger even without the mass media, thanks to the plague of computer 
viruses, trojans, “logic bombs” and other threats. AddiƟ onally, reports featured 
on TV, the radio, in the press and online oŌ en present false evidence concerning 
the acƟ ons of cyber-terrorists. This is due to inadequate understanding of the 
core of the problem and exaggeraƟ on of the signifi cance of events. 
A basic myth involving “cyber-terrorism” is associaƟ ng all undesired extorƟ ons 
taking place in cyberspace with terrorism. We should not be associaƟ ng com-
puter hacking carried out by teenagers, creaƟ ng computer viruses, acts targeƟ ng 
databases or computer networks (despite the fact that these acƟ viƟ es may lead 
to substanƟ al fi nancial loses) with informaƟ on terrorism (cyber-terrorism).19
Currently every new virus, online aƩ ack or breaking into a computer system 
is associated with terrorism. There are various moƟ ves behind spreading such 
19 A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, M. Gawrycki, Cyberterroryzm i problemy bezpieczeństwa infor-
macyjnego we współczesnym świecie, ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2003, p. 20.
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myths, including the search for sensaƟ ons or increasing the profi ts of companies 
that manufacture security soŌ ware. 
The fact remains that prevenƟ on is the best and potenƟ ally most eﬀ ecƟ ve 
form of counteracƟ ng this form of terrorism. Currently actual terrorist aƩ acks 
in cyberspace have not been noted, nor aƩ acks uƟ lizing computer technology 
(despite the popularity and emphasis on the subject of informaƟ on terror). This 
should not, however, dull the vigilance of persons and insƟ tuƟ ons responsible for 
safety in cyberspace. 
PotenƟ al terrorist aƩ acks in cyberspace may involve an opponent’s soŌ ware 
or informaƟ on system, as well as computer hardware. There is no single and 
unambiguous classifi caƟ on system due to the diversity of methods and crite-
ria involved. InformaƟ on contained in this arƟ cle is based mainly on the book 
by A. Bógdał-Brzezińska and M. Gawrycki, enƟ tled Cyberterroryzm i problem 
bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego we współczesnym świecie (Cyber-terrorism and 
the Problem of InformaƟ on Safety in Contemporary Times).20 The chosen terms 
and classifi caƟ on methods pertaining to levels of cyberspace aƩ acks are based 
mainly on this source. 
The fi rst classifi caƟ on method is a list of seven categories of cyberspace crime, 
elaborated by W. Cheswickaand S. Bellovina.21 This classifi caƟ on helps outline 
a few basic terms which allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the essence 
of cyber-terrorism. The above menƟ oned authors enumerated the following acts 
as forms of cyberspace criminal acƟ vity:
• Stealing passwords – obtaining passwords allowing access to networks. 
• Social engineering – exploitaƟ on of the incompetence of persons with access 
to systems. 
• Bugs and backdoors – use of systems without special permission or use of 
soŌ ware obtained from illegal sources. 
• AuthenƟ caƟ on failures – destroying or impairing authenƟ caƟ on procedures. 
• Protocol failures – use of loopholes in the set of principles direcƟ ng informa-
Ɵ on fl ow between two or more independent devices or processes. 
• InformaƟ on leakage – gaining access to informaƟ on accessible only by ad-
ministrators; informaƟ on that is necessary for the network to funcƟ on prop-
erly. 
• Denial of Service – making it impossible for persons to use a system.22
F. Cohen used the above list to create his own categories, which mainly em-
phasize the results of a cyber-terrorist aƩ ack. These categories are:
• CorrupƟ on – unauthorized change of informaƟ on.
• Leakage – informaƟ on is revealed to unauthorized parƟ es.
• Denial – when a computer or network can no longer be used.23
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibidem, p. 21.
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibidem, p. 24.
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Many experts, including J. Howard and T. Longstaﬀ , emphasize that cyber-
space criminal acƟ vity cannot always be classifi ed into only one category; oŌ en 
these acts fall into several categories. 
Due to this P. Neumann and D. Parker suggest the following classifi caƟ on, 
based on available empirical data:
• External InformaƟ on TheŌ  – examinaƟ on or theŌ  of informaƟ on by persons 
from outside the system. 
• External Abuse of Resources – destrucƟ on of a hard drive. 
• Masquerading – pretending to be somebody else. 
• Pest Programs – installing malicious soŌ ware.
• Bypassing AuthenƟ caƟ on or Authority – hacking passwords.
• Authority Abuse – data falsifi caƟ on. 
• Abuse Through InacƟ on – deliberate bad management. 
• Indirect Abuse – using other systems to create malicious soŌ ware.24
The classifi caƟ on introduced by P. Neumanna and D. Parkera seems to be 
most complete, as it allows us to classify various types of acts. Yet we can clearly 
see that this is not an ideal soluƟ on. There are opinions (e.g. voiced by E. Amo-
roso) that empirical lists are incoherent and illogical. In addiƟ on, creaƟ ng long 
lists based on empirical observaƟ ons is impracƟ cal. 
C. Landwehr and A. R. Buli created so-called conceptual matrixes, based on 
the following aspects: 
• Genesis – taking advantage of security fl aws. 
• Time of IntroducƟ on – “lifespan” of computer soŌ ware and hardware. 
• LocaƟ on – locaƟ on of “loopholes” in computer soŌ ware and hardware.25
The representaƟ ve matrixes created describe the various forms of possible 
cyberspace aƩ acks quite accurately, and are useful when classifying so-called in-
dividual events (those that cannot be assigned to just one category). 
As menƟ oned above there are various types of classifi caƟ on methods. For 
pracƟ cal reasons the fi nal classifi caƟ on presented in this arƟ cle was created by 
W. Stallings. It includes:
• InterrupƟ on – occurs when a safety system has been destroyed or cannot be 
used. 
• IntercepƟ on – an unauthorized person has gained access to exisƟ ng safety 
systems.
• Modifi caƟ on – an unauthorized group has not only gained access, but has 
manipulated the safety system. 
• FabricaƟ on – an unauthorized group has introduced a false object into the 
system.26
This classifi caƟ on has its limitaƟ ons as it pertains only to aƩ acks which are 
considered a series of acƟ ons. 
24 Ibidem, p. 27.
25 Ibidem, p. 28.
26 Ibidem, p. 29.
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The above diversity of classifi caƟ on proves both the complex nature of the 
issue and the dynamics of acƟ viƟ es taking place in cyberspace. 
Americans tested the concept of informaƟ on warfare (government cyber-
terrorism) during the confl ict in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989. Yet the 
fi rst typical informaƟ on baƩ le was carried in 1991 on the Persian Gulf, during Op-
eraƟ on Desert Storm; the operaƟ on leŌ  no doubts that technology had aﬀ ected 
all aspects of the art of war – from weapon systems to command systems. During 
OperaƟ on Desert Storm the United States employed, inter alia, a computer virus 
which had infected integrated oﬃ  ce device circuits (such as printers and copy 
machines); these devices were supplied to Iraq before the confl ict. The objecƟ ve 
was to disable the Iraqi army. Precisely on the 8th of January 1991 half of Iraq’s 
monitors, copy machines and printers were deacƟ vated. 
The anƟ -Iraqi coaliƟ on then aƩ empted to quickly neutralize or destroy the 
Iraqi army’s informaƟ on and communicaƟ on systems with the use of electromag-
neƟ c weapons. AnƟ -radiaƟ on clouds were shot from helicopters and planes dur-
ing the fi rst days of OperaƟ on Desert Storm and deacƟ vated the Iraqi air defense 
system. Strips of carbon fi ber enclosed in Tomahawk and Cruise missiles were 
shot over Iraqi power plants and energy distribuƟ on plants. This caused tempo-
rary interrupƟ ons in power supply; electrical grids were turned oﬀ .27
During the fi rst war with Iraq, very important informaƟ on concerning the al-
lied forces almost got into the hands of Saddam Hussein. This was due to Dutch 
hackers who had, between April of 1990 and May of 1991, broken into 34 of the 
US Department of Defense’s computers. 
The United States analyzed the possibility of using “cyber weapons” on a very 
wide scale when preparing for the second war with Iraq. In February of 2003 
the Washington Post revealed that half a year earlier President G. W. Bush had 
issued a secret direcƟ ve containing a strategy for employing cyberspace during 
armed operaƟ ons.28 Military experts and scienƟ sts had been assigned the task of 
elaboraƟ ng a plan to paralyze, with the use of cyber-aƩ acks: computer networks, 
command systems, the energy sector and phone connecƟ ons – which could neu-
tralize a naƟ on’s vital infrastructure. “Cyber weapons”, including electromagneƟ c 
weapons, currently at the disposal of the US army, are one of the best-kept mili-
tary secrets, enshrouded in mystery. 
The fi rst internaƟ onal-scale “cyber intelligence” scandal surfaced in 1989. For 
about two years hackers from the Hamburg-based Computer Chaos Club had 
been breaking into American computers and selling informaƟ on to KGB agents. 
This informaƟ on concerned strategic defense weapons, weapons of mass de-
strucƟ on, anƟ -aircraŌ  weapons, space expediƟ ons and plans in case of various 
types of crises. All informaƟ on was strictly confi denƟ al. The German police ap-
prehended over 20 hackers on the 2nd of March 1989. Three were charged with 
espionage for the Soviet Union. 
27 A. Bilski, “Asy” cyberwojny: spektakularna akcja wojskowa w Afganistanie to zaledwie 
początek globalnego starcia z terroryzmem, Polska Zbrojna 2001, No. 47, p. 14–15.
28 A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, M.F. Gawrycki, op. cit.
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Other acts, called government cyber-terrorism, broadly covered by the me-
dia, include: 
• The war in Kosovo in 1999;
• The Indo-Pakistan confl ict during the period from1998 to 2002;
• The China-Taiwan confl ict during the period from 1999 to 2000;
• The Arab-Israeli confl ict during the period from 1999 to 2000;
• The China-American confl ict in 2001.29
The Legion of Doom, established in 1984, boasted that it had the fi nest hack-
ers. The Masters of DecepƟ on, a rivaling group, picked up the gauntlet; the groups 
competed to see who could bypass more security systems, hack the most codes 
and the most websites. Their acƟ viƟ es caused signifi cant chaos in the internet. 
The fi rst fi ve members of the Legion of Doom were arrested in 1990. Two years 
later, aŌ er the Masters of DecepƟ on had broken into – among others – AT&T, the 
Bank of America and the NaƟ onal Security Agency, fi ve members were arrested. 
The leader of the Masters of DecepƟ on spent one year in prison; the remaining 
four only six months. 
Robert Morris, a PhD student at Cornell University’s Faculty of InformaƟ on 
Technology, created a special program called the Internet Worm, and uploaded 
it on the 2nd of November 1988 in order to – as Morris himself claimed – dem-
onstrate the weaknesses of the UNIX security system. The worm mulƟ plied at 
a tremendous rate and infected over 6000 computers with an internet connec-
Ɵ on, causing losses anywhere from 15 to 100 million dollars. Morris was arrested 
and convicted.
Kevin Poulsen used his computer skills to win two Porches, 20,000 dollars and 
two vacaƟ ons to Hawaii in radio contests.30
In 1994 Vladimir Levin broke into CiƟ bank and transferred 10 million dollars 
into his bank accounts. Most of this sum was reclaimed, but 400 thousand dollars 
were never recovered.31
AuthoriƟ es proved that Kevin Mitnick had – among other things – stolen over 
20,000 credit card numbers. In 1995 he was sentenced to prison and – what may 
have been even more of a punishment – Mitnick was forbidden to use or ap-
proach informaƟ on and communicaƟ on devices unƟ l the year 2003.32
The Strono Network Group organized a protest against French nuclear pol-
icy. On the 21st of December 1995 an internet strike was carried out; the strike 
blocked the websites of several government agencies and insƟ tuƟ ons. 
Portuguese hackers, in a typical example of website hacking, modifi ed forty 
Indonesian government websites in September of 1998, publishing on them the 
slogan: “Free East Timor”. 
29 R. Szymaniuk, Cyberterroryzm – wcale nie wirtualne zagrożenie, Kwartalnik Bellona 
2009, No. 4, p. 56.
30 G. Grallet, Wojna w cyberświecie: komputerowe ataki, kontrataki, operacje sabotażu 
i cichego szpiegostwa, Forum 2008, No. 27, p. 10.
31 Ibidem, p. 11.
32 A. Suchorzewska, Ochrona prawna systemów informatycznych wobec zagrożenia cy-
berterroryzmem, Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2010, p. 394. 
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The Triad Group caused much havoc. The group managed to create a special 
program which enabled access to commercial and military informaƟ on. The Triad 
Group used it to gain access to the NASA intranet and hack the security system at 
the WesƟ nghouse atomic power plant as well as the US Nuclear Defense Agency. 
In the UK the group bypassed the security systems at the Navy’s Weapon Re-
search Center. They also gained access to detailed informaƟ on concerning a top-
secret research program on using computers to control Cruise missiles. 
In February of 1998 a hacker from Israel, Ehud Tenennaum (21), aka the Ana-
lyzer, broke into MIT and the Pentagon’s computers, with the help of two teenag-
ers from California. 
The same year a teenaged hacker impaired the Worcester, MassachuseƩ s air-
port communicaƟ on system. His aƩ ack caused a six hour break in communicaƟ on 
between airplanes and the control tower. Thankfully there were no accidents 
during this Ɵ me, and no one was harmed. 
Radical right-wing groups, the Islamic Hamas, Jihad and the PalesƟ ne Lib-
eraƟ on OrganizaƟ on are no longer conglomerated in one region – the Arabian 
Peninsula. Members of these organizaƟ ons can be found in many parts of the 
world. The internet makes it possible for others to contact them, unite and call 
to baƩ le. Hamas currently has a well-developed informaƟ on and communicaƟ on 
network in the United States and Great Britain, used to gather informaƟ on con-
cerning potenƟ al targets and to plan and coordinate terrorist aƩ acks. There are 
many such examples. In 1995 Abdu-al-Rahmana Zaydana, a member and acƟ vist 
of Hamas, was arrested. His computer contained data on other members of the 
organizaƟ on. He contacted them via email. In December of 1999 fi Ō een Jorda-
nian terrorists linked with Osama bin Laden were apprehended. They were in 
possession of hard drives containing data on construcƟ ng bombs and Al-Qaeda’s 
training camps in Afghanistan. In June of 2000 a well-equipped computer center 
was found in Hezbollah’s headquarters. It is evident that terrorist organizaƟ ons 
are aware of technology’s potenƟ al and fully uƟ lize this potenƟ al.
Websites created by LaƟ n American parƟ sans are professionally executed 
and designed to bring maximum propaganda success. These websites feature all 
informaƟ on necessary to become acquainted with the organizaƟ ons’ ideology 
and the aims of specifi c groups – in several language versions.33
There are two kinds of websites created by Islamic groups. The fi rst kind is ad-
dressed to the general populaƟ on. These websites are wriƩ en mainly in English 
– for example Hezbollah’s website. Islamists are so eﬃ  cient at using the internet 
as a means of propaganda that there is talk of disƟ ncƟ ve Muslim informaƟ on 
agencies. The second kind of website contains informaƟ on in Arabic only and is 
addressed solely to members and sympathizers who are fl uent in the language. 
These websites are created mainly to enable communicaƟ on between members 
and supporters of a given organizaƟ on.
Hamas is one of the most eﬃ  cient groups at uƟ lizing new informaƟ on and 
communicaƟ on technology. Sources indicate that the group uses advanced 
33 G. Grallet, op. cit., p. 12.
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methods of informaƟ on transfer, including instrucƟ ons, maps, orders, codes and 
even the details of planned acƟ ons. Hamas acƟ vists from the United States great-
ly rely on online chat sites to coordinate plans. Sources also indicate that email 
has been used to synchronize acƟ viƟ es in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. 
AŌ er the arrest of PalesƟ nian Abu Zubaydaha, believed to be Al-Qaeda’s op-
eraƟ onal oﬃ  cer, in March of 2002, the police found proof that the internet was 
probably used to coordinate terrorist aƩ acks. In his home in Peshawar a comput-
er was found containing 2300 encrypted messages and fi les downloaded from 
Islamic websites. The informaƟ on had been circulaƟ ng from May of 2000 to the 
9th of September 2001. A peak of informaƟ on exchange had taken place in August 
of 2001, a month before the aƩ ack on the 11th of September.34
In January of 2002 evidence was found on a computer belonging to a member 
of Al-Qaeda in Kabul that the organizaƟ on is interested in aƩ acking digital control 
systems. The laptop contained fi les with diagrams of an American water dam and 
soŌ ware that simulated the catastrophic results of its destrucƟ on. The laptop 
also contained many internet tools which would enable a cyber-aƩ ack. Destroy-
ing the dam using convenƟ onal means would have required tons of explosives; 
an act of cyber-terrorism is much easier to carry out. 
RealisƟ cally, for the Polish state, the most likely form of cyber-aƩ ack may be 
aimed at the civil ICT systems. The security level of these systems is lower than of 
military teleinformaƟ on and teleinformaƟ c systems. Moreover in contrast with 
ICT systems used in the Ministry of Defence (e.g. of Miles – WAN, SEC – WAN), 
civil systems are not physically separated from other public systems which to 
a considerable degree facilitates access to them. A penetraƟ on of unsecured oﬃ  -
cial informaƟ on servers is an only threat concerning military systems, e.g. formal 
websites of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces. For the example, twice 
in 2007, the website of Ministry of Defence (specifi cally, the server of its Opera-
Ɵ on Command and Staﬀ  Department) was aƩ acked.
In Poland, the following ICT and teleinformaƟ on systems are parƟ cularly vul-
nerable to cyber-aƩ acks:
• air traﬃ  c control systems (civilian airports); 
• Shipping surveillance systems (VTS Gdynia, VTS Gdańsk and VTS Szczecin-Świ-
noujście); 
• civil and military communicaƟ on systems (teleinformaƟ c, teleinformaƟ on 
and satellite); 
• ICT systems using commercial transmission lines (especially databases of per-
sonal details); 
• emergency services noƟ fi caƟ on systems; 
• ICT systems used in the banking and fi nance sector.
With a view to the eﬀ ecƟ ve counteracƟ ng of cyberterrorist threats, as well 
as assuring an adequate level of teleinformaƟ c state safety, on 1 February 2008, 
a Government Team of ReacƟ ng to Computer Incidents (RZRnIK) – CERT GOV 
PL was appointed in The Internal Security Agency. The aim of CERT GOV PL is to 
34 Ibidem, p. 14–17.
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assure the teleinformaƟ c safety of organizaƟ onal units of the Republic of Poland. 
The main objecƟ ves and targets of RZRnIK include the following:
• reaƟ ng a security policy for protecƟ on against cyber-threats; coordinaƟ on of 
the fl ow of informaƟ on between enƟ Ɵ es in relaƟ on to cyber-threats; 
• detecƟ ng, recognizing and counteracƟ ng cyber-threats; 
• internaƟ onal cyberspace cooperaƟ on for the purpose of protecƟ on; 
• Heading cyberspace protecƟ on for all naƟ onal insƟ tuƟ ons, organizaƟ ons and 
departmental enƟ Ɵ es; 
• collecƟ ng the knowledge concerning the state of the safety and threats to 
IKP; 
• reacƟ ng to incidents of threats to teleinformaƟ c safety taking into account 
special IKP; 
• analysis aŌ er burglary using computer science invesƟ gaƟ on tools; 
• creaƟ ng the poliƟ cs of the cyberspace protecƟ on of the Republic of Poland; 
• training and informaƟ on; 
• cyber-safety consultancy and the consulƟ ng.
One should note that CERT GOV PL closely cooperate with the government 
and non-government insƟ tuƟ ons such as: 
• The Military Oﬃ  ce of Safety of Contact and Computer Sciences; 
• NASK CERT PL; 
• The Ministry of Interior and AdministraƟ on (IKP); 
• The Police (within the scope of cybercrime).
A similar team is being created in the organizaƟ onal structures of Ministry 
of NaƟ onal Defense which aims to create a teleinformaƟ c security policy in ICT 
systems of the department. It is worth noƟ ng, that work for the establishing of 
a system for reacƟ ng to Computer Incidents (SRnIK) was begun in 2002 and is sƟ ll 
in progress. The aim of SRnIK is to funcƟ on in a three-level organizaƟ onal struc-
ture (the incident room, Centre of Technical Reinforcements and Administrators 
of the systems and teleinformaƟ c networks), which should provide the Ministry 
of Defence with the possibility to react eﬀ ecƟ vely to threats to the teleinformaƟ c 
safety of its cyberneƟ c infrastructure. At present the following organizaƟ onal 
units are included in the structure:
– The incident room – SafeƟ es funcƟ oning in the Military Oﬃ  ce of Contact and 
Computer Sciences; 
– Centre of Technical Reinforcements – Managements funcƟ oning in the center 
with ICT systems. 
Also created was the “Government conservaƟ on program of the cyberspace 
Republic of Poland for years 2009–2011”, coordinated by the Ministry of Inter-
nal Aﬀ airs and AdministraƟ on, which is responsible for the compleƟ on of the 
program, and involving the Minister of Internal aﬀ airs and AdministraƟ on, the 
Minister of NaƟ onal Defense, the Head of the Internal Security Agency, the Head 
of the e-Military Counter-Intelligence Service and other bodies of public author-
ity according to the appropriateness of acƟ on.
Raising the security level of the state cyberspace is a strategic objecƟ ve 
of the Program. Reaching the strategic objecƟ ve requires the creaƟ on of an 
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organizaƟ onal and legal framework and a system of eﬀ ecƟ ve coordinaƟ on and 
informaƟ on exchange between departments of the civil service and with other 
subjects whose databases consƟ tute the criƟ cal IT infrastructure of the country, 
in the event of terrorist aƩ acks using public IT networks. The list of detailed aims 
of the program is as follows: 
a) increasing the security level of the criƟ cal IT infrastructure and hence improv-
ing the level of the state resistance to cyberterrorist aƩ acks, 
b) the creaƟ on and the cohesive realizaƟ on of bodies for the enƟ re the civil ser-
vice and other insƟ tuƟ ons which together make up the criƟ cal IT infrastruc-
ture of the poliƟ cal safety of cyberspace,
c) reducing the eﬀ ects of cyber-terrorist aƩ acks, and hence the cost of dealing 
with their results, 
d) creaƟ ng a long-lasƟ ng system for coordinaƟ on and informaƟ on exchange 
between public and private organizaƟ ons for assuring cyberspace safety 
and with government bodies consƟ tuƟ ng the criƟ cal IT infrastructure of the 
state, 
e) increasing competence in relaƟ on to cyberspace safety of organizaƟ ons in-
volved in the protecƟ on of the criƟ cal IT infrastructure as well as other sys-
tems and networks of the civil service,
f) increasing the awareness of users (including ordinary ciƟ zens) of IT networks 
and security systems available electronically. 
The aims of the program will be realized through: 
a) establishment of a system for coordinated protecƟ on against and reacƟ on 
to threats and aƩ acks on the cyberspace of the state, including aƩ acks of a 
cyber-terrorist nature, and through other organizaƟ onal and legal acƟ on, 
b) universal implementaƟ on amongst individuals of administraƟ on mechanisms 
for the prevenƟ on and early detecƟ on of IT threats and through other techni-
cal acƟ on, 
c) general and specialist educaƟ on within the scope of IT safety.
Fear linked with informaƟ on technology is becoming a popular phenomenon, 
yet appears to be exaggerated. Despite the fact that aƩ acks on focal elements 
of a naƟ on’s informaƟ on infrastructure are becoming more and more common, 
these aƩ acks are not as yet carried out by terrorists. The damage they cause is 
not substanƟ al enough to be qualifi ed as informaƟ on terrorism. Although fear 
of the phenomenon is exaggerated, these aƩ acks cannot be ignored or disre-
garded. 
CounteracƟ ng informaƟ on terror has become not only an important poliƟ cal 
challenge, but has also – or perhaps most of all – become an economic problem. 
Subsequent to the terrorist aƩ acks of September 2001 the American federal au-
thoriƟ es have spent almost 4.5 billion dollars on securing exisƟ ng informaƟ on 
systems. 
Paradoxically, success in counteracƟ ng convenƟ onal terrorism may cause ter-
rorists to direct their aƩ enƟ on towards new methods of spreading fear, e.g. cy-
ber-terrorism. Cyber-terrorism may become popular for the following reasons:
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• Acts of cyber-terrorism require less funding than acts of convenƟ onal terror-
ism. All that is really needed is a computer and an internet connecƟ on. There 
is no need to purchase or gain access to weapons and explosives. Instead of 
missiles, viruses, worms and Trojan horses are created and sent to chosen tar-
gets. It is even more eﬀ ecƟ ve, though also more diﬃ  cult, to infi ltrate a system 
and induce desired acƟ ons; this could be much more desirable than acts of 
convenƟ onal terrorism. 
• Acts of cyber-terrorism are more anonymous than acts of convenƟ onal terror-
ism. Just like the mulƟ tude of internet users, terrorism can use pseudonyms 
or the anonymous user opƟ on which will make it very diﬃ  cult or even impos-
sible to establish a terrorist’s true name. There are no physical control barriers 
in cyberspace; no borders, border patrols or customs oﬃ  cers who need to be 
outwiƩ ed. 
• The potenƟ al number of vicƟ ms of an act of cyber-terrorism is very large. 
Terrorists may aƩ ack government computers or computer networks, corpo-
rate networks or those used by private individuals. The probability of fi nding 
a weak link in the security system is thus relaƟ vely large. Of course the ter-
rorist must fi nd a target that is inadequately protected. Yet experience shows 
that the probability of such an aƩ ack is not small. 
• Cyber-terrorism requires less physical training and not as much logisƟ c prepa-
raƟ on. In addiƟ on, it is a staƟ onary acƟ vity and does not require travelling. 
The lives and safety of terrorists carrying out acts of cyber-terrorism are not 
at risk; it is thus much easier to recruit potenƟ al terrorists and convince them 
to act. 
• Past informaƟ on crimes show just how many people can be aﬀ ected by the 
consequences of cyber-terrorism; this is due to the global nature of informa-
Ɵ on. Thus one of the main aims of terrorists – gaining the aƩ enƟ on of the 
media – is met or even exceeded.
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